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ABSTRACT (English) 
In 2016 and 2017 Europe and North America witnessed the coming out of a rumoured 
backlash against the liberal democratic internationalist post-WWII world order. This led to 
and intensified a resurgence of populist-nationalist politics that manifested through an array 
of consecutive presidential and national elections that took place in some of the world’s most 
prominent liberal democracies, namely the USA, Holland, France and Germany. As such, 
each instance represents a unique set of circumstances and contexts that influenced their 
internal political climates; however, a shared hegemonic positioning within the global order, 
along with a history of multilateral relationships, makes the consequences of these 
(2016/2017) populist-nationalist electoral results far-reaching and inherently global.  
The populist-nationalist rhetoric of the 21st century remains closely aligned with notions of 
exclusionary and respectability politics, and the majority of marginalised communities 
remain resistant to this. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics have demonstrated new 
global political outcomes. With a specific focus on LGBTQ politics, this study notes that the 
rise of populist-nationalism in historically mature liberal democracies in Europe and North 
America poses a significant threat to the broader LGBTQ community across the globe. Rights 
advancement remains low (if present at all) on the domestic and foreign agendas of (right-
wing) political entities. This study is particularly interested in the increasing public support 
for populist-nationalist groups coming from segments of the LGBTQ community itself. As 
such, it argues that in contrast to previous decades, the 21st century is presenting a new type 
of LGBTQ politics. 
Through employing the lenses of Queer IR, Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of 
statecraft” and Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism, this study seeks to expose what it 
calls “queer collusions” by understanding what seems to be an unconventional and 
counterintuitive political phenomenon. Through bringing these theories and concepts into 
conversation, this study conceptualises what it calls a “political and historical shift in 
European and North American LGBTQ politics,” that is, from Homonationalism (post-9/11) 
to Homopopulism (post-Orlando/ISIS). The theorisation of Homopopulism thus assists in 
understanding the dynamics associated with this shift, particularly the inclusion of the politics 
of fear against the backdrop of a declining (neo)liberal world order.  
Homopopulism therefore reveals the queer logics of populism, the fearful queer sovereign 
subjects that authorise it, and the fear-based sovereign leaders who deploy it. 
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ABSTRACT (isiXhosa) 
Ngo-2016 nango-2017, iYurophu noMntla Melika zangqina ukuphuma kwamarhe 
embuyekezo achasane ne-Liberal Democratic-Internationalist emva kommiselo wehlabathi 
weMfazwe yesiBini (WWII). Oku kwenze iziphumo  nemivuka yendumo-zwe zepolitiki 
eyathi yabonakaliswa kwintlaninge yonyulo jikelele elandelelanayo yamazwe 
neyeenkulumbuso eyathatyathwa kwezinye zezizwe ezihlonitshiweyo zeNkululeko 
yeDemokrasi, ezinjenge- US, iFransi neJamani. Kungoko ke, isehlo ngasinye sahlukile 
ngemeko nangesimo-ntlalo esiphembelela isimo sezepolitiki, nangona, ubunkokheli 
obabelanayo kwezezwe lonke kunye nembali yamacala amaninzi obudlelwane enza iziphumo 
(2016/2017) zohlaselo ezingalindelekanga zonyulo  yendumo-zwe zingafikeleleki kwaye 
zayanyaniswe kwihlabathi jikelele. 
Ubuciko bendumo-zwe yenkulungwane yama-21 ihleli isondele izayamanise nembono 
yezopolitiki yokwahlula neyokuhlonela kwaye noninzi loluntu olukumda wentlupheko 
ongagqithekiyo luhleli lungagungi. Kodwa ke, inthsukumo yomhlaba yezopolitiki ibonakalise 
iziphumo ezintsha kwezopolitiki lwehlabathi jikelele. Kujoliswe ngokukodwa kwezopolitiki 
ze- LGBTQ, esi sifundo siqaphela ukuba ukukhula kwendumo-zwe kwimbali kukhulise 
iiNkululeko zeDemokrasi eYurophu naseMntla Melika kwenza isisongelo esibalulekileyo 
kuluntu lwe-LGBTQ ngokubanzi kwihlabathi jikelele. Ukuphuhliswa kwamalungelo 
kusahleli kusezantsi kwezekhaya nakwezangaphandla ii-agenda ezinxulunyaniswa nemibutho 
yezopolitiki yasekunene. Esi sifundo sibonakalisa umdla ekwandeni kwenkxaso yoluntu 
yamaqela endumo-zwe avela kwizintsu ze-LGBTQ ubuqu. Kungoko ke, sixoxa 
ngokuchasene nezimvo zeshumi leminyaka edlulileyo, inkulungwane yama-21 idandalazisa 
uhlobo olutsha lwezepolitiki lwe-LGBTQ. 
Ngokusebenzisa imbono ka-Queer IR, Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft” 
no-Jasbir Paur’s (2007b) Homonationalism, esi sifundo sefuna ukudandalazisa oko ikubiza 
ngokuba yi-“queer collusions”  ngokuqonda imeko yezopoitiki ekhangeleka ngathi 
ayiqhelekanga nechasaneyo nokuqonda izinto ngokuziva (intuitive). Ngokudibanisa 
ezithiyori zingentla nesigama kwincoko, esisifundo sivelisa isigama esibizwa ngokuba yi- 
“lutshintsho kwezopolitiki nembali lwe- LGBTQ e-Yurophu naseMntla Melika” okuthi, 
ukususela kwi- Homonationalism (emva ko-9/11) ukuya ku- Homopopulism (emva kwe- 
Orlando/ISIS). Ukubhalwa kwethiyori ye-Homopopulism kuncedisa ekuqondeni 
ubucukubhede obunxulanyaniswe notshintsho, ingakumbi ukufakwa kwepolitiki zoloyiko 
(fear-politics) omva kokuhla (neo) kommiselo komgaqo wehlabathi. 
I -Homopopulism ke ngoko ityhila ingqiqo engaqhelekanga yendumo, abalawuli aboyikekayo 
abanika imvume yoko, neenkokheli ezisekelwe-kuloyiko ezilumiselayo. 
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Interview Questions  
The following questions were used to guide the semi-structured interviews with the study’s 
key informants: 
1. Do you believe that the majority of members of the LGBTQ community are 
inherently progressive when it comes to their political stances? Particularly on issues 
of immigration, security and war.  
2. Do you think LGBTQ rights advancement is an overwhelming priority for LGBTQ 
politics? 
3. Do you think that mature Liberal Democracies have achieved significant inroads 
when it comes to LGBTQ rights advancement and equal citizenship?  
4. Do you think that LGBTQ identity is an important factor when it comes to LGBTQ 
political behaviour? 
5. Do you think that events such as the Orlando massacre have impacted LGBTQ views 
on immigration, security and war?  
6. Do you think that immigration, globalisation and regional integration have advanced 
or regressed LGBTQ quality of life?  
7. Do you think that more LGBTQ individuals are supporting populist-nationalist 
political parties and candidates in Europe and the US?  
8. If so, why do you think this is the case?  
9. Do you think that there is a fundamental shift in LGBTQ political prioritisation, 
specifically from rights advancement to security in Europe and North America? 
10. Do you think Homonationalism (Puar, 2007b) is sufficient in explaining such 
phenomenon?  
11. Do you think that populism and the politics of fear are used to entice and intimidate 
LGBTQ voters?  
12. Do you think that more LGBTQ individuals will support populist-nationalist policies 
in the future, even if they do not condone LGBTQ rights advancement? 
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identifying as Transmasculine. Dr Coleman Chavez is an Assistant Professor in the Women’s 
and Gender Studies Department at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Their 
expertise is in the fields of gender and sexuality; decolonial thought and praxis; queer theory; 
transnational LGBTQ thought; trans studies; performance studies; oral history; local-global 
race relations and feminism.  
Doctor Fransch, Chet. Interview conducted on 24 July 2018. Dr Fransch is a lecturer in the 
History Department at Stellenbosch University. His expertise is in the fields of sexual 
violence, race, and the histories of homosexuality. 
Adjunct Associate Professor Judge, Melanie. Interview conducted on 2 July 2018. Prof. 
Judge is an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Law Faculty at the University of Cape Town 
and a long-time queer activist and scholar. She is an expert on policy and law reform around 
gender and sexuality rights, particularly in regard to homophobia-related violence, identity, 
politics and social justice. She recently published the book Blackwashing Homophobia: 
Violence and the Politics of Sexuality, Gender and Race (Routledge, 2018).  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction & Rationale 
Background 
In 2016 and 2017 Europe and North America witnessed the coming out of a rumoured “shift” 
in the liberal democratic internationalist post-WWII world order. This manifested in an array 
of consecutive presidential and national elections that took place in some of the world’s most 
prominent liberal democracies in these two years, namely the USA, Holland, France and 
Germany. As such, each instance represented a unique set of circumstances and contexts that 
influenced their internal political climates; however, a shared hegemonic positioning within 
the global order along with a history of multilateral relationships, made the consequences of 
such electoral outcomes far-reaching and inherently global. Such dynamics, along with 
similar geopolitical foundations and the shared implications of prominent global events, 
including 9/11, the global financial crisis, and the EU migration crisis, have led to a popular 
backlash, both in rhetoric and action, against the liberal democratic internationalist status quo 
that emerged after WWII. The consequential rise of populist-nationalist movements 
throughout Europe and North America have manifested into significant electoral inroads and 
resulted in victories that have had, and could continue to have, radical implications for the 
globe and broader societal relations in predominantly liberal democratic and global 
dispensations (Broning, 2016). In her interview Judge (2018) states the following in this 
regard: 
We have seen an erosion of the radical potential of democracy in the global North. A 
corrosion of a post-WWII consensus that ushered in more radical possibilities both in terms of 
social relationships but also in terms of economic relationships (Interview, Melanie Judge, 
02/07/2018). 
The very nature of populist-nationalist ideology embodies the politics of fear and intolerance, 
and in this context an ever-growing backlash against what is perceived as political 
correctness and an increasingly “soft” and “weak” (feminine, homosexual) Western nation-
state (Weber, 1999). The millennial (21st century) nation-state is thus framed as an 
embodiment of global values that seek to disrupt and erase traditional and historical national 
identities, more specifically through the promotion of multiculturalism, internationalism and 
tolerance. Prominent global events that resulted in widespread violence and suffering are 
therefore pinned, rationally and irrationally, on an ever increasing perceived inability of the 
Western nation-state to maintain control of its sovereignty in the midst of rapid globalisation.  
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The war on terror, a policy adopted by the USA and Europe following a series of “on-soil” 
terrorist attacks after 9/11, saw the first radical shift in domestic and international approaches 
in Europe and North America. Interventions in the Middle East, accompanied by heightened 
surveillance and incarceration, ignited the first 21st century debate on human rights and 
security in an age of advanced biometric technology and drone warfare (Monaco, 2017). The 
2007/2008 global financial crisis acted as a further catalyst for the advancement of anti-
globalisation rhetoric, as integrated economies that were established under widely supported 
multilateral agreements resulted in amplified and widespread financial implications for states 
that had little to do with the source of the crisis (Edey, 2009). The Arab Spring in 2011 
created instability and numerous power vacuums throughout the Middle East, opening up 
space for radical groups to operate with little regulation. In 2013 one such group, ISIS, 
became the first radical Islamic organisation to establish control over a vast territory, utilising 
social media to recruit and instigate attacks on Western nations and associated liberal 
democratic values.  
Two years later in 2015, during a protracted civil war in Syria, Europe was struck by a mass 
migration crisis, a pivotal moment where Europe was forced either to maintain its historically 
liberal democratic internationalist ideology or revert to closing its borders in the name of 
protecting its economies and broader national identity. Whilst some European nations such as 
Germany allowed refugees to enter the country, many EU member states, such as Hungary, 
resisted in the name of security. This was a result of both top-down and bottom-up resistance, 
as a growing consensus amongst citizens in Europe was that an influx of refugees would 
harbour terrorism, put a strain on their economies and erode their national identities. The 
implications of this, further exacerbated by the Paris and Orlando attacks in 2016, were an 
increase in support for re/established populist-nationalist political entities, and a marked shift 
amongst established political groups towards populist-nationalist rhetoric as a means to 
maintain electoral support (Roth, 2017).  
In 2016 the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the USA 
elected Donald Trump as President. Both these events acted as an electoral outlet for the 
people of Europe and North America, as they represented a “resistance vote” to established 
liberal democratic internationalist norms. In France, Holland and Germany populist-
nationalist political parties were followed closely by the media; Marine Le Pen, Geert 
Wilders and the newly established Alternative for Germany (AFD) aligned themselves with 
the new “resistance” to the socio-economic and political establishment, offering radical 
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reforms in the areas of immigration, security, multilateralism and the economy, on the basis 
of protecting national identity and interests. Although none of these “resistance clubs” 
achieved an all-out electoral victory in their respective political races, significant electoral 
gains occurred, positioning these entities at the heart of decision-making centres throughout 
Europe and North America (Broning, 2016).  
The implications of such phenomena raise questions about the roles and positioning of 
various interest groups and minorities residing in these regions. Non-citizens and immigrants 
remain the ultimate target of both state and non-state sponsored violence. However, women, 
LGBTQ groups and people of colour have found themselves closely associated with the 
perceived breakdown in traditional values, and as active proponents of multiculturalism and 
liberal democratic internationalism. Judge (2018) states the following in this regard: 
If you look at emerging neo-Fascist and reactionary political leadership, a key characteristic is 
their homophobia, their transphobia and their misogyny. The racism and the misogyny and 
the homophobia congeal and come together, so you cannot think of these systems of power 
apart from one another (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). 
With specific reference to gender and sexual dynamics, the historical rhetoric of populist-
nationalist groups has positioned women in traditional roles, occupying the private space with 
domestic and reproductive imperatives. LGBTQ individuals were framed as unnatural and 
opponents of a broader desire to preserve morality and family values. As a result, over the 
past four decades a majority of women and LGBTQ individuals have traditionally resisted 
this discourse as a (for the most part) united, progressive force striving for equal rights. The 
populist-nationalist rhetoric of the 21st century remains closely aligned with the notions of 
respectability politics, and the majority of women and LGBTQ individuals remain resistant to 
this trend. However, the shifting geopolitical dynamics in Europe and North America, 
exemplified by the abovementioned global events, have had specific implications for women 
and the LGBTQ community.  
With a specific focus on the LGBTQ community and the politics of queerness, the 
advancement of rights in historically mature liberal democracies has been significant over the 
past ten years. Legal/state recognition of same-sex couples, marriage equality, anti-
discrimination and work place protection now form the basis of much US and European state 
legislation in this regard (Drucker, 2016).  Public opinion of homosexuality and trans* issues 
have also shifted dramatically: a Pew Research Centre “Global Trends & Attitudes” Poll in 
2013 indicated a broad acceptance of homosexuality across Europe and North America, with 
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“greater acceptance in more secular and affluent countries” (Pew Research Center, 2013). 
Furthermore, two liberal democratic nations (Ireland and Australia) made history by voting 
overwhelmingly in favour of marriage equality by means of a public referendum. The famous 
2011 Human Rights Day speech by Hillary Clinton in her capacity as Secretary of State also 
saw LGBTQ issues thrust into the global arena and insert itself into the foreign policy 
objectives of many liberal democratic states, particularly under the umbrella of human rights 
(Altman & Symons, 2016). 
Such phenomena have resulted in the hardening of the boundaries between Western and non-
Western states, exemplified through the parameters of modernity. The West has positioned 
itself as a vanguard for global LGBTQ rights advancement against the backdrop of hostile 
resistance to LGBTQ issues in many non-Western countries, and more specifically non-
secular Arab and African nations. Within the context of growing populist-nationalist 
sentiment in Europe and North America, along with an associated resentment of non-Western 
“values,” the global divide between pro-LGBTQ and anti-LGBTQ has begun to play itself 
out within international and domestic spheres. This has been further exacerbated by targeted 
attacks on the LGBTQ community by radical Islamic groups over the past five years, with 
significant attention being drawn to the Orlando club shooting in 2016 and the widely 
propagated public executions of homosexuals by ISIS (Wilson, 2016). This is further 
substantiated by Bouchard (2018) in her interview: “[The] Orlando [massacre] has been 
mobilised in that [populist-nationalist] way. LGBTQ rights in the US are becoming conjoined 
with securitisation and militarisation” (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 29/06/2018). 
This “us vs them” narrative has been successfully adopted by a number of politicians, 
surprisingly by many within the populist-nationalist camp. Although many remain resistant to 
marriage equality, as this resonates with their traditional and conservative support base, 
Marine Le Penn, Geert Wilders, Donald Trump and the AFD actively campaigned in favour 
of protecting the LGBTQ community against “violent foreign ideologies” that seek to erode 
American and European (Western) values of tolerance and human rights (Feder et al., 2017). 
As a result, such sentiments have begun to resonate with members of the LGBTQ community 
residing in these regions, particularly within the context of a growing status of equal citizenry 
(rights advancement), material access and consumerism. Reported cases of homophobic and 
transphobic violence being perpetrated by non-citizens (immigrants), particularly of Arab and 
African descent (Shubert et al., 2017), may have amplified a possible re-alignment of 
LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America, with activist sentiments demonstrating the 
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potential moving away from historical solidarity and coalition-building, to prioritising 
security through national and cultural regulation (Rogers, 2017).  
There is indeed an assumption that LGBTQ individuals are inherently progressive, an 
assumption based on broader historical and traditional sentiments. From the 1970s to the 
early 2000s the visibility of the LGBTQ community within social justice and progressive 
circles was overwhelmingly evident, particularly at the height of HIV/AIDS and equal rights 
activism. This can be supported by statistical and electoral outlets; however, recent data 
expose a number of developing trends in this regard. In February 2017 a poll conducted 
through the gay social networking application “Hornet” surveyed approximately 3,200 users 
prior to the first round of the 2017 French elections. This sample of predominately gay men 
of average age of 26 provides an informed perspective on a number of areas that fall within 
the parameters of this subject matter (Martet, 2017). 
The first finding was that gay men are mobilised and active politically, with 92% of the 
participants stating that they intended to vote in both rounds of the election. The second 
finding was that gay men are indeed shifting their ideological allegiances from traditionally 
voting for left-aligned groups (33.2% of the respondents indicated that they voted for 
Socialist Party candidate Francois Hollande in 2012) to centre and right-aligned groups; 
13.3% of the respondents indicated that they voted for anti-equal rights candidate Marine Le 
Penn in 2012, with 19.3% (one in five) respondents indicating that they intended to vote for 
her in 2017 – a 6% growth in five years. In line with national trends, centrist candidate 
Emmanuel Macron garnered 38.1% support from the respondents. The third relevant finding 
was that, when asked to rank important issues that need addressing in French society 
(participants were given 8 options), Work (77%), Education (49.6%) and Security (45.1%) 
overwhelmingly occupied the first three positions. LGBTQ rights (36%) ranked in fifth 
position, whilst HIV/AIDS support received the lowest ranking at approximately 8.1% 
(Martet, 2017). 
Whilst fully acknowledging the contextual dynamics of this poll, particularly that it 
exclusively surveys gay men living in France, it does point to a growing trend in historically 
mature liberal democracies. This is particularly relevant when noting Coleman Chavez’s 
(2018) interview statement that: “No, [LGBTQ people are] definitely not inherently 
progressive, or radical anymore. Nowadays thinking critically about anything is against the 
nation” (Interview, Daniel Coleman Chavez, 19/07/2018).  
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Such behaviour has been problematised in various academic and activist circles, particularly 
through the lenses of Homonationalism as conceptualised by Jasbir Puar in 2007 (Puar, 
2007b, 2017) and Queer IR (Weber, 2016a, 2016b). Although theorised extensively over the 
past decade, rapidly increasing LGBTQ (public) support (including candidate and campaign 
participation) for populist-nationalist entities and a subsequent decline in support for liberal 
democratic internationalist values in Europe and North America as demonstrated in the most 
recent national elections requires further exploration. 
Problem Statement 
LGBTQ politics have occupied a prominent space in Europe and North America over the past 
four decades, with significant policy inroads being made in the areas of rights advancement 
and equal citizenship (decriminalisation, marriage equality, anti-discrimination). In recent 
years (after 2011) this has become an extension of the liberal democratic nation-state in the 
global arena (LGBT rights as human rights), often hardening the boundaries between East 
and West, North and South through contested approaches. At the receiving end, many 
members of the LGBTQ community live under the threat of violence from both state and 
non-state actors across the globe. As such, there is still a significant amount of work to be 
done in order to extend equal citizenship and protection to millions of LGBTQ individuals 
around the world. Many liberal democratic nation-states have indeed played a central role in 
driving LGBTQ issues domestically and globally, predominantly because of the prominence 
of (permitted) political activism from LGBTQ communities (and Allies) residing in these 
regions. 
The rise of populist-nationalism in historically mature liberal democracies in Europe and 
North America poses a significant threat to the broader LGBTQ community across the globe, 
as rights advancement remains low (if present at all) on the domestic and foreign agendas of 
associated (right-wing) political entities. What is particularly interesting is the increasing 
public support for populist-nationalist groups coming from segments of the LGBTQ 
community, specifically (white) gay men and lesbian women. In contrast to previous decades, 
the 21st century may be presenting a new type of LGBTQ politics, one that no longer 
considers sexual and gender identity, and solidarity activism, as guiding components for 
political behaviour. Notions of queer political and historical shifts have been problematised 
by queer theorist Jasbir Puar (2007b) in her book: Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism 
in Queer Times, and through subsequent academic explorations. Puar’s (2007b) 
conceptualisation of Homonationalism attempts to expose a possible “facet of modernity and 
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a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of 
protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship 
between the state, capitalism, and sexuality” (Puar, 2013b: 337). This offers a unique lens by 
means of which to understand 21st century LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America.  
The problem now is that there is an ostensibly successful populist-nationalist backlash against 
the established liberal order in Europe and North America. Subsequently, there are increasing 
numbers of LGBTQ individuals in Europe and North America who are publicly supporting 
populist-nationalist political entities. Moreover, many of these predominantly anti-LGBTQ 
entities are employing strategies to further increase support from gay and lesbian voters.  As 
such, the aim of this study is to understand why and to what extent this seemingly 
counterintuitive phenomenon is taking place, and whether such a phenomenon indicates a 
paramount shift in LGBTQ politics. Furthermore, through applying the lenses of Queer IR 
and Homonationalism, this study seeks to explore whether Puar’s (2007b) concepts require 
further theorisation within the context of what Campani & Lazaridis (2017) call a “populist 
shift.”   
Puar’s (2007b, 2017) conceptualisations of Homonationalism in conjunction with Weber’s 
(2016a, 2016b) theorisations and applications of the “queer logics of statecraft” and fearful 
sovereignty and patriotism, will be applied to assist in solving this problem.  
Research Questions 
The study is guided by one primary and three secondary research questions. 
Is there an LGBTQ political shift taking place in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence 
in Europe and North America?  
The three secondary questions are as follows: 
1. Does this potential shift entail a move towards a (populist) fear-based prioritisation of 
security interests over (liberal) LGBTQ rights advancement?  
2. Does Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism have the theoretical scope to identify, 
describe and explain queer politics in the context of this potential shift?   
3. Does Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft” assist in identifying, 
describing and explaining the collusions and/or resistances that may form from this 
potential shift?   
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Theoretical Approaches 
In order to solve the research problem and answer the research questions, this study will 
employ the lenses of Queer International Relations (IR) Theory. More specifically, it will 
explore Jasbir Puar’s (2007b; 2017) theorisation of Homonationalism in Terrorist 
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007b) and Homonationalism in Trump 
Times (2017). It will further utilise the work of Cynthia Weber (2016a; 2016b) and her 
theorisation of “queer logics of statecraft” (2016) as well as her Queer IR analysis in 
Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Trump (2016b). 
Queer Theory is a field of study that critically explores and disrupts notions of sex, gender 
and sexuality within conventional analysis. As such, it aims to expose the power dynamics 
associated with prescriptive heterosexual and hetero/homonormative hierarchies and binary 
constructions, and in this context within the frameworks of conventional Political and 
International Relations (IR) theorising. Since Queer Theory’s emergence in the 1990s, 
prominent queer theorists such as Sedgewick (1990, 1993), Butler (1990, 1993) and Berlant 
and Warner (1998) have played a significant role in developing and endorsing Queer Theory 
as a political tool. This marked shift from identity-based gay and lesbian studies to an 
embrace of dissident, non-representational politics has developed significantly as a 
framework for analysis. In doing so, Queer Theory’s far-reaching and interdisciplinary scope 
has become embedded in many fields across the spectrum of the social sciences, particularly 
for the purpose of understanding and disrupting power and facets of identity such as race, 
class, sexuality, gender, nationality and so forth.  
The queering of International Relations (IR) has rarely been discussed until recently. Cynthia 
Weber (2014b) has consistently challenged the field/discipline of International Relations (IR) 
in this regard. In her article “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” Weber (2014b) 
claims that Queer Studies has indeed become “Global Queer Studies”, generating new and 
significant insights into fundamental global political processes. In referring to the work of 
Puar (2007b), Agathangelou (2013) and Scott (2013), Weber (2014b) highlights the point that 
queer themes around empirical practices and global hegemony do exist. She thus critiques the 
hierarchies associated with the study of IR by asking “Why does there appear to be no Queer 
International Theory?” (Weber, 2014b: 29).  
Cynthia Weber (2016a; 2016b) has since sought to develop the necessary theoretical and 
methodological frameworks with which to produce Queer IR analysis. In her book 
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Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge, Weber (2016a) outlines the theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of Queer IR, exposing what she terms “queer logics of 
statecraft” through drawing from various theoretical and conceptual poststructuralist, queer 
and IR contributions. This tool for analysis is deployed throughout her book in various case 
studies, particularly that of Eurovision winner Conchita/Wurst, and the subsequent (either/or) 
global response to their (and/or) Otherness. More recently, Weber (2016b) sought to further 
apply her work by producing a Queer IR analysis of the election of Donald Trump in her 
article “Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Trump.” Here she exposes what she terms the 
“fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” (white, Christian, American), which was figured to 
authorise a fear-based agenda of the sovereign leader (Trump). The work of Cynthia Weber 
and the abovementioned two texts (2016a, 2016b), inform a significant part of the theoretical 
and methodological core of this study.  
Furthermore, particular attention is paid to Weber’s (2014b) and Schotten’s (2014) assertion 
that Queer Theory, and Queer IR more specifically, are useful for understanding 
international/global modes of collusion and resistance. In this regard, Homonationalism 
provides the necessary queer lens with which to understand 21st century LGBTQ politics in 
Europe and North America, also contributing significantly to the theoretical core of this 
study.  
In her book Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times queer theorist Jasbir 
Puar (2007b) seeks to expose complicit and collusive gay, lesbian and feminist approaches to 
war, securitisation, terrorism, immigration and nationalism. In doing so, she argues that 
certain segments of the LGBTQ community participate in liberal missionary projects that 
seek to protect and liberate both non-Western women and queer people from the patriarchy 
and homophobia that is closely associated with predominantly non-secular societies. Such 
discourses, she argues, often collude with imperial, neoliberal and nationalistic objectives of 
the hegemonic US nation-state, occupying a space of moral supremacy attributed to a 
perceived sexual openness aligned with modernity. Through combining the terms 
“Homonormative” (Berlant & Warner, 1998; Duggan, 2002, 2003) and “Nationalism” (post-
9/11 patriotism and citizenship), Puar (2007a) conceptualises Homonationalism as an 
analytical means to locate her claims. In doing so, she states that her theory explores a 
reorientation of power relations associated with the nation-state, neoliberalism and sexuality. 
Rather than emphasizing the resistant or oppositional, I seek to exhume the convivial relations 
between queernesses and militarism, securitization, war, terrorism, surveillance technologies, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 10 | P a g e  
 
empire, torture, nationalism, globalization, fundamentalism, secularism, incarceration, 
detention, deportation, and neoliberalism: the tactics, strategies, and logistics of our 
contemporary war machines (Puar, 2007b: xiv) 
The term “Homonationalism” has been developed significantly over the last decade with 
various contributions and critiques now forming the basis of its conceptual framework. It has 
also transformed into a popular catchphrase within activist circles, often utilised to describe 
LGBTQ individuals who are racist, assimilatory and/or conservative. Puar (2013) defends the 
analytics of her original conceptualisation, cautioning against prescriptive notions in an 
attempt to maintain its theoretical utility. She does, however, acknowledge its “viral” 
transformation as a positive campaign for drawing attention to themes associated with 
regulation, discipline and state control (Puar 2012).  
The lenses of Queer IR and Homonationalism provide the necessary gaze with which to 
understand the interaction between LGBTQ politics and increasing populist-nationalism in 
Europe and North America (see Chapters 4 and 5). According to Puar (2007b; 2013a), a 
growing neoliberal collusion is amplifying a growing division amongst segments of the 
LGBTQ community, particularly along the lines of race, class and nationality. As such, 
Homonationalism is often, but not exclusively, manifested through the post-9/11 gay or 
lesbian (white) citizen and patriot. Through constructing this queer subject of the US nation-
state, Puar (2007b) positions LGBTQ politics within a transitional timeframe that illustrates 
its development from radical solidarity activism to (neo)liberal hegemonic politics (see 
Chapter 5, Figure 5.4).  
Following the publication of Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times in 
2007, times have indeed queered even further. This has coincided with events such as the 
global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, the EU migration crisis, Brexit, the 
Orlando massacre, and the election of Donald Trump, simultaneously producing and 
demonstrating significant shifts in global geopolitics that point to relevant themes associated 
with Homonationalism. Expanding its original theoretical scope by applying the concept with 
the purpose of exploring the political dynamics of the last decade (since 2007) may provide 
new insights into queer politics, and an impending shift in line with a populist-nationalist 
resurgence in Europe and North America.  
Understanding such a shift requires both the application and further theorisation of 
Homonationalism as an analytic, more specifically from Homonationalism to Homopopulism. 
As such, a new queer disciplinary subject is formed when the works of Puar (2007b, 2017), 
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Weber (2016a, 2016b) and Wodak (2015) are brought into conversation (see Chapter 5). As 
will be discussed throughout this study, the exploration of the development of Homopopulism 
assists in exposing the “fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject” – an authorising queer 
subject of a fear-based (populist-nationalist) sovereign leader who employs “queer logics of 
statecraft” as a means to figure versions of sovereignty (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; Puar, 2007b, 
2017; Wodak, 2015).  
Research Design and Methods 
In order to explain LGBTQ political shifts and Homopopulism in Europe and North America, 
this study has consulted a number of academic journals, books, articles and online sources to 
collect information. The method used to collect the information for this study was 
predominantly through consulting secondary sources. As such, this research is for the most 
part limited to a desktop study. However, limited primary data were also collected by 
conducting interviews. As a student of both Stellenbosch University and the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro whilst conducting this research, the secondary data used were 
accessed through the libraries and databases of these two institutions. The sources used were 
focused on themes associated with Queer Theory, Queer International Relations, 
Homonationalism, carceral politics, LGBTQ history, global politics of Europe and North 
America, populism studies, and LGBTQ, Queer, gender and feminist studies. This study 
greatly benefited from the in-depth semi-structured interviews. The interviews that were 
conducted discussed LGBTQ perspectives on the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and 
North America, and the key informants were carefully selected based on their association 
with and expertise on LGBTQ issues, Queer Theory, Queer IR, Homonationalism, global 
politics, International Relations, and gender, sexuality and feminist studies.    
According to Burnham et al. (2008: 39), a research method is the logical structure of the 
research inquiry that the social scientist is engaged in. As such, the research method that was 
deemed appropriate for this study is a qualitative method. Qualitative research involves 
collecting in-depth information from a relatively limited number of sources. This type of 
research is more concerned with issues of an intricate nature, particularly the richness, texture 
and feeling of raw data, because its deductive approach emphasises developing insights and 
generalisations from the data collected (Neuman 2005: 137). In this way the study seeks to 
contribute to existing data.    
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A case study design was found to be most useful for this study. Case study designs are 
extremely popular and widely used throughout the social sciences. According to Burnham et 
al. (2008: 65), a case study design can be based on single or multiple cases. As such, 
carefully selected case(s) can provide a robust test of a theory. The case study design enables 
this study to describe and conceptualise the phenomenon of LGBTQ political shifts in Europe 
and North America. This study examines one case study, namely the rise of (LGBTQ) 
populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. Whilst it does focus on the historically 
mature (European and North American) liberal democratic nation-state in general, this study 
focuses more specifically on France, Germany, Holland and the United States as examples in 
the light of their recent national elections (2016-2017).   
The purpose of selecting these examples is not necessarily for comparative purposes. These 
examples provide an interesting look into the interaction between LGBTQ politics and 
populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. It is precisely as a result of the 
hegemonic positioning of the historically mature liberal democratic nation-state within global 
political dynamics that LGBTQ political shifts are analysed within the theoretical framework 
of Queer IR and Homonationalism presented by Jasbir Puar (2007b, 2017) and Weber 
(2016a, 2016b). This case study and these examples illustrate the political behaviour of the 
liberal democratic nation-state and LGBTQ individuals, their collusion and resistance, and 
the (re)orientation of their positioning within global politics.  
Ethical Considerations 
Addressing ethical considerations is imperative when conducting research in the social 
sciences, in particular with regards to the collection of primary data. As such, research ethics 
have been followed with precision throughout this study. The primary data were collected by 
conducting interviews. Key informants were carefully selected based on their expertise and 
association with the themes discussed throughout. Confidentiality of key informants is strictly 
maintained. If applicable, the identity of the key informant is disclosed, depending on their 
permission to disclose their identity or not. This study follows the strict guidelines as set out 
by Stellenbosch University’s Research Ethics Committee (REC) for Humanities, which 
granted ethical clearance. 
Outline of Study 
Chapter 1 is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction to, and formulation of, 
the research question and objectives. The background to this study is provided along with a 
theoretical framework for the study. This chapter identifies the research problem and states 
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the research questions that are posed to guide this study. This chapter focuses on the research 
design and research methodology. This study also acknowledges the ethical considerations 
relevant to the gathering of primary data. 
Chapter 2 is a literature and historical review of LGBT and Queer.  It notes the complexities 
of identity terminologies. It provides a historical overview of the 20th century with reference 
to the Nazi persecutions, the homophile movement, Stonewall and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
It reviews the development of Queer social movements, from gay liberation to equality and to 
queer, and the associated methodologies for resistance. Furthermore, this chapter explores the 
political deployment of LGBTQ manifesting specifically in the movement for marriage 
equality and the international political juncture of LGBTQ Rights as Human Rights. Finally, 
it reviews the academic, conceptual and theoretical developments associated with LGBTQ, 
specifically gay and lesbian studies, poststructuralism and Queer Theory. 
Chapter 3 is a literature and historical review of populism and Western politics (Europe and 
North America). It explores terminologies of populism, particularly with regards to the 
ideological dispensations of left-wing vs right-wing populism. The chapter provides an 
historical contextualisation of 21st century politics by exploring prominent and far-reaching 
global events and responses such as the war on terror, the global financial crisis and the EU 
migration crisis, among others. It frames this contextualisation with purpose of exposing a 
growing backlash against globalisation and the subsequent rise of populist-nationalism. It 
then provides a historical review of the academic and political development of populism.  
Chapter 4 is a theoretical chapter that explores Queer IR and Homonationalism. It begins 
with Queer International Relations (IR) Theory, its journey from Queer to Global Queer 
Studies, to Queer IR. It then tracks the historical development of Queer IR. In doing so, the 
chapter explores the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Weber’s (2016a) 
“queer logics of statecraft”, acknowledging the theoretical contributions of Foucault (1979), 
Haraway (1997), Butler (1999) and Ashley (1989), among others. It further explores the 
historical and theoretical journey of the widely deployed term Homonationalism. In doing so, 
the chapter unpacks the theoretical contributions (US sexual exceptionalism, Queer as 
regulatory and the ascendency of whiteness) to Homonationalism in its founding text by 
Jasbir K. Puar (2007b). 
Chapter 5 is an application chapter that examines the shift from Homonationalism to 
Homopopulism. It begins with Weber’s (2016b) application of her Queer IR theoretical and 
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methodological developments to the 2016 election of Donald Trump as US President. It 
argues that the Trump campaign employed queer and/or logics in figuring authorising 
(fearful) sovereign subjects. It then argues against Puar’s (2017) assertion that the current 
political scene is not exceptional, going further to claim that Homonationalism requires an 
expansion of its theoretical scope. It then takes on the task of expanding theoretical scope of 
the concept of Homonationalism. It does so by conceptualising Homopopulism as an analytic 
of the politics of queer and/or the politics of fear. 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions based on the study as a whole. These conclusions address the 
identified research problem and research questions. Conclusions are offered on an LGBTQ 
political shift in Europe and North America, as well as on the contributions of theory towards 
understanding this political phenomenon. Finally, this chapter identifies areas for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A Modern History of LGBT & Queer  
Introduction 
For thousands of years homosexuality and gender non-conformity have featured in the 
histories of humankind. From the Ancient Greeks and Romans to the Renaissance kings and 
queens of Europe, gender and sexuality have been documented in the social relations in 
diverse cultures and communities. Whilst the prominence and existence of homosexuality and 
gender non-conformity have been accepted, ignored and persecuted throughout history, the 
politics associated with the LGBTQ community has proven to be inherently formidable and 
influential. This politics has consistently embodied oppression, discrimination and associated 
taboos. It has resulted in societal tensions, religious persecutions and socio-political 
disruptions.  Queer politics has even participated in the downfall of political regimes, wars 
and mass economic turmoil. Most importantly, the LGBTQ community has suffered 
immensely at the hands of society, the state and dominant social and global systems. In recent 
years such oppression has been challenged through various mechanisms, and in some 
respects successfully occupied a moral positioning within a broader rights-based political 
enlightenment. Whilst notable tensions remain in this regard, reviewing the history that led 
the LGBTQ community to this point is as important now as it has ever been. For the purpose 
of this study, any discussion of 21st century queer politics cannot be explored without a 
discussion of what occurred before. This is particularly relevant in the light of Fransch’s 
(2018) statement that “Historical influence is a very important factor to consider when 
examining LGBTQ politics” (Interview, Chet Fransch, 24/07/2018). 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review and contextualisation of the historical and 
academic underpinnings of LGBT and Queer. It begins by noting the complexities of the 
terminologies of the associated themes, attempting to explore rather than definitively 
categorise the various groupings within the LGBTQ community. This chapter proceeds with 
a historical overview of the 20th century to explore the Nazi persecutions, the homophile 
movement, Stonewall and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Doing so entails a review of the 
development of Queer social movements, from gay liberation to equality and to queer, at the 
same time attempting to differentiate the methodologies for resistance and the associated 
tensions in this regard. Furthermore, this chapter explores the political deployment of 
LGBTQ manifesting specifically in the movement for marriage equality and the international 
political juncture of LGBTQ rights as human rights. Finally, it reviews the academic, 
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conceptual and theoretical developments associated with LGBTQ, specifically gay and 
lesbian studies, Poststructuralism and Queer Theory. 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the research questions and to provide 
an overview of LGBTQ as political, activist and intellectual. In doing so, it demonstrates the 
evolving background of LGBTQ politics, highlighting both the interventions and general 
phenomena that led to the LGBTQ of 2018. With specific reference to Homonationalism and 
the rise of Homopopulism, this contextualisation is imperative in providing the foundation for 
understanding the political shifts in 21st century LGBTQ politics.  
Terminology 
Sexuality & Gender 
There is often confusion around the meanings of, and differences between, the terms sex, 
gender and sexuality. Whilst all are equally important when discussing themes associated 
with gender and sexual politics, it is imperative to understand the associated distinctions, 
tensions and power-relations.  
Sex: refers to a biological and/or physiological assignment, that is, it is a medically 
constructed definition associated with one’s chromosome alignments and apparent genitalia 
(Bornstein, 2013).  
Gender: is more commonly associated with a sociocultural phenomenon, more specifically a 
social construct. It can be aligned with one’s “given” sex; however, this is not necessarily 
always the case. Whilst it inherently divides people into various categories (male, female, 
other) based on features, characteristics and behaviours, the deployment of “Queer”, 
“Trans*” and “Other” narratives seeks to disrupt the normative constructions of gender. 
Judith Butler (1990a) famously argues that gender is a “performance” stating that: “When we 
say gender is performed, we usually mean that we’ve taken on a role or we’re acting in some 
way and that our acting or our role playing is crucial to the gender that we are and the gender 
that we present to the world” (Butler, 1990a). 
Sexuality: refers to a person’s sexual and/or erotic interests in and attraction to others. This 
can be associated with physical and emotional arousal as well as a capacity to have erotic 
experiences with others. Sexuality is closely associated with sexual orientation, where one’s 
attractions are defined by one’s sexual interest in men, women, both, other and/or none 
(Bornstein, 2013).  
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LGBTQIA+ 
Often referred to as the “alphabet soup”, the LGBTQIA+ acronym has developed and 
transformed extensively over the past 20 years. Whist the terms ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ 
dominated the original terminology associated with non-heterosexual sexuality, the inclusion 
of gender non-conforming and various “Other” groups has resulted in the acronym’s 
expansion in an attempt to be inclusive and all-encompassing. Many critics argue that the 
earlier merging of the various sectors of LGBTQIA+ violently erases the unique differences 
and associated struggles experienced by the diverse array of communities. Others, 
particularly queer activists, argue that the acronym is prescriptive and that it divides the 
community along hardened boundaries that create hierarchies, differentiate and normalise. 
Each letter in the acronym also represents unique political formations; groups within groups 
have formed and boundaries have developed between those associated with sexuality, those 
with gender, and those with both. There are political tensions between the deployment of 
“Gay”, “Lesbian”, “LGBT” and “Queer” particularly along the lines of identity politics and 
methodologies for resistance. As such, the terminologies associated with gender and sexuality 
are inherently meaningful and complex. Without further categorising, normalising and/or 
further hardening/disrupting established boundaries, this section will attempt to elucidate 
these complexities. For the purpose of this overall study, the terms “LGBTQ” and “Queer” 
will be used interchangeably (unless otherwise indicated) in an attempt to acknowledge the 
associated tensions and complexities. 
In her book Blackwashing Homophobia: Violence and the Politics of Sexuality, Gender and 
Race, Melanie Judge (2018) explains the complexities associated with writing and 
using/disrupting identity terminology. In doing so, she provides a unique strategy with which 
to acknowledge these complexities, tensions and opportunities. This strategy informs much of 
the identity terminology deployed throughout this study: 
Identities are messy in their (in)completeness, (in)consistencies and (dis)locatedness. To 
account for the slippages in and between the ways in which LGBTI subjectivation is manifest, 
in contextually bound ways, I deploy a smorgasbord of terms: sometimes referring to 
‘lesbian’, other times to ‘woman’, ‘queer’, ‘LGBTI’ or ‘gay’. This slippery mix prohibits me 
from comfortably (and conveniently) settling on a particular formulation that might, wittingly 
or unwittingly, foreclose other possible meanings (Judge, 2018: 9). 
Lesbian: A self-identifying woman whose primary sexual and affectional orientation is 
towards people who identify as the same gender. Whilst the term ‘gay‘ is often used to refer 
to women who are attracted to women, in an effort to disrupt hierarchies and to promote 
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identity boundaries, many lesbian women prefer to be differentiated from gay men 
(Stonewall UK, 2017). 
Gay:  A sexual and affectional orientation toward people of the same gender. Whilst this term 
is predominantly used to describe men who are attracted to men, it is often used as an 
umbrella term to describe all non-heterosexual orientations. This deployment has been 
criticised for erasing the identity parameters of various other sexualised and gendered 
groupings. The term ‘gay‘ is also heavily criticised by queer and radical activists who 
associate it with ‘homonormativity‘ as well as gendered and sexual hierarchies (Stonewall 
UK, 2017). 
Bisexual: A person whose primary sexual and affectional orientation is towards people of the 
same as well as other genders. It can also indicate attraction towards people regardless of 
their gender performance/identity. Critics within and outside the (LGBTQ) community often 
produce violent narratives around bisexuality by referring to it as a segment or fluid 
description for gay and lesbian (Stonewall UK, 2017)..  
Trans*: Gender non-conforming and/or non-binary people. The asterisk notes that this term 
is complex and that there are a variety of divisions and identities within the Trans* 
community itself. Whilst some argue that this is an inclusive gesture, critics argue that it is an 
attempt to further normalise and/or categorise a non-normative political formation (Stonewall 
UK, 2017).  
Queer:  Historically, the term was used to describe something as abnormal or strange. It was 
further used as a derogatory term to describe people whose gender, gender performance 
and/or sexualities do not conform to normative and/or dominant socio-political expectations. 
In recent years the word has been appropriated and reclaimed as a means to strip it of its 
historical violence. It has been deployed as an umbrella identity that encompasses the entire 
LGBTQIA acronym as a means to challenge hierarchical divisions and binaries. It has also 
been deployed politically as a verb and a noun, either to encapsulate non-normativity and/or 
Otherness. Radical groupings claim the word as a means to disrupt and/or challenge 
assimilatory and equality-seeking politics. In summary, “Queer” is commonly deployed as a 
political tool in an attempt to challenge/disrupt dominant and oppositional power-relations 
(Stonewall UK, 2017). 
Intersex: An adjective and/or identity used to describe a naturally occurring phenomenon 
(without medical intervention) where people develop multiple sex characteristics, often after 
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birth. Such characteristics do not fit into the dominant and socially accepted categories of 
male and female, with multiple variations implicit within this definition. Intersex is thus an 
umbrella term used to describe these multiple variations which are often violently erased 
through medical interventions and/or narrative building. Whilst these characteristics can be 
visible or invisible, many intersex people are subject to medical mutilation without 
consultation. Doctors are often the perpetrators in this regard as they seek to assign sexes 
based on what they deem is dominant and appropriate. Many intersex people are scarred, 
traumatised and ostracised as a result (Stonewall UK, 2017). 
Asexual: A sexual orientation that is generally categorised by not experiencing any sexual 
attraction or desire for all genders/non-genders and sexualities. Asexuality is often confused 
with celibacy, though the two are completely different. Celibacy represents an active choice 
with regards to abstention from sexual activity; asexuality is not necessarily a choice though 
it can be in some instances. Some asexual people still have sex and/or participate in sexual 
activities. As with most of the acronyms, there are many subdivisions of asexuality 
(Stonewall UK, 2017). 
Heteronormativity vs Homonormativity  
In 1991 queer theorist Michael Warner published an article titled “Introduction: Fear of a 
Queer Planet” in which he conceptualised the term “Heteronormativity.” Whilst drawing 
from concepts such as  Rubin’s (1984) sex hierarchy and Rich’s (1980) compulsory 
heterosexuality, Warner (1991) describes heteronormativity as a reference to a set of 
(normative) cultural assumptions. More specially, heteronormativity distinguishes the 
“normal” and “natural” form of attraction (men and woman) from the “abnormal” and 
“unnatural” form of attraction (men and men, women and women, other). In doing so, a 
hierarchy is established between the two, exemplifying “normal” gender and sexual norms 
and oppressing “abnormal” gender and sexual (non)norms. This formation of hegemonic 
social systems, discourses and (private) practices is heavily criticised through Queer thinking. 
“Homonormativity” thus refers to the idea that (certain) sexual minorities can and should 
conform to heteronormative institutions (such as marriage) as a means to achieve greater 
acceptance into the dominant (heteronormative) social system. Duggan (2002; 2003) and 
Puar (2006) have published extensively on homonormativity, merging neoliberal arguments 
by exposing what they claim is gay and lesbian capital, consumerism and institutional 
assimilation. In discussing what she calls the “neoliberal self-governing [homonormative] 
subject” Judge (2018) states:  
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I have alluded to how neoliberal self-governing subjects resist radical politics, opting for a 
privatised sexuality that legitimises the status quo and its hierarchies of citizenship. Some of 
the homonormalising strategies discussed indicate how queer integration into normative 
cultures is contingent upon the rejection of alternative positions that trouble middle-class 
values and normative whiteness. This is a politics that, in staving off its own precarity, 
legitimises a certain kind of life as the ‘good gay life’ through repudiating another kind of gay 
life. The idealised form of gay life - a white homonormative one - both comprises of and 
expends value. This imagery of gay life is underwritten by economies of materialism and 
liberal individualism, and functions as a local coordinate of the global gay discourse. It is in 
strategies of neoliberal self-care that this gay subject’s prospect for a valuable life, free of 
violence, resides. Constituting a politics of depoliticisation, these strategies undo solidarities 
that might otherwise be forged across multiple planes of exclusion that, when stitched 
together, can mobilise action against intersecting forms of violent oppression (Judge, 2018: 
97). 
The notion of Homonationalism, which will be discussed throughout this study, is an 
extension of this homonormativity, particularly in that it involves the privileging of 
homonormative subjects along the lines of nationalistic and ideological discourses (Robinson, 
2016).  
Methodologies for Resistance  
In 2007 a prominent queer theorist, Dean Spade, published a chapter titled “Methodologies of 
Trans Resistance” (Spade, 2007) in which they explore the work of Chela Sandoval’s (2000) 
Methodology of the Oppressed. In doing so, Spade (2007) explores Sandoval’s (2000) 
analytical framework for understanding various forms of resistance, consciousness and social 
movements in the USA. Sandoval (2000) describes how fractures often form in social 
movements between groups utilising different forms or methodologies, often exclusively and 
without consensus. Her analysis identifies five categories around which oppositional 
consciousness is mobilised, more specifically with the purpose of intervening in established 
power relations. As discussed throughout this study, related divisions have plagued the LGBT 
and Queer movements across the globe throughout history, making it imperative to 
understand the terminologies and dynamics of these methodologies as explored by Sandoval 
(2000) and Spade (2007):  
Equal Rights, Reform & Assimilation: This mode represents the idea that “We are the same as 
you, therefore we can be and do the same as you.” Sandoval (2000) states in this regard: 
“Aesthetically, the equal rights mode of consciousness seeks duplication, politically it seeks 
integration, physically, it seeks assimilation” (Sandoval, 2000: 56). As such, this mode 
articulates that the view that differences between the oppressed and the oppressor are over-
exaggerated, and that as a result the oppressed should receive equal citizenship (and 
associated benefits) as this is defined by the oppressor’s dominant system (Spade, 2007)  
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Radical, Transformation & Revolution: This mode challenges the current social order and 
dominant system, arguing that the assimilation of differences are not possible. As such, it 
expresses the imperative to restructure society and change or disrupt the norms associated 
with its structures. In doing so, its ultimate goal is to shift away from the domination vs 
subordination power axes that is deeply embodied in society (Spade, 2007).  
Supremacy & Elitism: In this mode oppressed groups imply that their differences afford them 
access to a higher evolutionary power, noting this supremacy as a reason for their oppression. 
As such, groups prescribing to this method believe that they occupy an elevated moral, 
ethical, social and sometimes physical positioning in contrast to those in power (Spade, 2007) 
Separatism & Division: In this mode oppressed groups attempt to emphasise, maintain and 
protect their differences from the oppressors. As such, they seek to separate completely from 
the dominant social order with a desire to “create their own.” This is in contrast to reforming 
or transforming existing structures (Spade, 2007). 
In the next section, a queer history of the 20th and 21st centuries will be explored, dating back 
to the early 1930s. This will demonstrate how LGBTQ political formations manifested 
throughout the globe.  
Queer History 
The Pink Triangle  
In 1972 German writer Heinz Heger published an anonymous memoir of a gay survivor of 
the Sachsenhausen and Flossenbürg concentration camps. He gave it the title Männer mit dem 
rose Winkel (The Men with the Pink Triangle), which references the upside-down pink 
triangle used to mark identified homosexuals in the Nazi concentration camps. The book was 
controversial at the time and inspired the production of Martin Sherman’s West End play 
Bent, which starred openly gay actor Sir Ian McKellen. It was the first time any research was 
presented on the persecution of gays and lesbians under Nazi rule, opening the doors for the 
development of queer Holocaust scholarship. Heger’s (1972) publication was followed by a 
paper by sociologist Rüdiger Lautmann titled “The Pink Triangle: The Persecution of 
Homosexual Males in Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany (Gesellschaft und 
Homosexuality)” (1981) and a renowned book by German American author Richard Plant 
titled The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War against Homosexuals (1986). 
It was only in the last two to three decades, with the emergence of LGBTQ activism and 
discourse, that the history of homosexual persecution under Nazi occupation in Germany and 
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Europe was brought to light. Whilst a number of memoirs, artistic productions, verbal 
articulations and literary explorations associated with the gay and lesbian holocaust emerged 
in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the most prominent, up-to-date and ground-breaking 
academic study that explores this relatively unexplored phenomenon is a book called Hidden 
Holocaust? Gay and Lesbian Persecution in Germany 1933-1945 by Günter Grau and 
Claudia Schoppmann (Grau & Schoppmann, 1995). Published in 1995, it reviews a number 
of rare documents, including speeches, policies and recorded data, all of which represent and 
demonstrate the coordinated and systematic persecution of gays and lesbians under Nazi rule. 
Since then, various academics have sought to analyse and simultaneously expose the 
intricacies (and horrors) of the gay and lesbian holocaust, many of whom have contributed 
significantly to the broader literature on LGBT and Queer explorations. They include the 
book by queer theorist William J. Spurlin, Lost Intimacies: Rethinking Homosexuality under 
National Socialism (2009). 
The first anti-sodomy (anti-homosexuality) law in Germany was promulgated in 1871. The 
law itself remained unchanged for the most part until the Nazis took over. In fact, prior to 
that, it was rarely enforced, particularly during the 1920s, when post-WWI Germany was 
suffering from a protracted economic crisis. As a consequence, cosmopolitan centres such as 
Berlin became prominent hubs for (sexual) openness, art, theatre, burlesque and a general 
embracement of queerness. When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, the persecution began 
almost immediately. It started with members of the Nazi vigilante group, the Brown Shirts, 
attacking the Berlin Institute of Dr Magnus Hirschfeld, a prominent sexologist and founder of 
the Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee (Scientific Humanitarian Committee), the world’s 
first gay rights group. This persecution took place in conjunction with the eradication of all 
progressive literature, including the entities that produced and housed it. Mass arrests of 
homosexuals followed, gay bars were shut down and the famous cosmopolitan centres ceased 
to function (Newton, 2012). 
Prior to becoming the largest party represented in the Bundestag (German Federal 
Parliament), the Nazi party released a number of statements reiterating their position on 
homosexuality calling it “evil” and “deplorable.” Following the Nazi’s attainment of 
institutional power, many gay and lesbian Germans believed that their position would change, 
particularly because of the known homosexuality of a number of high-ranking Nazi officials, 
including SA Chief of Staff Ernst Rohm. A prominent activist, Adolf Brand, wrote to the 
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Nazis requesting that they review the references to homosexuality in the anti-sodomy law. 
The party responded with the following:  
Anyone who thinks of homosexual love is our enemy. We reject anything which emasculates 
our people and makes [them] a plaything for our enemies. Might makes right. Let us see to it 
that we once again become strong! But this we can achieve only in one way: the German 
people must once again learn how to exercise discipline. We therefore reject any form of 
lewdness, especially homosexuality, because it robs us of our last chance to free our people 
from the bondage which now enslaves us (Newton, 2012). 
Ernst Rohm was murdered in 1935 during the “Night of the Long Knives” and so the war on 
homosexuality in Nazi Germany intensified. After that, the anti-sodomy law was amended to 
include any form of social interaction such as touching or kissing between same-sex 
individuals. By 1941 the Nazi security apparatus had been given full instructions to arrest and 
place all homosexuals in “preventative custody,” code for incarceration in concentration 
camps. Whilst this had already occurred prior to this date, as was the case with various 
groups persecuted by the Nazis, the systematic incentive for experimentation on and the 
elimination of all homosexuals had begun. Between 1933 and 1945 approximately 15,000 
gays and lesbians died as a result of starvation, execution, medical experimentation and 
disease in the Nazi concentration camps of Adolf Hitler and WWII (Grau & Schoppmann, 
1995).  
The persecution did not end there. Many anti-sodomy laws remained in place throughout 
Europe even after the end of the war. The case of Alan Turing and his persecution in the 
United Kingdom, despite the fact that he saved millions of lives due to his code-breaking 
abilities as a result of the invention of the enigma machine, remains a prime example. These 
untold segments of history are particularly relevant for this study. After WWII, a liberal 
democratic internationalist order dominated the Western values system. In the case of Europe 
and North America, it is this very same order that has, in many ways, facilitated the 
integration of LGBTQ discourses into state and statutory frameworks, domestically and 
globally. This calls into question whether the recent populist-nationalist resurgence in these 
regions will have a significant impact on the lives of LGBTQ individuals across the globe.  
The Homophile Movement & Stonewall 
On 28 June 1969, twenty-four years after the end of WWII, a routine raid took place at the 
Stonewall Inn, a well-known gay club located in Greenwich Village, New York. This was not 
the first time the New York police had raided the Stonewall Inn; in fact, this was common 
practice, particularly in areas that were known to house cosmopolitan and “sexually deviant” 
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institutions of queer gathering and refuge seeking. This was, however, different from other 
raids as this particular instance sparked riots amongst patrons, employees and the surrounding 
neighbourhood as a result of the growing frustration with police brutality and the systematic 
targeting of the LGBTQ community. Six days of violent clashes and protests followed, with 
many historians claiming this to be the very moment that acted as a catalyst for the formation 
of the gay liberation movement, the first modern, universal and inherently united movement 
that sought to end the oppression of gay and lesbian individuals. The Stonewall Riots, as they 
are referred to in LGBTQ literature, marked a significant and notable shift in queer activism, 
particularly in terms of coverage and exposure. However, there are untold segments of queer 
history that point to the fact that gay and lesbian organising did occur many years preceding 
this historical event (Jackson, 2015). 
The homophile movement was built on the basis of gay and lesbian solidarity, subtly 
operating within urban centres across the West since the 1870s, over a hundred years prior to 
Stonewall. In his book Sexual politics, sexual communities: The making of a homosexual 
minority in the United States, 1940-1970 J. D’Emilio (1983) provides a unique exploration of 
queer movements prior to Stonewall. The author notes that during a state-sponsored 
crackdown on homosexuality in the 1960s, the homophile movement established three fields 
in which the oppression of homosexuals was rooted: 1) psychiatry declared gay men and 
lesbians to be mentally ill; 2) the law criminalised homosexual sex acts; and 3) most religions 
condemned homosexuals as sinners. The notion that homosexuality was an illness was a 
significant focal point in this regard, as a member of the movement, Frank Kameny, stated in 
1964: “The entire homophile movement … is going to stand or fall upon the question of 
whether or not homosexuality is a sickness, and upon our taking a firm stand on it” (Carter, 
2014).  
The author goes further to note that by the end of 1965 the homophile movement was “ready 
to escape the isolation and marginality of the past and to enter into the mainstream of social 
and political reform” (D’Emilio, 1983: 196) and that 15 gay groups were known to exist in 
1966, increasing to 50 by 1969 (D’Emilio, 1983: 199).  Susan Stryker and Jim Van Buskirk 
(1996) also draw attention to the activity of gay and lesbian movements prior to Stonewall by 
bringing to light a number of isolated riots that occurred in predominantly LGBTQ areas in 
Los Angeles and San Francisco.  
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Cynthia Poindexter’s article “Sociopolitical Antecedents to Stonewall: Analysis of the 
Origins of the Gay Rights Movement in the United States” (1997) examines the 
organisational process that led to Stonewall and the social changes that followed. Queer 
theorists, amongst others, have also critiqued accounts of the Stonewall riots, particularly 
with regard to the binary hierarchies that dominated the narratives associated with this event. 
A specific focus on the prominence of Trans* individuals and people of colour at Stonewall, 
such as Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson, has emerged in recent literature, contributing 
significantly to the historical interrogation of the foundation for the first modern LGBTQ 
movements (Cohen, 2008).  
Whilst an array of literary contributions continue to expand the accounts of the homophile 
movement and the Stonewall riots, there is little doubt that the events of the 1960s set the 
stage for the renowned gay liberation movement, exposing a radical shift in LGBTQ activism 
and a significant moment in Queer history. 
HIV/AIDS 
Dennis Altman and Jonathan Symons, collectively and individually, offer some of the most 
comprehensive insights into the interactions between HIV/AIDS and LGBTQ  in two 
prominent published works, namely The End of Homosexual (2013) and Queer Wars (2016). 
In the first book Altman (2013) offers insights into the history of LGBTQ movements in 
relation to HIV/AIDS. He dedicates a chapter to this topic: “The 1980s: HIV/AIDS and 
Working inside the System,” where he summarises this tragic yet fundamental period in 20 
pages.  
It is impossible to reflect on the homosexual world over the past quarter century without 
mention of HIV/AIDS, just as it is impossible to discuss the global epidemic without 
acknowledging the extent to which our perceptions of what is not predominately a “gay 
disease” remains marked by its particular connection with male homosexuality, even in 
countries in which HIV transmissions occurs primarily through heterosexual intercourse or 
shared needles (Altman, 2013: 106). 
Altman (2013) discusses the history of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, highlighting that its geo-
political impacts on the LGBTQ community were far-reaching often reinforcing the sense 
amongst gay men that they were worthless, as well as exemplifying the common perception 
that homosexuality was an illness. He explores the role of government and civil society in 
this regard, discussing the Reagan Administration’s reluctance to address the disease, and 
highlighting that it was predominately the LGBTQ community that lobbied consistently and 
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successfully for attention, research and funding, ironically reinforcing the myth that 
HIV/AIDS was linked to homosexuality (Altman, 2013: 108). 
Altman (2013) offers an important historical insight into the emergence of Queer Theory and 
the interactions between LGBTQ and feminist movements during the start of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in the 1980s. He discusses how HIV/AIDS became a dominant issue for gay men in 
particular, with a rapid and uneven mobilisation of resources, complicating relations between 
men and women in the LGBTQ movement. Some lesbian leaders in the movement expressed 
resentment at this emphasis on a single issue, which was ironic as many demands of 
HIV/AIDS activists echoed feminist analyses of the health system, particularly as gay men 
became exposed to a health system that was hierarchical and dominated by financial 
constraints, issues that women had experienced for a very long time (Altman, 2013: 111). 
Altman (2013) highlights a prominent shift that occurred in the global LGBTQ movement 
after the emergence of HIV/AIDS. He emphasises that HIV/AIDS changed the way in which 
activists imagined working within the state, indicating that the tragedy of the pandemic 
assisted gay men the same way in which affirmative action and state services assisted women 
across the globe. He demonstrates how this period saw gay activists move away from the 
street activism of the 1970s to organisation building, allowing individuals to attain positions 
in large community bodies, government and international organisations. 
Furthermore, in their chapter “HIV, Health and Human Rights” Altman & Symons (2016) 
explain how, over the past 30 years, the unfolding HIV/AIDS pandemic connected human 
rights issues and sexuality (Altman & Symons, 2016: 90).  The authors discuss the 
incorporation of women, men who have sex with men (MSM), sex workers and drug users 
into public health campaigns, uniting health practitioners and gay activists in the promotion 
of individual sexual rights. They reveal that governments that adopted a model of engaging 
with communities, rather than adopting a purely medical response, had greater success in 
curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, thus resulting in state-sponsored outreach in LGBTQ 
communities that had not previously existed (Altman & Symons, 2016: 90).  
Altman & Symons (2016) go further to refer to a lead essay in the first issue of Health and 
Human Rights to expose a connection between health and human rights, noting that: 
The evolving HIV/AIDS pandemic has shown a consistent pattern through which 
discrimination, marginalization, stigmatization and, more generally, a lack of respect for the 
human rights and dignity of individuals and groups heightens their vulnerability to becoming 
exposed to HIV (Mann et al., 1994).  
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In doing so, the authors of this essay, including Jonathan Mann, the founder of the World 
Health Organisation’s Global Programme on AIDS, reiterate that human rights and health are 
“mutually reinforcing” (Mann et al., 1994). 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic led to extensive exploration and insight into its impact on the 
global LGBTQ movements, often through the use of historical knowledge. With an array of 
successful medical inroads and social mobilisation, HIV/AIDS is now less of a threat to the 
LGBTQ community and to the world at large. This development has ignited further 
conversations around sexuality in contemporary global settings, particularly in relation to 
human rights discourses. The next section will explore the historical development of various 
LGBT and Queer social movements, as well as the associated activism and advocacy.  
Queer Activism and Social Movements 
The Gay Liberation (Revolution & Separatism) 
The gay liberation movement is often seen as being definitively launched in 1969 following 
the Stonewall riots in New York City, marking a shift in queer activism and social 
mobilisation. Though this was not the first gay and lesbian organising initiative to take place, 
gay liberationists differentiated themselves by adopting alternative methodologies and 
outcomes with regards to their political activism. One of the most prominent of the gay 
liberation organisations was the Gay Liberation Front (GLF). It was, in the words of their 
manifesto, “a militant coalition of radical and revolutionary homosexual men and women 
committed to fight the oppression of the homosexual as a minority group and to demand the 
right to the self-determination of our own bodies” (Terence, 1995: 107). It was the first of 
many radical and militant gay liberation organisations to emerge throughout the United States 
and Western Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Whilst the pre-Stonewall 
homophile groups sought to decriminalise homosexuality and challenge associated medical 
diagnostics, groups aligned with gay liberation agendas criticised their approach, labelling 
them as “reformist”, “conservative” and “respectable.” In contrast, organisations such as the 
Gay Liberation Front sought to “transform” (initiate a Revolution) and/or “remove 
themselves” (advocate Separatism) from society through radical solidarity and militant 
activism, rather than seek admission to it (avoid Assimilation) (Weeks, 2015). 
Through adopting the feminist feature of “the personal as political” as one of the key 
methodologies for resistance, the Harvey Milk-inspired “coming out” activism of the gay 
liberation movement gained momentum across the globe. As such, gay liberation affiliates 
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organised the world’s first Gay Pride event with the sole purpose of engaging in direct action 
by demonstrating gay and lesbian unity, solidarity, mobilisation and visibility. Whilst the gay 
liberation movement played a significant role in the development of queer activism, 
particularly in unifying and universalising LGBTQ resistance, successful inroads with 
regards to decriminalisation and declassification (as a mental illness) had an impact on the 
movement. This, in conjunction with the outbreak of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s, as argued 
by Altman (2013) and Altman & Symons (2016), intensified the (unintended) desire for 
collaboration between the state and the LGBTQ community. The equality movement was 
born.   
The Equality Movement (Assimilation)  
In 1978 Harvey Milk, a well-known political figure based in the Castro district of San 
Francisco, became the first openly gay man to be elected to public office in a modern liberal 
democracy. Having initiated the “coming out” activism that dominated the gay liberation 
movement, Milk played an integral role in advancing LGBTQ interests, particularly with 
regards to policy formation. It was in this light that Milk’s ambition to run for public office 
grew, and after almost 10 years of attempting to attain a seat on the San Francisco City Board 
of Supervisors, he was finally elected. Through adopting a reformist strategy, Milk 
demonstrated that it was possible to change a system from within. He had thus relinquished 
his former association with the radical strategies of the gay liberation movement and set the 
stage for a new era in queer activism. Harvey Milk was assassinated a few months later, 
before he could run for a seat in the California state assembly. His political career was 
marked with an array of successes in effecting political change through his role in 
government (Stryker & Van Buskirk, 1996).  
The Milk effect remains one of the key strategies of many LGBTQ organisations today, 
where policy influence is attained through a combination of access to capital, holding public 
office and political lobbying. A few present-day examples include the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC) and the Victory Institute. Dennis Altman (2013) argues that the global 
response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic forced sexuality onto the agendas of a wide range of 
governments as well as national and international organisations, resulting in gay activists 
becoming vital stakeholders in institutional structures. In his book The End of the 
Homosexual Altman (2013) refers to the 1980s as a period of “working inside the system”, 
attributing an LGBTQ move towards assimilatory strategies to the outbreak of HIV/AIDS.  In 
unpacking the socio-political dynamics of the pandemic, particularly with regard to the 
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LGBTQ community, the author states with regard to an unintended wave of assimilatory 
practices: “In health departments, in development agencies, in a few research centres, even in 
some small areas of the United Nations, it became possible to build a career out of one’s 
involvement in the gay world” (Altman, 2013: 111). 
In their book Queer Wars Altman & Symons (2016) refer to China as a case study in this 
regard, illustrating how engaging with HIV can shift attitudes and change minds about MSM 
specifically. They refer to the discussion of sexuality as a taboo in Chinese society, 
demonstrating how this had an impact on HIV/AIDS transmission rates amongst MSM in the 
country, citing delayed yet significant government action in the early 2000s (Altman & 
Symons, 2016: 91).  The authors go further to discuss the role of developmental aid and its 
impact on HIV/AIDS in relation to MSM. They draw attention to a global increase in support 
for international efforts to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, with the integration of treatment 
programmes into the Millennium Development Goals, as an important threshold. Altman & 
Symons (2016) highlight this as a clear shift in global trends that led to further material 
support for the LGBTQ movement, demonstrating that while services directed at 
marginalised groups such as MSM and Trans* remain under-resourced, the emphasis on 
HIV/AIDS did in fact create new opportunities for both activists and donors to focus on 
increased attention to issues of sexuality (Altman & Symons, 2016: 126).  
A combination of factors led to the re-emergence of reformist and assimilatory politics in the 
LGBTQ community in the 1980s, marking the (re)birth of the equality movement. Whilst the 
1990s witnessed a new shift towards a radical (queer) politics, the drive of the equality 
(formerly homophile) movement did not diminish, as it did in the 1970s. With the wave of 
decriminalising legislation, successful attainment of public office and material investment in 
HIV/AIDS, assimilatory strategies gained momentum throughout Europe and North America.  
Many (queer) critics argue that this was further exacerbated by a new “commercialization of 
queerness” with corporations sponsoring Pride events and a popular cultural integration of 
LGBTQ themes in the media (Will & Grace, Ellen DeGeneres). As such, it was the equality 
movement that drove the “LGBT” marriage equality, military recruitment and debates to 
counter work-place discrimination in the 2000s, establishing the groundwork for mainstream 
LGBTQ rights advancement (the politics of inclusion) – a strategy that has been both 
applauded and heavily critiqued (Paternotte et al., 2016).  
The Queer Movement 
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Queer activism is distinct from lesbian and gay or LGBT activism. It distinguishes itself by 
challenging normative societal relations and celebrating difference. The re-emergence of this 
radical strategy in the late 1980s coincides with the Reagan (USA) and Thatcher (UK) 
government responses (or rather lack thereof) to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The direct action 
associated with the queer movement shares similar principles with that of the gay liberation 
movement of the early 1970s, critiquing both the economic (neoliberal) and socio-political 
dynamics of Western society. Much like the equality movement, the queer movement’s 
longevity extended far beyond its founding movement. This resulted in noticeable tensions 
between the two strategies of LGBTQ activism, particularly as they now occupy similar 
spaces on the broader political spectrum. The queer movement did arise in opposition to what 
it considers as the “normative assimilatory” nature of the LGBT equality movement. Through 
challenging and questioning regimes of ‘the normal’, including the identity-based binaries of 
LGBT, the queer movement also gave rise to academic Queer Theory (Brown, 2015). 
Queer activism has developed significantly over the past twenty-five years. Its initial values 
were embedded in a commitment to LGBTQ safety and visibility, particularly with regard to 
HIV/AIDS in the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s and in recent years following the 
commercialisation of LGBT and significant inroads with regards to (legal) rights 
advancement, queer activism has since emerged more prominently as a counterpoise to the 
extension of equal rights and “equality”, instead staking its claim to the “right to difference.” 
Much like Queer Theory, queer activism attempts to dissolve the hierarchies and boundaries 
associated with sexual and gender identities. Alliance and solidarity form a major part of this, 
elements that briefly united gay men and lesbian women after protracted tensions during the 
HIV/AIDS crisis. Certain segments of the queer movement often align themselves with anti-
capitalist, anti-gentrification, anti-globalisation and anarchist movements. Such associations 
have further divided the queer and equality movements, particularly along the lines of 
ideological and political economic boundaries.  
What is sad about the Castro (and similar gay ghettos across the country and the world,) and 
indicative of what gay people do with even a little bit of power, is that these same smiling gay 
men have failed to build community for queer (or anyone) outside of their social group. Many 
gay men (even in the Castro) still remain on the fringes, either by choice or lack of 
opportunity. But as the most “successful” gays (and their allies) have moved from outsider 
status to insider clout, they have consistently fought misogynist, racist, classist, and ageist 
battles to ensure that their neighborhood remain a community for only the rich, male, and 
white (or at least those who pass). They’ve succeeded in clamping down on the defiance, 
anger, flamboyance, and subversion, once thriving in gay subcultures, in order to promote a 
vapid consume-or-die, we’re just like you mentality (Mattilda, 2004: 4).  
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Statements such as this form the basis of both a queer theorist and queer activist critique of 
what they claim to be the assimilatory nature of the (LGBT) equality movement. They are 
fervently opposed to the idea of marriage equality, hate-crime legislation and military service 
as they view this as an enabler of the queerphobic, neoliberal and carceral nation-state. 
Consequently, the foundation of 1990s and 2000s queer activism (and theory) is formed on 
the idea that whilst early queer activism organised against homophobic violence, present 
queer activism entails organising against the symbolic and material violence associated with 
“gay assimilation.” Critics of this approach often claim that queer activism expends too much 
energy challenging gay assimilation or “homonormativity”, when they should be challenging 
the persistent violence of “Heteronormativity” (Brown, 2015). The next section will explore 
LGBTQ politics of the 21st century, specifically marriage equality and the global extension of 
LGBT rights as Human Rights.  
LGBTQ Politics 
Marriage Equality 
In April 2001 the Netherlands became the first country in the world to legally recognise a 
state-sponsored marriage between two people of the same sex, followed by Belgium, Spain, 
Canada and South Africa during the period 2001 to 2006. Since the beginning of the 
millennium, the marriage equality debate has dominated LGBTQ politics, forming a central 
part of the equality movement’s campaign for equal rights. Many countries across the globe 
have since legalised same-sex marriage as a result of a combination of political, legal and 
activist pressure, with Ireland and more recently Australia, voting in favour of marriage 
equality through popular referenda. The level at which states are measured in terms of being 
“modern,” pro-LGBTQ and pro-human rights is often based on their response (or lack 
thereof) to same-sex marriage. However, the goal of achieving marriage equality has been 
highly contested within the broader LGBTQ movement. Whilst a number of anti-LGBTQ 
forces have mobilised to challenge any advances to same-sex marriage regulations, the 
LGBTQ community has found itself embroiled in a highly contentious and complex debate 
about whether marriage equality is desirable, valuable, counter-intuitive and/or advantageous 
to LGBTQ lives (Bernstein & Taylor, 2013). 
Gay liberationist, queer and feminist critiques form the basis of “internal” opposition to 
same-sex marriage. Depending on the lens, marriage is viewed as an inherently oppressive 
institution, constructed on heteropatriarchal, binary-dominated and hierarchical narratives. It 
is further viewed, particularly by proponents of queer thought, as a means of “normalising” 
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queerness and a method for promoting the neoliberal privatisation of sexuality. Such 
narratives question whether marriage equality is helpful in mobilising and uniting the broader 
LGBTQ movement, as many critics claim that it depoliticises queer identities. In the book 
Against Equality: Queer Revolution Not Mere Inclusion (Conrad, 2014) a collection of essays 
critiques the methodologies of the equality movement, particularly its desire for marriage 
equality. This book demonstrates a clear and radical dichotomy between queer and LGBT 
equality discourses (transform vs reform):  
This liberal model of “progression” is one of the primary ways many of us are ideologically 
trapped into a reformist way of thinking. To understand how gay marriage, like voting, will 
never lead to liberation, we can look to the histories of many “social justice movements” that 
only address oppressions on a level of the symptomatic. Gay marriage and voting are 
symbolic gestures that reinforce structures while claiming to reconfigure them.  This scheme 
will undoubtedly become apparent with “marriage equality” advocates. As they have 
positioned gay marriage as the last great civil rights battle, will they continue to fight after the 
Honeymoon? (Bornstein, 2014) 
In response, proponents of marriage equality argue that marriage does the opposite of 
depoliticising queer identities. They state that embedding oneself in an institution that is 
inherently heteronormative is the best way of challenging such accounts, with same-sex 
marriage acting as a catalyst for further political mobilisation. In the book The Marrying 
Kind? Debating Same-Sex Marriage within the Lesbian and Gay Movement (Bernstein & 
Taylor, 2013) various case studies are used to present different perspectives on the marriage 
equality debate. Heath (2013) argues that marriage is an act of “political testimony” in which 
thousands of LGBTQ individuals have exerted power and mobilised in often inherently 
conservative and discriminatory environments.  
Either way, the marriage equality debate, as divisive as it is, has drawn unprecedented 
attention (positive and negative) to LGBTQ causes. Whilst it is currently a central feature of 
LGBTQ socio-political, legal and historical discourses, issues around violence and 
discrimination remain prominent throughout the globe. Whether the trend of rights 
advancement in the West will continue, or whether the attainment of marriage equality 
represents the climax of LGBTQ citizenship, potentially to the detriment of much needed 
reformation/transformation, remains to be seen.  
Gay Rights as Human rights 
When discussing LGBTQ rights as human rights, most of the available literature refers to 
Hillary Clinton’s 2011 International Human Rights Day speech at the UN in Geneva in her 
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capacity as US Secretary of State, as a turning point for LGBTQ discourses in relation to 
global politics: 
Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethnic minority, being LGBT 
does not make you less human. And that is why gay rights are human rights, and human rights 
are gay rights … The Obama Administration defends the human rights of LGBT people as 
part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a priority of our foreign policy (Weber, 
2016a: 18).  
In that very moment, for better and for worse, Clinton intertwined LGBTQ politics with the 
international human rights framework, officially thrusting the (queer) subject into the realm 
of international relations. According to Altman & Symons (2016), Weber (2016a) and 
Langlois (2015), this was indeed a pivotal moment for human rights, LGBTQ rights and 
international relations (IR). However, many academics and activists differ in their views on 
how this proclamation by a leading (Western hegemonic) foreign affairs stakeholder, the 
United States, shaped perceptions of and reactions to global LGBTQ dispensations. 
Dennis Altman and Jonathan Symons dedicate a chapter to this theme “Queer Rights as 
Human Rights” in their book Queer Wars (2016: 73). In discussing international norms and 
global polarisation, the authors highlight the notion that in recent years LGBTQ rights have 
been a polarising dynamic in global politics, predominantly dividing states along the 
historical and hierarchical boundaries of “The West vs the Rest” and “Modern vs 
Traditional.” The LGBTQ issue, as it is often called in global forums, is simultaneously 
constructed and viewed as a discreet tool for Western intervention, further exacerbating the 
complex debate around defining universal human rights and its subsequent tensions with 
national sovereignty. Altman & Symons (2016) go further to state that this debate is a popular 
discourse amongst most contemporary queer activists, institutions and state entities. They 
claim that many governments are so hostile to the concept of LGBTQ rights as Human Rights 
that the persecution of LGBTQ people is of international concern, to the extent that “division 
over gay rights is undermining support for international human rights more generally” 
(Altman & Symons, 2016: 73). 
Anthony Langlois in his chapter “Human Rights, LGBT Rights, and International Theory” 
(2015) articulates a human rights approach to international relations, illustrating that the 
international politics of sexuality and gender are “consequential for international theory” 
(Langlois, 2015: 35). He discusses IR’s contemporary interest in the human rights concept, as 
well as the significance of sexuality within this framework. He emphasises, much like 
Cynthia Weber (2014), that although sexuality and queer theory are abundant in IR, the 
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discipline/field fails to effectively utilise LGBTQ perspectives, stating that human rights 
concepts and LGBTQ perspectives do not fit well with each other. He provides a critical 
examination in this regard and goes further to identify significant tensions between the two 
(Langlois, 2015). The author is particularly coherent in emphasising his approach when he 
states: “The familiar is first made strange, then used to make strange ways of looking at 
international politics familiar once again” (Langlois, 2015: 35). With this in mind, he 
demonstrates the need for an expansion of international human rights theory, identifying a 
significant gap in the literature on human rights and LGBTQ perspectives in critical IR. 
These critical engagements with international theory, LGBTQ politics and human rights 
provide a unique and necessary approach not only to LGBTQ perspectives, but also to human 
rights theory and international theory in general. Whilst LGBTQ rights as human rights play 
a significant role in globalising LGBTQ politics and rights advancement, such explorations 
create platforms to advance LGBTQ causes within global structures as well as within the 
discipline of international relations itself. 
Queer Theory 
Poststructuralist Theory 
Poststructuralism is associated with the writings of two prominent French philosophers, 
namely Michel Foucault (1978) and Jacques Derrida (1967). This discourse explores the 
interpretation of the “self” and the “social,” breaking with conventional epistemologies. This 
way of thinking has earned the label of “antifoundational thought,” defined by a refusal to 
accept individualism and agency as masters of a social body’s self. Poststructuralism thus 
challenges these associated assumptions by questioning subjectivity, social institutions and 
language, ultimately seeking to explore the constitution of subjectivity in social life rather 
than identifying an essential origin (Namaste, 1994).  
[Poststructuralism] argues that subjects are not the autonomous creators of themselves or their 
social worlds. Rather, subjects are embedded in a complex network of social relations. These 
relations in turn determine which subjects can appear where, and in what capacity. The 
subject is not something prior to politics or social structures, but is precisely constituted in 
and through specific sociopolitical arrangements. Poststructuralism contends that a focus on 
the individual as an autonomous agent needs to be "deconstructed," contested, and troubled 
(Namaste, 1994: 221).  
Through articulating his “repressive hypothesis” in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 
Michel Foucault (1979) considers the idea that sexuality has been repressed throughout 
history due to its “controversial” nature. He claims that there is a production of sexuality in 
various judicial, administrative and medical domains, highlighting the notion that speech 
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associated with sexuality has been prescribed (poststructuralism) rather than prohibited 
(structuralism). The work of Jacques Derrida (1967) is similar to that of Foucault. In Writing 
and Difference Derrida explores pairs of concepts that are diametrically opposed, which he 
calls “binary oppositions” (man vs woman, heterosexual vs homosexual). He argues that 
these “oppositions” are unstable and ultimately break down because the value of each term 
relies on its (power) relationship with its opposition (Jagose, 1996).  
Three recurring themes emerge in the work of both Foucault (1978) and Derrida (1967). 
Firstly, they both adopt an antifoundational stance, rejecting the “voluntaristic” understanding 
of agency whereby individual power dictates responsibility and ability; secondly, both 
authors interrogate the productive nature of power; and thirdly they insist on a need for 
reflection with regards to the terminologies (identities) that are assigned as the basis for 
political action. Such themes are aligned with the foundations of Queer Theory, and although 
Foucault (1978) and Derrida (1967) are not necessarily its “founders,” Queer Theory forms 
part of a broader poststructuralist project:  
Queer theory employs a number of ideas from poststructuralist theory, including Jacques 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic models of decentred, unstable identity, Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstruction of binary conceptual and linguistic structures, and, of course, Foucault’s 
model of discourse, knowledge and power. Predictably, it does not have a single moment of 
origin, but is often retrospectively identified as beginning to be crystallised at a series of 
academic conferences in the United States in the late 1980s that addressed gay and lesbian 
topics in relation to poststructuralist theories (Spargo, 1999: 40). 
 
Queer(ing) Theory 
The term “queer” has taken on many different forms throughout the twentieth and twenty first 
centuries. It was once slang for homosexual, but transformed into a derogatory term used as 
weapon for homophobic abuse. More recently ‘queer’ has been appropriated in ways that 
strip it of its historical violence. Sometimes it is an umbrella term for non-cisgender, non-
heterosexual identity; at other times it is deployed as a political formation of “Otherness” as a 
verb and a noun, or it is used to describe a developing theoretical model that emerged out of 
feminism, gay and lesbian studies. It is in itself a complex term; within its very nature ‘queer’ 
resists precise definitions out of a desire to repel any form of disciplinary and/or normalising 
regimes. Judith Butler, one of the “founders” of queer theory, states that “normalising the 
queer would be, after all, its sad finish” (Butler 1993: 21). Annamarie Jagose (1996) goes 
further to state: “To attempt an overview of queer theory and to identify it as a significant 
school of thought, which those in pursuit of general knowledge should be familiar with, is to 
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risk domesticating it, and fixing it in ways that queer theory resists fixing itself” (Jagose, 
1996:1-2). There are, however, a number of core values that remain consistent throughout the 
various developments, combinations and contributions of queer theorising (Jagose, 1996).  
While there is no critical consensus on the definitional limits of queer – indeterminacy being 
one of its widely promoted charms – its general outlines are frequently sketched and debated. 
Broadly speaking, queer describes those gestures or analytical models which dramatise 
incoherences in the allegedly stable relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual 
desire. Resisting that model of stability – which claims heterosexuality as its origin, when it is 
more properly its effect – queer focuses on mismatches between sex, gender and desire 
(Jagose, 1996: 3).  
In the late 1980s queer theory emerged in academic circles in conjunction with a wave of 
queer activism that was sparked by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  Its postmodern, 
poststructuralist and social constructionist approaches to sexual and gender identity inspired 
both activist and academic thinking – a discourse that has maintained prominence over the 
past two to three decades.  Drawing from the original works of Judith Butler (1990a,1990b) 
and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990), as well as numerous later contributions, queer theory 
took shape both from feminist challenges to gender as essential, and from gay and lesbian 
studies’ explorations of sexuality and social constructions. Queer theory thus expands the 
subject focus beyond that of the homosexual, encompassing any sexual identity and/or 
behaviour that can be associated with a normative vs deviant dichotomy. Through attempting 
to debunk stable and correlated sexes, genders and sexualities, queer theory develops from 
the (gay and lesbian) reworking of a poststructuralist approach to a focus on identity, framing 
it as a grouping or gathering of numerous unstable positions.  
With reference to Judith Butler’s (1993) Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of 
Sex, Turner (2000) states:  
The basic approach, central to queer theory, is the investigation of foundational, seemingly 
indisputable concepts, such as “matter.” Queer theorists perform those investigations with an 
eye to tracing the historical development of those concepts and their contributions to 
definitions of “sex” and “gender” such that differences of power along those axes of identity 
pervade our culture at a level that resists fulsomely the  ministrations of political actions 
conventionally defined. Could it be that effective resistance to violence, much less 
meaningful access to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, requires not merely more 
legislation, however necessary legislation may be, but also a fundamental reconceptualisation 
of the political, beginning with our understanding of individual identity as the foundation of 
political organisation and action? (Turner, 2000: 3).  
In his book A Genealogy of Queer Theory William Turner (2000) explores a 1998 New York 
Times article by Dinitia Smith in which she discusses the queer theoretical contributions of 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick who, like Butler, is considered one of the “founders” of queer 
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theory. Turner (1996) argues against attempts to “simplify” queer thought whilst noting 
significant challenges in translating queer theory. He highlights that through queer lenses 
“relationships among desire, repressions, and politics become matters for scrutiny” and that 
“one cannot understand desire and repression without understanding gender, which  in our 
culture is inextricably related to sexual practice and sexual identity” (Turner, 2000: 4). He 
critiques the notion that Sedgewick and Butler were the first to deploy “queer” to describe 
such intellectual endeavours. He refers to feminist film theorist Teresa de Lauretis’s use of 
queer theory through questioning the position of women in language and the conceptual 
regimes constructed by men, all within the context of a social and political order that 
violently excludes women, except for the purpose of commodification.  Turner (2000) argues 
that: “It is impossible to understand queer theory fully without first understanding something 
about the specifically and emphatically feminist concerns that motivated Lauretis, Sedgwick, 
Butler and others” (Turner, 2000: 5).  
Queer (ing) International Relations  
Queer Theory has expanded globally since its inception in the early 1990s, more specifically 
in the form of Global Queer Studies (Weber, 2014a). It has also extended into the field of 
international relations, with much resistance from conventional IR scholars who challenge its 
disciplinary stability. Cynthia Weber (1999, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016a) has, since the 
publication of her book Faking it: U.S. Hegemony in a "post-phallic" Era, (Weber, 1999) 
propelled Queer into the discipline of international relations (IR). She has subsequently 
published a number of texts that develop what is now termed “Queer IR” and its theoretical 
frameworks, whilst arguing in favour of its utility in understanding international 
relations/global politics. This has informed many theoretical, conceptual and analytical 
developments that have contributed to and made use of Queer IR perspectives, including 
Puar’s (2007b) concepts of Homonationalism and Homopopulism – a product of this study 
(see Chapter 5). Whilst Queer IR is a relatively new field, the contributions of Cynthia Weber 
and various queer scholars continue to demonstrate the utility and theoretical potential of 
Queer IR. Accordingly, Queer IR and Homonationalism form the theoretical core of this 
study, as will be discussed in the dedicated theory chapter (see Chapter 4).  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a historical overview of LGBT and Queer, more specifically during the 
20th and 21st centuries. In an attempt to contextualise the broader debate around 
Homonationalism (see Chapter 4) and more recently Homopopulism (see Chapter 5), this 
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review has a central role within the broader context of this study. By exploring the 
complexities and tensions associated with the range of terminologies, it reveals the political 
formations with which various segments of the LGBTQ community align themselves. 
Through analysing historical persecutions, this chapter demonstrates the purpose and need for 
the formation of prominent LGBTQ social movements in the latter half of the 20th century, 
and what the consequences were of those formations for LGBTQ politics. An exploration of 
these social movements, their methodologies of resistance and their tensions, exposes 
established hierarchies and divisions specifically played out within heteronormative (and 
homonormative) state institutions, their reform and/or transformation and the associated 
collusions. These debates manifested in the political deployment of LGBTQ, particularly 
with the formation of the marriage equality movement and the thrusting of queer politics into 
the realm of global politics (LGBTQ rights as human rights). Finally, a review of LGBTQ as 
an academic enterprise provides the necessary contextualisation and historical background of 
the theoretical and conceptual frameworks which this study applied as analytical tools, more 
specifically Queer Theory (Queer IR and Homonationalism).  
This historical and literature review has demonstrated the evolving nature of LGBTQ politics; 
by tracking its development this chapter has positioned these histories within the broader 
context of LGBTQ politics in the 21st century. Such an exploration could contribute 
significantly to understanding why and how a shift in LGBTQ politics is taking place (from 
Homonationalism to Homopopulism). Whilst the necessary historical and scholarly insights 
have provided a foundation from which to proceed with this study, a further review is 
required in order to fully contextualise LGBTQ politics within the 21st century. 
Consequently, Chapter 3 will provide a review of the contemporary geopolitics of Europe and 
North America; the chapter will explore themes that specifically impact on LGBTQ politics 
in these regions, particularly in conversation with Homonationalism. The recent rise of 
populist-nationalism in historically mature liberal democracies in Europe and North America 
may have implications for the LGBTQ community across the globe. Certain events, such as 
the war on terror, the EU migration crisis and the Orlando massacre, have led to a push-back 
against globalisation, multiculturalism and liberal democratic internationalist values, and in 
order to understand why this has occurred, a historical and literature review is required. A 
specific focus on conceptualising populism, nationalism and populist-nationalism is 
necessary, particularly for the purpose of theorising Homopopulism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Populism & Western Politics  
Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview and contextualisation of 21st century politics in Europe 
and North America. It also explores the rise of right-wing populism within the broader study 
of populist-nationalism and LGBTQ politics in these historically mature liberal democratic 
regions. This is in order to provide the necessary contextualisation, historically and 
theoretically, of the politics and scholarship that inform the study of populism and so-called 
Western geopolitics – key areas of inquiry that are addressed in the problem statement, 
research questions and overall study.  
The wave of national elections that took place across some of the world’s most prominent 
liberal democracies in the period of 2016 to 2017 translated a widely debated geopolitical 
shift into an unprecedented reality. Whilst a number of prominent geopolitical events have 
impacted on a rapidly globalising world since the beginning of the 21st century, the politics of 
Europe and North America have been at the heart of a culmination of global political 
developments, internal dynamics and contextual outcomes because of their hegemonic 
positioning in a predominantly liberal democratic internationalist (and since the1970s, 
neoliberal) world order. Discourses seeking to challenge the (neo)liberal status quo have 
grown in prominence in recent years, particularly as a result of the capitalisation of fear 
politics as a reaction to catastrophic global events, among other things. The rise of right-wing 
populist-nationalism in Europe and North America is thus a result of a culmination of 
historical, contextual and circumstantial dynamics that have framed the Western world, and 
the Western nation-state more specifically, as a gradually failing political hegemon, incapable 
of protecting its sovereignty and interests in the midst of rapid globalisation and subsequent 
global security threats.  
After WWII populist discourses fell generally silent following the atrocities that occurred 
under the fascist regimes that dominated Europe during the 1930s and 1940s. The appeal of 
populism, however, has steadily increased since the 1980s. Whilst alignments have varied 
over the years, prominent global events, including the war on terror, the global financial crisis 
and the EU migration crisis, have reinforced the tendencies driven by populist rhetoric and 
subsequent support in many traditionally liberal democratic dispensations. The growth of 
populist political parties such as Front National (FN) in France, the Alternative for Germany 
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(AFD) in Germany and the ascendance of populist governments in Poland and Hungary, all 
point to a dramatic shift in support for  right-wing populist politics. Furthermore, the election 
of Donald Trump as US President in 2016, as well as the UK voting to leave the EU (Brexit), 
collectively demonstrate that electoral outlets are gradually aligning with populist sentiments 
in the traditionally liberal democratic internationalist centres of Europe and North America 
(Abromeit, 2017).  
In order to understand the politics of the 21st century and the subsequent rise of populist-
nationalism in Europe and North America, as indicated in the research questions and problem 
statement of this study (see Chapter 1), this chapter will provide both an historical 
contextualisation of the politics of Europe and North America as well as an historical review 
of the development of populism as scholarship, on an epistemological level, and as politics. 
The chapter begins by exploring the terminology associated with populism, particularly with 
regard to the ideological dispensations of left-wing vs right-wing populism. It highlights that 
this study focus specifically on right-wing populism (populist-nationalism) in Europe and 
North America, as discussed in Chapter 1. The present chapter then seeks to provide an 
historical contextualisation of 21st century politics by exploring prominent and far-reaching 
global events and responses such as the war on terror, the global financial crisis and the EU 
migration crisis, among others. It frames this contextualisation to expose a growing backlash 
against globalisation and the subsequent rise of populist-nationalism.  
This chapter goes further to provide a historical review of the academic study of and political 
development of populism. It begins by exploring the continued debate around defining 
populism, whilst providing various conceptualisations of the different types of populism. It 
notes that even today populism is volatile and ever-changing, and that defining it within rigid 
binaries remains unilluminating. Finally, this chapter tracks the intellectual development of 
populism dating back to the 1960s. It then seeks to provide an overview of the various 
“waves” of scholarship on populism that developed subsequently, whilst noting a significant 
increase in the study of populism within a contemporary context.  
The next section will explore the terminology associated with populism, nationalism, and 
left-wing and right-wing ideology. This is in order to fully understand the varying ideological 
strands associated with populism, particularly that which informs the new politics of Europe 
and North America.    
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Terminology 
Left-Wing Populism vs Right-Wing Populism 
According to Rooduijin & Akkerman (2017), populist political parties, with their “host 
ideology” (left-wing or right-wing) aside, are united in their critique of what they term “the 
establishment” (status quo). Huber & Schimpf (2017) argue that the host ideology of a 
populist movement inherently determines against whom “the people” should rally or unite 
against (Katsambekis, 2017: 205). These authors claim that left-wing populist entities define 
“the people” based on class, with a particular focus on the poor and working class. Right-
wing populist entities, on the other hand, define “the people” on the basis of multi-class 
culture, nationality and ethnicity. Left-wing populist entities construct their criticisms through 
socio-economic lenses with the purpose of “protecting” and “empowering” the proletariat 
against the backlash of capitalism (populist-socialism). Right-wing populist entities, on the 
other hand, seek to defend national parameters such as culturalism, nativism and ethnicity 
through political, social and economic strategies, all with the purpose of protecting “the 
nation” from “others” (populist-nationalism) (Mudde, 2007). In summary, left-wing and 
right-wing populism differ in that they embody radically inclusive (left-wing) compared to 
radically exclusive (right-wing) perceptions of society (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).  
Whilst left-wing populist entities can be inclusive on a societal level, it is important to note 
that they are often anti-pluralistic on a political level. Using democracy as the assumed 
political system, particularly in considering the case studies discussed in Chapter 1 (Europe 
and North America), left-wing and right-wing populism can be demonstrated through 
focusing on their interactions with the central features of democracy, more specifically 
political inclusion and political contestation (Dahl, 1971). With specific reference to minority 
rights, which occupy a central role in measuring democratic and pluralistic societies, left-
wing populist entities generally do not oppose minority rights for as long as they do not 
present political competition, as they present themselves as the only viable representatives of 
“the people.” As such, left-wing populism (populist-socialism) is exclusive and anti-
pluralistic when it comes to power and public contestations; for example, the democratic 
principles of institutional power and effective opposition are viewed as barriers for 
implementing “the peoples’ will” (e.g. the opposition and the media are colluding to prevent 
the liberation/freedom of our people) (Huber & Schimpf, 2017). Yet they can be seemingly 
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inclusive (in their rhetoric) when it comes to societal and political participation (Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).  
Right-wing populist entities are inherently exclusive with reference to all of the 
abovementioned societal dynamics. Through employing the politics of fear and intolerance, 
right-wing populism (populist-nationalism) objects to affording rights to political 
participation to minorities as they view themselves as the only representatives of “the people” 
(e.g. immigrants should not have voting rights/equal citizenship). At face value, left-wing and 
right-wing populism may seem easy to define; the former advocates for radical inclusivity, 
the latter for radical exclusivity. Whilst both may share ideas around political contestation 
and power, it is also common for these two host ideologies to overlap in a contextual striving 
to incite fear and/or popularity. Furthermore, there are populist entities that do not have fixed 
ideologies; Havlík and Stanley (2015) argue that such entities are known as “centrist 
populist”, particularly in that their policy proposals are inconsistent (Huber & Schimpf, 
2017).  
The scope of this study includes an exploration of right-wing populism and populist-
nationalism in Europe and North America. Accordingly, any reference to “populism” in this 
study will imply right-wing populism and populist-nationalism, unless otherwise indicated. 
Furthermore, considering their shared definition, and in an attempt to vary the terminology of 
this study, the terms “right-wing populism” and “populist-nationalism” will be used 
interchangeably throughout.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 43 | P a g e  
 
Figure 3.1: A comparative summary of the characteristics of right-wing and left-wing 
populism in traditionally liberal democratic societies in Europe and North America. 
Right-wing Populism 
(Populist-nationalism) 
Left-wing Populism 
(Populist-socialism) 
 Radically exclusive 
 The politics of fear and intolerance 
 Critiques “the establishment” and “elite” 
(Liberal, multiculturalism, globalisation) 
 Populist-nationalism 
 “The people” are selective multi-class 
ethnic, nationality, culture  
 Protect “the nation” from “others” 
 Politically anti-pluralistic  
 Supportive of political participation 
(direct democracy) 
 Intolerant of opposition and institutional 
resistance  
 Limited minority rights 
 Alternative for Germany (Germany); 
Front National (France) 
 
 Radically inclusive 
 The politics of fear 
 Critiques “the establishment” and “elite” 
(The rich, neoliberalism, capitalism, 
globalisation). 
 Populist-socialism 
 “The people” are the poor and working 
class 
 Protect the proletariat from capitalists 
(neoliberalism)  
 Politically anti-pluralistic 
 Supportive of political participation 
(direct democracy) 
 Intolerant of opposition and institutional 
resistance 
 Selective minority rights 
 Syriza (Greece)  
 
(The Author) 
The next section will provide an historical overview of 21st century geopolitics, specifically in 
(but not limited to) Europe and North America. In doing so, it will explore some the events 
that have acted as catalysts for, as well as continuing to promote, a populist-nationalist 
resurgence in historically mature liberal democracies.  
Historical Contextualisation 
The War on Terror 
On 11 September 2001 four United States (US) commercial aircraft were hijacked by 
operatives of the radical Islamist global terror network Al-Qaeda. Two of the planes were 
diverted to New York, where they crashed into the two towers of the World Trade Centre, the 
symbolic heart of America’s global economic complex. The third plane flew to Washington, 
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DC, the capital of the USA, where it crashed into the country’s defence headquarters, the 
Pentagon. The final aeroplane’s target was the US Capitol, the legislative centre of the 
Federal establishment. As a result of the intervention of passengers and crew, this plane 
crashed in a field in Pennsylvania (Hayden et al., 2016). This prominent global event came to 
be known as 9/11 and, whilst it was not the first attack on the US by radical Islamic groups, it 
resulted in thousands of deaths as the largest attack on American soil since Pearl Harbour 
(Rapoport, 2017). 
The political and psychological implications of 9/11 were inherently global, resulting in a 
radical realignment of US domestic and foreign policy, particularly with regards to security. 
Newly adopted narratives also almost exclusively associated global terrorism with religious 
fundamentalism (Rapoport, 2017). President George. W Bush articulated the government’s 
response at the time in a speech to a Joint Session of Congress, where he officially declared a 
war on terror: “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government which 
supports them. Our war . . . will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated” (Bush, 2001: 68).  
In that very moment a major redistribution of political power took place within the United 
States, with a renewed authority afforded to the country’s formidable security apparatus at 
home and abroad. Surveillance technologies and strategies were heightened drastically, with 
drone warfare and small-scale military operations becoming the new norm. After large-scale 
military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the years that followed, the USA 
demonstrated that it was prepared to act without the full support of its allies and established 
global institutional frameworks (Hayden et al., 2016).   
Whilst the joint US-UK invasion of Iraq was highly contested amongst global actors, the 
intervention in Afghanistan was afforded wide support. The USA’s Western allies were 
conflicted about the aggressive response to 9/11. However, following attacks in the UK and 
Spain, amongst other places, many European states established joint security networks and 
operations in an attempt to collectively coordinate the response to terrorism. Since then, the 
War on Terror has been steeped in controversy, often involving overt surveillance, human 
rights violations and torture. The policy itself has been widely debated, evolved, and drawn 
on ever-changing levels of support. The Obama administration oversaw a radical shift in US 
foreign policy, evincing a more pacified rhetoric, accompanied by more technologically 
advanced, small-scale and precise interventions (e.g. drone warfare) (Hayden et al., 2016).  
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As a result, the War on Terror, in whatever shape or form, has had a profound impact on 
global geopolitics, particularly amongst prominent liberal democracies. In present-day 
popular political rhetoric, a re-emergence of securitised narratives has resulted in the 
adoption of the war on terror as a means to enhance nostalgic politicking and fear-mongering 
in response to ever-changing forms of global terrorism.   
The Global Financial Crisis 
In mid-2007 a collection of unprecedented events in the global financial markets triggered the 
most severe global financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. After 2008 the 
global financial crisis (GFC) demonstrated both the economic severity and drastic geographic 
reach of economic and financial turmoil in an ever-growing volatile, interlinked and 
globalised international system. Two events with geopolitical significance occurred between 
2007 and 2009: the first was the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the second was the meeting 
of the G-20 heads of government in Pittsburgh. These two events marked the beginning and, 
possibly, the beginning of the end of the global financial crisis respectively. The financial 
crisis itself was inherently global, although most literature tends to focus on the USA, the 
decline in growth that affected virtually every single country in the world, although the 
impact was predominantly on the European and North American (neoliberal) economies 
(Claessens et al., 2014). 
The rapid and highly coordinated mobilisation of international response was unique in itself; 
the G-20 emerged as a result, overshadowing the exclusive G-7 group, thus indicating a 
pivotal shift in the global political order. Emerging markets were least effected by the crisis 
because, some analysts claim, their rigid credit controls and broader market regulation. These 
countries now had a seat at the table and were no longer disregarded as economic inferiors. A 
highly criticised globally coordinated “stimulus package” emerged as a response to the crisis, 
repositioning the global financial institutions such as the IMF and indicating unprecedented 
levels of global political and economic cooperation (Birdsall, 2012). There have been 
numerous debates on the causes of the 2008 global financial crisis; ideological clashes 
become ever more exposed with policy makers; social scientists and economists attempting to 
answer questions on how it occurred and thus how to prevent it from happening again 
(Crotty, 2009).  
According to most political economic analysts attempting to investigate the causes of the 
2008 global financial crisis, the failure to put in place effective regulatory systems played an 
integral role. Robert Wade’s (2009) “The Global Slump: Deeper Causes and Harder Lessons” 
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states that one of these regulatory failures was the moment in 1999 when the US Congress 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, a measure that had been introduced in 1933 in wake of the 
Great Depression in order to prevent financial institutions from engaging in the speculative 
actions that led to the 1929 Wall Street crash. Germain (2009) makes the point about the 
2008 crisis: 
This crisis has revealed the unprecedented vulnerability of the financial system as a whole 
when activities of all systemically significant financial institutions are not in some way 
supervised by regulatory officials with a mandate for system-wide stability. Such institutions 
range from mortgage providers to hedge funds to private wealth funds to insurance firms to 
(until September 2008) investment banks. It is not that these institutions have not been 
regulated; rather, it is that the manner in which they were regulated did not take into account 
their potential impact on the overall financial system. They have been regulated in terms of 
micro-prudential rather than macro-prudential rationales (Germain, 2009: 678). 
However, such regulatory failures are not stand-alone causes; the crisis consists of an array 
phenomena converging at the same time, including global imbalances and income inequality. 
The rapid growth of developing economies and the global economy at large during the years 
of 2003 to 2007 was perceived as an indication of sustained long-term growth in the future, 
but according to Wade (2009), this was based on a flawed growth model. As a result, 
politicians, academics and ordinary citizens alike, particularly in Europe and North America, 
criticised the very structural composition of the global economic system. The political, 
economic and psychological implications of the GFC were as far-reaching as the collapse 
itself. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their jobs, their homes and their livelihoods 
because of events taking place beyond their control and even their own borders. Many 
entities began to capitalise on the emotion and fear associated with economic integration, and 
so the anti-neoliberal, anti-global, protectionist and isolationist rhetoric of politicians, 
particularly those in the populist camp, became ever more appealing to broader populations. 
The backlash against globalisation had begun. 
The Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS 
In December 2010 protests erupted in Tunisia following a government crackdown. A year 
later nation-wide protests spread to a number of countries throughout the Middle East and 
North African region (MEDA). Most of the mass action expressed a common desire for 
regime change, as most of these governments were inherently authoritarian in nature. Whilst 
democratic dispensations were established in Tunisia, violent incursions occurred in Libya, 
Egypt and Syria, eventually developing into full-blown revolutions and civil wars. This 
unprecedented and unpredictable wave of events came to be known as the Arab Spring, 
which resulted in the inherent destabilisation of the broader North African and Middle East 
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region. Incursions, counter-incursions, rebellions, government crackdowns, coups and 
counter-coups, and international interventions have dominated the complex turmoil that 
resulted following the Arab Spring uprisings. To this day a civil war continues to rage in 
Syria with a number of international actors involved. Libya is yet to hold free and fair 
elections or establish a stable government, whilst Egypt has struggled to deal with the conflict 
between a secular vs non-secular dispensation that has resulted in further oppression 
(Hazbun, 2017).  
As a result, a number of radical groups formed out of the widespread conflict, particularly 
radical Islamist groups that were once kept in check by secular authoritarian regimes. The 
most prominent of these groups is the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), formed out of a desire to 
establish their own sovereignty, security and alternative world view that inherently embodies 
the notions of jihad, Sharia law and anti-West discourses (Hamid et al., 2017). ISIS was 
successful in gaining territory in Northern and Central Syria; their ideological dispensation 
was forced upon hundreds of thousands of individuals falling both within and outside of their 
sphere of influence. The group has been immensely successful in terms of foreign recruitment 
and has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks including the 2016 Paris 
attacks and the Orlando massacre, among others. Whilst ISIS has lost most of its territorial 
gains, it remains one of the most prominent threats to Western security. Following the rise of 
ISIS and the Arab Spring more broadly, one of the greatest humanitarian crises has ensued 
throughout the North African and Middle East region. Mass migrations as a response to 
persecution and conflict have resulted in an influx of refugees crossing into Europe, creating 
tensions amongst European nations with regard to their commitments to EU principles such 
as integrated government, human rights and the free movement of people (Bremberg, 2016).  
Brexit and the EU Crisis  
In 2015 and 2016 the European Union (EU) experienced an unprecedented influx of refugees 
and migrants attempting to enter the regional community through various ports of entry by 
land and sea including Greece, Italy and Hungary. In a space of a year over one million 
people arrived at EU borders fleeing the nearby conflict in Syria, amongst others. This 
protracted humanitarian crisis resulted in a large-scale political crisis within the EU, 
particularly with regard to joint and individual responses from member states. In 1985 the EU 
had established what would be known as the Schengen Agreement. This agreement abolished 
internal border regulation amongst EU member states, thus allowing for the free movement of 
people, goods and capital within what was known as the eurozone. Whilst there are 
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agreements with regard to safeguarding the external borders of the Schengen area, once an 
individual enters the Eurozone, internal regulations with regard to movement are almost non-
existent (The EU Commission, 2017).  
As a result, when vast numbers of people began entering and gathering at European member 
states borders, the EU governance framework was not necessarily equipped to deal with a 
crisis of this magnitude and for such a protracted period of time. Hungary for example, under 
the leadership of a Eurosceptical right-wing government, went against agreed-upon 
EU/Schengen regulations and permanently sealed its internal and external borders. This 
created a knock-on reaction from EU law makers, governments and citizens, who began to 
simultaneously question and seek to rectify what seemed to be an internal rebellion among a 
handful of EU member states, whilst also dealing with one of the largest humanitarian crises 
in post-WWII history. Germany, on other hand, despite the defiance of many of its citizens 
and European partners, decided to allow refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict to enter the 
country. For the growing populist-nationalist movements throughout Europe, this was a 
prime moment to capitalise on the fears of European citizens and radically drive their 
Eurosceptical agendas (Kallius, et al., 2016).  
At the same time, the UK was debating its own status within the EU. Having joined the 
developing European Community in 1973 with special privileges, the UK sought to maintain 
much of its own governance mechanisms, including regulation of its borders and its own 
currency. Populist-nationalist movements within the UK saw the EU migration crisis and the 
EU’s response as a threat to state sovereignty. Following a number of terrorist attacks in the 
UK and on mainland Europe, many European citizens saw entering migrants as a potential 
“Trojan Horse” in that terrorist groups, such as ISIS, could harbour their supporters amongst 
refugees within EU borders. Thus a culmination of political and economic events, the politics 
of fear and a rising right-wing movement, saw the United Kingdom voting to withdraw from 
the EU in a popular referendum in 2016, a move that would significantly weaken both the 
UK and the EU (Norris & Inglehart, 2016). 
The EU migrant crisis and Brexit confronted post-WWII liberal democratic-internationalist 
global political systems with unprecedented political tests. According to those within the 
populist-nationalist camp, the status quo was failing to address a number of global security 
concerns. As a result, electorates within the UK and the EU are beginning to demonstrate a 
shift in political behaviour, a shift that, as electoral outcomes have shown, is gradually 
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leaning towards these right-wing and populist-nationalist sentiments (Norris & Inglehart, 
2016).   
The Orlando Massacre 
On 12 June 2016, in the midst of a heated presidential campaign between Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump, an ISIS affiliate entered Pulse, an LGBTQ night club in Orlando, Florida, and 
opened fire using an automatic weapon. As a result, 49 of the predominately gay patrons 
were killed, marking it as the single most violent attack on the LGBTQ community in 
America. At the time it was also the most violent terrorist attack on US soil since 9/11. 
Whilst ISIS and various radical Islamic groups actively opposed the LGBTQ community, 
often posting videos of executions of gay, lesbian and Trans* individuals residing in their 
spheres of influence, this was the first direct attack by a radical Islamic group on the LGBTQ 
community of a mass scale on the soil of a liberal democratic nation (New York Times, 
2018). 
As expected, the United States government under the leadership of then President Obama 
condemned the attack, along with Democratic hopeful Hillary Clinton. Donald Trump also 
condemned the attack and, unlike many other right-wing politicians, his rhetoric was 
inherently unorthodox in that he promised to “protect” the LGBTQ community from “violent 
foreign ideologies.” This narrative was similarly adopted by other populist-nationalist leaders 
in Europe and North America including Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen and the AFD, marking 
a significant shift in the traditionally anti-LGBTQ narratives of right-wing populist 
politicians (Lotter, 2018).  
The global implications of the Orlando massacre have not been adequately explored in 
academic terms, particularly as it represents a marked shift in LGBTQ politics. More 
members of the LGBTQ community are being enticed into succumbing to the populist-
nationalist rhetoric of Homopopulism (see Chapter 5) and are now openly supporting right-
wing populist entities. This interaction between the politics of queer and the politics of fear 
requires further academic exploration (Lotter, 2018).   
* 
The Backlash against Globalisation 
Globalisation can encompass many different areas; whilst predominantly referred to as a 
political economic phenomenon, there are prominent elements of cultural and national 
integration as well. The origins of the present-day dominant globalised political order are to 
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be found in the post-WWII Bretton Woods conference, where a number of countries met to 
establish systems of free trade, open markets and global financial institutionalism. As a result, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) were established with the purpose of integrating national economies 
within a shared global economic system. This liberal discourse was formed on the basis that 
global integration would inherently ensure a peaceful and prosperous world. In the decades 
that followed, global integration expanded across the globe, particularly in Europe and North 
America. This extended to regional systems as well and by 1993 the European Union (EU) 
was established as the first highly integrated regional economic and political structure. The 
free movement and circulation of people, goods, capital and infrastructure dominated this 
liberal internationalist discourse, including the further integration of political and governance 
mechanisms (Frieden, 2018).   
Recent events, including the election of Donald Trump, Brexit and the rise of right-wing 
populism throughout Europe and North America, demonstrate a growing backlash against 
globalisation in all forms, as each of these events inadvertently represent anti-global and 
protectionist narratives – their antithesis. Following an array of prominent global events, 
including the war on terror and the global financial crisis, among others, the electorates of 
Europe and North America have increasingly upset the post-WWII liberal democratic 
internationalist political status quo by voting to resist and roll back on political, economic and 
cultural globalisation. Integration also allowed for the diversification of cultural norms; this 
was particularly evident in urban centres throughout Europe and North America. Whilst 
many individuals, particularly the intellectual elites, embraced the emergence of 
cosmopolitan centres, they were equally met with growing resentment and fear perpetuated 
by a combination of populist rhetoric and catastrophic global events. The “foreign other,” 
whether in the form of cultural integration or immigration, has emerged at the centre of both 
prominent debates and subsequent radical shifts in the geopolitics of Europe and North 
America. The fear of immigration has indeed come to occupy the most dominant space 
within the broader backlash against globalisation; however, this is not exclusive of political 
and economic narratives. As a result, a growing nationalist rhetoric, perpetuated by populist 
politics, has seen the backlash against globalisation manifest in the hardening of racial, 
ethnic, cultural and national boundaries (Short, 2016).  
The next section will explore populism as an academic discipline and examine its 
epistemology  in order to clarify its historical and theoretical contribution to this study. It will 
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demonstrate how populism has developed as a field of study in the disciplines of Political 
Science and International Relations.  
Developing Scholarship on Populism  
Defining Populism 
Despite extensive academic explorations of the nature of populism, there is little consensus 
on how to define the concept. Most scholars agree that “populism worships the people” 
(Ionescu & Gellner, 1969: 4), though there is limited agreement beyond that shared 
characteristic. There are equally conflicting views on how to operationalise it. Structuralists 
argue the importance of macro socio-economic factors, institutionalists highlight the 
prominence of national aspects such as social norms and constructivists emphasise the role of 
agents, voters, leaders and their roles in acting and playing on traumas, fears and emotions at 
an individual level (Pappas, 2016). Where there is consensus is that the term itself originated 
as a formal conception at a conference at the London School of Economics in 1967. Ghita 
Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969) later compiled a book which presented the findings of a 
diverse gathering of experts. In doing so, the authors documented the first attempt to define 
populism, whilst arguing the importance of understanding populism as a concept. However, 
much like today, they problematised that there is an uncertainty around explaining it:  
There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear 
just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up 
everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? Or 
does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies? (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969: 1). 
A few years later in the 1970s and 1980s two main approaches dominated deliberations on 
the implications of the term. The first was associated with modernisation theory, the second 
with structural Marxism. Their shortcomings were that they understood populism to be the 
consequence of historical and political factors associated with the developing, post-colonial 
and peripheral worlds (Pappas, 2014). In line with the prominence of constructivist thought, 
the 1990s witnessed a new wave of populism studies whereby the roles of both leaders and 
supporters were critiqued. In the 21st century the scope of the concept of populism has 
expanded extensively and as a result some scholars have argued it has a reduced analytical 
utility (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Considering the importance and prominence of populism in 
the 21st century, it is imperative to explore recent attempts to define the concept before 
attempting to expand on its modern intellectual journey. 
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Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron (2013) in their working paper titled “Varieties of 
Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda” take on the challenge and attempt to 
define the concept of populism. The authors identify three conceptual approaches in existing 
literature, namely populism as ideology, populism as a discursive style, and populism as a 
political formation, all of which will be discussed below.  
Populism as Ideology 
Populism as an ideology and movement can be employed through various socio-political 
contexts, by different actors and through numerous mechanisms. Political parties and leaders 
may be populists, particularly identified through their narratives in public forums. Cas Mudde 
(2004) in her piece “The Populist Zeitgeist,” explores populism through the lens of public 
discourse. Commenting on Mudde’s (2004) two prominent understandings of public 
populism, Dinc (2016) states:  
First is the politics of the public, meaning “highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is 
directed at the ‘gut feelings’ of the people.” Second is the “opportunistic policies with the aim 
of (quickly) pleasing the people/voters.” Building up on these two general assumptions, 
Mudde defines populism as follows: “An ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the 
corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people” (Dinc, 2016: 7).  
Populism as Discourse 
Populism as discourse is formed as a discursive style and/or narrative that disseminates 
throughout the broader society. This style is more specifically constructed through a 
dichotomy of us (the people) versus them (the corrupt elite). Bonikowski & Gidron (2013) do 
not define this as an ideology as they see it rather as mode of political expression, deployed 
politically and strategically across the spectrum (left, right, liberal, conservative etc.). Bale et. 
al. (2011) identify a possible relationship between the media and populism as discourse, 
highlighting the notion that political leaders are often branded as populists if they appear in 
the media more frequently than others. It appears then that this definition provides a fluid 
conceptualisation of populism, particularly in that it describes populism as a form of politics 
rather than a rigid categorisation of actors (Dinc, 2016).  
Populism as Politics  
Bonikowski & Gidron’s (2013) third approach seeks to expose populisms’ contextual limits 
and fluid nature, going further to highlight the notion that populism is a political strategy. 
Dinc (2016) argues that these strategies could be associated with policy objectives such as 
nationalisation and economic redistribution, and/or securing the support of prominent 
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political parties, leaders and (majority) segments of society. Levistsky and Roberts (2011) 
describe populism as “a top-down political mobilisation of mass constituencies by 
personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an 
ill-defined pueblo” (Levistsky & Roberts, 2011). This approach thus suggests that populism 
is not necessarily a “bottom-up” approach as commonly implied. In fact, it argues that 
charismatic leaders (acting on behalf of ‘the people’) seek to redefine both the will of the 
people and the people themselves in order to challenge the establishment. Pinar Dinc (2016) 
states: 
This definition suggests that in politics populism may be used as a strategy for policy making, 
political organization, and forms of mobilization within different economic, historical, and 
political contexts. Political actors, especially charismatic leaders, are important actors in 
populist politics as they offer a way to not only explain what populism is but also evaluate the 
mechanisms through which they proceed (Dinc, 2016: 7). 
Furthermore, in referring to Jan-Werner Müller’s What is Populism? (2016), Abroheim 
(2017) argues that:  
Müller’s approach has the advantage of capturing one decisive aspect of right-wing populism 
that many commentators have overlooked, namely, its tendency to depoliticize its followers 
and to reduce democracy to a spectacle, in which passive citizens do nothing more than watch 
or listen to their leaders. Populism can be as much about demobilizing as mobilizing “the 
masses”, as Schmitt and the Nazis also knew. For populists, popular sovereignty is more 
acclamatory than participatory. This also helps explain why populism often appeals to people 
who hate politics (Abroheim, 2017: 183). 
 
Populism as Style 
In addition to Gidron & Bonikowski’s (2013) three approaches, Moffitt & Tormey (2014) 
provide a further definition of populism in the form of populism as a “political style.” The 
authors argue that there is a relationship between a performing politician and an audience, 
stating that analysts need to explore what they claim to be a reflective interaction. They argue 
that such interactions are subject to change whilst going further to identify three “elements” 
of populist performance, namely appeal to the people; perception of crisis, breakdown or 
threat; and bad manners. Moffitt & Tormey (2014) therefore unpack the notion of “us vs 
them” (people vs elite) by exposing the (performance) techniques with which populist leaders 
distinguish themselves as “one of the people.” Pinar Dinc (2016) states: 
By this, populist politicians not only become “pseudo-celebrities,” but they also increase the 
value of ordinary citizens’ knowledge, which is defined as “epistemological populism.” 
Second, through real or perceived crises such as globalization, neoliberalism, war, terror, or 
immigration, populist leaders propose an emergency exit program to the people, usually in 
favor of “short-term and swift action rather than the ‘slow politics.’” As a result, they care 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 54 | P a g e  
 
less about being politically correct or appropriate, resulting often in “tabloid style” politics 
that involve “slang, swearing, political incorrectness” as opposed to diplomacy (Dinc, 2016: 
8).  
The Historical Development of Populism 
The gradual re-emergence of populism since the 1980s has inspired a new wave of 
scholarship associated with its study, notably shifting away from traditional debates around 
utility and agrarian vs urban origins (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). Newly developed scholarship 
seeks to explore the dynamics of populism, ascertain whether it represents democracy or 
threatens it, and assessing the role of the media in enhancing and/or inhibiting populist 
movements. Moreover, explorations into the role of leaders, government capacity and 
longevity are all enhancing the understanding of populism. In order to explore populism in 
the 21st century, it is important to understand its historical development as both a political 
phenomenon and as a theoretical concept.  
Populism 1.0 (Origins) 
The first wave of populism studies originated at a conference at the London School of 
Economics in 1967, where a group of scholars from various backgrounds and disciplines 
came together in an attempt to define what they then termed a “political phenomenon.” The 
result was a publication of the conference proceedings in the form of a book called Populism: 
its meaning and national characteristics by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969). Whilst 
there was a lack of consensus around definitive conceptualisations and operationalisations, 
this marked the beginning of the intellectual journey that is the study of populism.  
During the late 1960s, when scholars began to discuss what would later be termed 
“populism,” they observed that rulers of certain nations were embracing a particular type of 
political action that often had shared characteristics and objectives. They also noted that 
while this political action seemed to emerge sporadically across various areas across the 
globe, it often took erratic and contradictory forms. As such, it was difficult to pinpoint any 
recurring factors that may have contributed to its adoption, as “populism” was witnessed in 
communist states, pluralist societies, modern nations, pre-modern nations, post-colonial and 
colonial states. The question thus arose as to whether populism does in fact have any 
underlying unity, or whether it is simply an umbrella term used to describe “a multitude of 
unconnected tendencies” (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). Whilst the LSE conference marked the 
founding moment of populism as a scholarly concept, few of the attending scholars were able 
to reach consensus on what its nature was, and so Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner’s (1969) 
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ground-breaking book of proceedings lacks a necessary concluding chapter or a synthesis of 
findings (Pappas, 2016).  
Without a clear conceptual understanding, early research associated with populism was 
difficult to harness. Despite these conceptual shortcomings, significant findings were made. 
These are particularly evident in the case studies outlined by Pappas (2016) in which they 
highlight: “premodern movements, such as the Narodniki in imperial Russia; nondemocratic 
regimes, such as Latin America’s post-war autocracies; interwar peasant movements in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans; and anti-capitalist and anti-colonial movements in Africa” 
(Pappas, 2016). Notably, none of these studies focused on mature liberal democracies, 
particularly in the West. Consequently, the first wave of populist studies fulfilled the purpose 
of revealing this political phenomenon to the academic world, placing it firmly on the agenda 
of comparative politics. But it did fail to produce any commonly agreed conceptualisations 
and definitions, which resulted in conceptual flaws and empirical uncertainties, all of which 
continue to this day (Pappas, 2016). 
Populism 1.5 (Classic) 
The second wave in the study of populism emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, predominantly 
among Latin American scholars. Written within the socio-political context of Latin America 
during this time, these scholars sought to explore the socio-economic determinants of mass 
political mobilisation rather than focusing on the conceptual constraints identified in the 
previous wave. The purpose of this scholarship was to explore “the conditions under which 
the political participation of the lower classes is channelled through a populist movement” 
(Germani, 1978: 95). Two distinct approaches emerged: the first was associated with 
modernisation theory, the second with structural Marxism. Through the lenses of 
modernisation theory, populism was a means to integrate the newly emerged urban working 
and middle class that resulted from the fall of autocratic systems and the subsequent rise of 
capitalism and modernity after WWI and WWII. Through the lenses of structural Marxism 
and dependency theories, populism was seen as a multiclass political movement that formed 
in the backlash to Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) – a widely adopted economic 
policy. This “multiclass” approach thus represented populism as successful cross-class 
alliances between various sectors (labour, business etc). Whilst there are significant 
differences between these two approaches, they both share a view that populism is 
intrinsically linked to historical and political contexts associated with development in the 
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world’s (semi-)peripheries (relations of production and market conditions) (Jansen, 2011: 
79).  
Scholars associated with this wave of populism studies thus organised their research 
intention, more specifically focusing on populism as a means for contextual mass 
mobilisation. Their case studies included countries in Latin America; however, Greece was 
an exception in this regard. In the 1970s and 1980s Argentina, Mexico, Columbia, Bolivia 
and Guatemala all shared meaningful similarities in the light of the newly developed theory 
of populist mobilisation. Whilst this wave made significant inroads in bridging the gap 
between conceptual intention and research extension, there were a number of shortcomings 
associated with this era of populist scholarship, particularly with regards to comparability 
potential. Accordingly, the associated theoretical developments could only be used to explain 
authoritarian populist movements, in Latin America, under very specific economic and 
historical conditions. As a result, classical studies of populism are constrained in that they 
cannot be utilised to understand populism in liberal democracies. Nonetheless, classical 
populism studies made a significant contribution to the development of the scholarship on 
populism, particularly in that it exposed populism’s mass movement characteristics, the role 
of individual agency and the relevance of charismatic leadership (Dix, 1978).  
Populism 2.0 (Neoliberal) 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the end of ISI economic strategies in Latin 
America, the material foundations for which state-based populism (classical populism) had 
all but disappeared, resulting in a broad social demobilisation (Roberts, 1995). Because of 
this, the utility of the theories of modernisation, structural Marxism and dependency for the 
study of populism was now being contested. Whilst the study of populism was facing a new 
scholarly dilemma, the structural Marxist-inspired populist mobilisation did not altogether 
recede as a political phenomenon. In particular, the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela 
represented the continuation of classic populist thinking within the politics of Latin America. 
However, a new type of populism was now emerging in line with the changes in the socio-
economic dynamics of the region, a shift that required a further theorisation of populism as a 
field of study (Pappas, 2016).  
In the early 1990s many scholars observed that, contrary to historical trends, Latin American 
politicians were successfully implementing neoliberal economic policies whilst maintaining 
immensely high levels of popular support. The most prominent cases were Peru, Brazil and 
Mexico. They called this “neopopulism” thus setting the stage for a new wave of populist 
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studies. All of these cases demonstrated a deviation from classic populism in two ways: the 
first was its social basis, which consisted of individuals in both the rural poor and the urban 
informal sector as opposed to organised class action; the second was the implementation of 
neoliberal policies similar to those of the USA and the UK, in which free market economics 
were prioritised over the former state-based ISI approach (Weyland, 1999). As such, new 
understandings of populism were required, particularly with regard to the relationship 
between formerly opposed neoliberal policies and overt popular support. As a result, further 
questions began to emerge around the role of leaders and their ability to garner support for 
market-oriented structural adjustments (Roberts, 1995: 82).  
A number of important developments emerged in this wave of scholarship on populism. The 
first was an emphasis on an ever-growing interest in the role of charismatic leaders, 
particularly those who rose from pluralist rather than oligarchic systems (Hawkins, 2003: 
1138). Secondly, populism was viewed as a political strategy, one that was instrumental in 
mobilising support, and subsequent power, through “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized 
support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland, 2001: 14). Finally, 
there were explorations of the narratives, discourses and language patterns used by populist 
leaders in order to politically mobilise and incorporate the masses. As with the previous 
waves of scholarship, there were a number of shortcomings in the development of neoliberal 
populism, particularly in that it retains the comparatively poor flexibility of classic populism. 
As a result, during this time there were few explorations of case studies that fell beyond the 
socio-economic parameters of Latin America, with specific reference to Europe and North 
America. Furthermore, there were few attempts to provide any comparative analysis between 
classic populism and neopopulism in Latin America itself (Pappas, 2016).  
Populism 3.0 (Contemporary) 
In the 21st century the study of populism and its scope has grown exponentially. This is in 
line with the gradual surge in populist politics around the globe, more recently in Europe and 
North America. Despite substantial investments in resolving a number of conceptual 
constraints, Pappas (2016) argues that scholars are still lacking connotative precision in this 
regard. The author attributes this to definitional instability, whilst highlighting that the 
scholarship on populism has identified a number of recurring definitional approaches:  
populism is understood primarily in terms of actors (the “people,” some elite, a leader); 
actions (mass mobilization, strategic leadership); style (moralistic, dichotomous, 
majoritarian); domain (old–new, left–right, democratic–nondemocratic, European–non-
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European); consequences (polarization, social homogenization, charisma); and normative 
implications (threat to or corrective of democracy) (Pappas, 2016: 7). 
Pappas (2016) thus argues that although there is significant merit in all the features, these 
definitional approaches are established on unstable conceptual and methodological 
foundations, which will “often impede comparative and theoretical efforts” (Pappas, 2016: 7).  
Whilst fully acknowledging Pappas’s (2016) conceptual critiques of the development of 
populism studies, it important to review the most recent publications that have sought to 
address these challenges, further develop the scholarship, contextualise populism in the 21st 
century and understand the recent surge in what Moffitt (2016) terms “the global rise of 
populism”, particularly in Europe and North America (Moffitt, 2016). In his article “A 
Critical Review of Recent Literature on Populism” John Abromeit (2017) seeks to position 
the study of populism within a contemporary context, more specifically within the 21st 
century. In doing so, Abromeit (2017) reviews the five most recent studies of populism, 
namely: 1) Ruth Wodak’s The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean 
(2015); 2) Benjamin Moffitt’s The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and 
Representation (2016); 3) Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s Populism: A Very 
Short Introduction (2017); 4) Jan-Werner Müller’s What is Populism? (2016); and 5) John B. 
Judis’s The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and 
European Politics (2016).  
Abromeit (2017), much like Pappas (2016), argues that the study of populism has notably 
shifted away from traditional debates. The author also agrees with Pappas (2016) that newly 
developed scholarship is seeking to explore the definitions of populism. Whilst 
acknowledging that the study of populism has resurfaced significantly over the past thirty 
years, Abromeit (2017) argues in favour of academic explorations into fascist, populist and 
right-wing discourses that were prominent throughout the 1930s and 1940s (i.e. prior to the 
1967 London School of Economics Conference), particularly by the Frankfurt School of 
critical theorists.  
John Abromeit (2017) affirms that the interdisciplinary approach of the Frankfurt School 
offers numerous valuable insights into the study of populism, ultimately claiming that such 
approaches address some of the shortcomings in the scholarship:  
I have suggested here that contemporary approaches to the study of populism that rely 
predominantly on discourse analysis, new media, or even political theory are not adequate to 
the task. Preferable, in my view, would be a return to the sophisticated, interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of populism that was pioneered by the Frankfurt School Critical 
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Theorists in the 1930s and 1940s, in which a non-dogmatic Marxist critique of capitalism, 
psychoanalytically based social psychology and empirical social research were combined to 
grasp the powerful right-wing populist tendencies that emerged in the twentieth century 
(Abromeit, 2017: 185).  
Having contextualised the contemporary wave of populism studies and its associated 
theoretical debates, this review will briefly explore three prominent texts which provide 
significant insights into the study of right-wing populist politics in Europe and North 
America.  
In her study The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean Ruth Wodak 
(2015) utilises what is termed the “discourse historical approach” (DHA) to explore the 
prominent rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist entities. She argues that there is 
no single overarching explanation for the resurgence of right-wing populism in Europe and 
North America, going further to attribute the phenomenon to a culmination of factors 
manifested through varying rhetorical discourses and material factors that are inherently 
unique to local contexts.  She does, however, identify re-nationalisation politics as a recurring 
feature of most of 21st century populist politics of the West, highlighting four major 
components of the rhetorical discourses in this regard: “nationalism, anti-Semitism, 
performance and the media, and gender” (Wodak, 2015).  
In the fifth chapter Wodak (2015) makes an intervention in the ongoing debate about the role 
of anti-Semitism in right-wing populist parties and whether or not it has – as some 
commentators have recently claimed – been displaced by Islamophobia among “second-
generation” leaders, such as Marine Le Pen or Heinz Christian Strache, who have arguably 
distanced their respective parties from the open anti-Semitism of their successors and have 
instead moved toward a chauvinistic concept of “Western Civilization” allegedly under attack 
by Islam. Wodak (2015) convincingly criticizes this thesis and argues that anti-Semitism is 
just as important as ever for right-wing populist parties in Europe, even if it must now be 
expressed in coded forms. She makes clear that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism can and do 
continue to exist side by side (Abroheim, 2017: 178).  
In The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation, Benjamin 
Moffitt (2016) seeks to provide an interpretation of populism as a style in which the mediated 
performances by leaders maintain the pivotal essence of populism, rather than ideology or 
content. The author also goes beyond the traditional scope of populism studies by 
conceptualising populism as global phenomenon. To illustrate his claim that there are 
common characteristics, Moffitt (2016) refers to a number of case studies in which he 
analyses the “performances” of populist leaders around the world. Finally, the author refers to 
the radical transformation of the media of the past twenty years, claiming that this 
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phenomenon makes the study of populism qualitatively different from the previous waves, as 
the “new” media benefitted and advanced populism significantly (Moffitt, 2016). 
In chapter four of his study, Moffitt turns his attention to the much-debated role of the leader 
in populism. He argues – against Cas Mudde and others – that downplaying the role of the 
leader betrays a Eurocentric approach to populism; the centrality of the leader to populist 
movements and parties is the rule, rather than the exception, when one views populism as a 
global phenomenon. For Moffitt, “it is the leader that should be our main focus when studying 
the phenomenon, given that they are the figures that ultimately ‘do’ populism” (Moffitt, 2016, 
pp. 51–52). Populism differs from traditional political ideologies also in that the leader does 
not represent but actually embodies “the people”. But, as Moffitt points out insightfully, 
charisma is not necessary to become a living symbol of the “general will”; more important are 
convincing “performances of ordinariness and outsiderness”, which make it possible for 
people to identify with the leader (Abroheim, 2017: 178). 
In The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European 
Politics John Judis (2016) provides a historical analysis of the recent resurgence of populism. 
Through drawing on political theory, particularly the antagonistic nature of populism, the 
author focuses on the historical socio-economic transitions that took place in Europe and the 
USA in the 1980s and 1990s. He refers to a political-economic shift from Keynesian to post-
industrial neoliberal policies of which he claims occupied a hegemonic status throughout 
Western society. Judis (2016) views the resurgence of populism as an expression of 
discontent with neoliberalism: 
So, during periods when neo-liberalism seemed to function well, such as the late 1990s, 
populism lost support. At other times – most notably in the wake of the 2008 crisis – left- and 
right-wing populist movements exploded in Europe and the U.S. Judis argues compellingly 
that populist movements “often function as warning signs of a political crisis” and that they 
arise “only under very special circumstances” (p. 16), which explains why – as most of the 
other authors also noted – populism was so weak in Europe and the U.S. during the 
prosperous postwar decades (Abroheim, 2017: 184).  
The author goes further to note the historical transitions of populist political entities in line 
with such economic transitions. In referring to Marine Le Pen’s Front National Judis (2016) 
notes a resurgence of economic nationalism and pro-welfare policies. He argues that such 
discourses are therefore channelled through nationalistic and anti-immigrant narratives that 
seek to entice the working class (particularly those hit hardest by the “failure” of neoliberal 
policies) through the promise of protectionism and socio-economic prosperity (Judis, 2016).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of 21st century politics in Europe and North America 
and the development of the scholarship on populism and the associated politics . This is 
imperative in answering the research questions and problem statement highlighted in Chapter 
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1 (and in conceptualising Homopopulism in Chapter 5), particularly in considering the case 
studies and populist themes discussed throughout. In addressing the rise of right-wing 
populism in Europe and North America, this chapter sought to connect prominent global 
events and the discourses of populist politics. Within the context of Homonationalism and the 
rise of Homopopulism (see Chapters 4 and 5), such an overview, read in conjunction with 
Chapter 2, provides the necessary contextualisation in order to understand the histories of 
both LGBTQ politics and populism, and how they have taken shape in the 21st century. By 
discussing prominent geopolitical events and responses, such as the war on terror, the global 
financial crisis and the EU crisis, among other things, the rise of populist-nationalism and the 
contextual rhetoric of populist discourses can be better understood. By exploring the 
scholarship on populism – on an epistemological level and as politics – the rise of right-wing 
populism in Europe and North America can be understood within developing academic 
debates, particularly with regards to its varied conceptualisations and operationalisations (or 
lack thereof). Revealing the different terminologies, ideologies and definitions of populism 
demonstrates both its complexity and developing nature, whilst simultaneously striving to 
provide clarity on the overall scope of this study.  
This chapter, in conjunction with the previous chapter, contributes significantly to the 
conceptualisation of Homopopulism, particularly in providing the necessary literature 
reviews, historical overviews, theoretical foundations and contextualisations of associated 
scholarship, discourses and political dynamics. In order to further understand the rise of 
populism and LGBTQ politics, the next chapter will seek to provide the necessary theoretical 
lenses with which to investigate these global political phenomena. It will provide an 
exploration of Queer International Relations (IR) and Homonationalism, what they entail, 
how they can be applied in a theoretical context and why they should be used in this study. 
The newly developing theoretical framework of Queer IR is proving to be an inherently 
useful theory of International Relations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Queer International Relations (IR) Theory & Homonationalism   
Introduction 
Theory is an important component of qualitative research. The contribution of theoretical 
principles to this study is essential to solving the research problem and answering the 
research questions outlined in Chapter 1. Queer IR and Homonationalism form the theoretical 
and methodological core of this study, particularly in that they assist in understanding queer 
modes of collusion and/or resistance that operate in the international/global realm. Whilst 
these theories offer extremely valuable insights, it is important to acknowledge Judge’s 
(2018) assertion that “We need a multiplicity of concepts that we use in a way that doesn’t 
ultimately fix meaning, that opens new passages of meaning and understanding of the world 
as we think we know it. I find that very useful as an approach” (Interview, Melanie Judge, 
02/07/2018). It is this approach that informs the ways in which theory is explained and 
deployed in this chapter as well as the overall study.  
The growing relevance and utility of Queer scholarship in the realms of politics and 
international relations (IR) is evident in the rapid development of Queer and Queer IR as a 
theoretical and methodological deployment. Since the late 1990s and the publication of 
Faking It (1999), Cynthia Weber has propelled queer modes of disruption and logic into the 
realms of IR. Her ground-breaking book Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, 
Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (2016a), in which she theorises “queer logics of 
statecraft”, and the array of articles that emerged as a result have contributed significantly to 
the fields of Queer IR and IR more broadly. Despite the constant dismissal of Queer by 
conventional IR scholars, queer scholarship has proven to be both a useful and necessary tool 
for analysis. Disrupting the binaries, hierarchies and discourses of conventional IR has 
opened up new avenues for understanding international relations and global politics, 
particularly with regard to issues of hegemony, nationhood, security and the global political 
economy, among others.  
Furthermore, modes of queer intellectual curiosity have inspired the work of numerous queer 
(IR) theorists, even prior to the consolidation of Queer to Queer IR. This includes the ground-
breaking work of queer theorist Jasbir K. Puar in Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times (2007b), where the widely deployed term Homonationalism is theorised and 
conceptualised. It is these texts by Weber and Puar that inform the theoretical and 
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methodological approaches of this study, both of which will be explored throughout this 
chapter.  
The chapter begins by exploring Queer International Relations (IR) theory, its journey from 
Queer to Global Queer Studies, to Queer IR. It then tracks the historical development of 
Queer IR dating back to the late 1990s and the publication of Faking It (Weber, 1999) to its 
most recent theoretical and methodological expression, Queer International Relations: 
Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (Weber, 2016a). The chapter explores the 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Weber’s (2016a) text, noting the theoretical 
contributions of Foucault (1979), Haraway (1997), Butler (1999) and Ashley (1989), among 
others, to the formation of the “queer logics of statecraft” in Queer IR. It further explores the 
historical and theoretical journey of the widely deployed term Homonationalism by 
unpacking the theoretical contributions (US sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory and 
the ascendency of whiteness) to Homonationalism in its founding text by Jasbir K. Puar, 
Terrorist Assemblages Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007b). The chapter provides two 
diagrams illustrating the subsequent theoretical developments based on Weber’s (2016a) and 
Puar’s (2007b) texts.  
The purpose of providing such intricate explorations of the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of Weber’s (2016a) and Puar’s (2007b) work is to make explicit the theory 
underlying this study. This chapter establishes the theoretical lens for the final analysis in the 
chapter to follow. Both “queer logics of statecraft” and Homonationalism will be deployed to 
critique and contextualise the 21st century international relations/global politics of Europe and 
North America . This is done to enhance the understanding of a LGBTQ political shift, and in 
subsequently conceptualising Homopopulism.  
Queer International Relations (IR) Theory 
From Queer to Queer IR  
Since the early 1990s Queer scholarship has increasingly explored global and international 
political dynamics, originally in the form of Global Queer Studies (GQS). Various scholars 
have since produced a number of significant queer insights into conventional IR themes such 
as war, security, globalisation, nationalism, state and nation formation, and the political 
economy, among others. Furthermore, without necessarily attributing their work to Queer IR 
scholarship, many authors have sought to critically assess how normative and non-normative 
gender and sexual constructions inform and disrupt global political power relations. As a 
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result, through the gradual development of Queer to Queer IR, formerly distinct boundaries 
between Global Queer Studies (GQS) and IR have been disrupted or queered, as it were. 
Queer IR scholars employ methodologies that (like poststructuralist methodologies) do not 
seek to uncover “the truth” of sexed, gendered, and sexualized bodies, assemblages, 
institutions, and orders (Foucault 1979). For in what I call a queer logic of the and/or, such 
“truths” are never stable and their representation is never guaranteed; therefore, any attempt 
to represent them as if they were stable is understood as a political act. For this reason, Queer 
IR scholars instead track when queer figurations emerge and how they are normalized and/or 
perverted so that they might challenge but also support heterosexual, heteronormative, cis‐
gendered, homonormative, homophobic, and trans*phobic assumptions, orders, and 
institutions. The resulting “deviant knowledges” of international relations these 
methodologies produce can disorient Disciplinary IR knowledges not only about queer 
subjects (Ahmed 2006) but also about international relations subjects and the discipline of IR 
as a subject (Weber, 2014: 598). 
As Weber (2014a) argues, Queer IR does make use of IR theories and concepts that are often 
bound to normative IR literature and debates. Thus, Queer IR can be positioned as playing 
the role of queering (challenging norms, binaries and power structures) International 
Relations theory in certain instances. A few examples include formations of security, 
sovereignty and practice, particularly with reference to the feminist, gendered and queer 
debates with conventional IR. Weber (2014a) argues that Queer IR scholars have made (and 
continue to make) significant contributions to both Global Queer Studies and conventional 
international relations theories, approaches, concepts and debates (Queer IR) (Weber, 2014a).  
In his chapter “Introducing Queer Theory in International Relations”, Markus Thiel (2017) 
outlines the complexities associated with defining this very recently developing field of 
Queer IR. In introducing his text he states: 
Queer theory offers a significant avenue through which to deconstruct and then reconstruct 
established IR concepts and theories. Stemming from various fields that transcend a narrow 
view of IR, queer research applies an interdisciplinary outlook to advance new critical 
perspectives on sexualities, gender and beyond. A single viewpoint in a field as diverse as IR 
would unnecessarily limit the range of scholarly viewpoints. It would also preclude a nuanced 
debate about the contents and forms of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) 
perspectives, queer scholarship and queer scholarly politics in IR. Due to these themes, and 
because of its diversity, it is difficult to define queer theory precisely. Indeed, a narrow 
definition of it would not be in line with queer theoretical tenets. Queer theory is not just 
confined to sexualities or sexual rights. It also questions established social, economic and 
political power relations – and critically interrogates notions of security (Thiel, 2017: 97). 
Thiel (2017) does, however, highlight some of the important debates and conversations that 
have emerged as a result of the queering of International Relations, some of which have 
informed the theoretical development of Queer IR. In applying Queer to IR, Thiel (2017) 
argues that queer disrupts many of the mainstream IR assumptions associated with global 
politics that are unrelated to sexuality and gender. Queer IR deconstructs conventional 
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binaries that govern IR thinking as well as recognising the instability of political, social and 
international orders. As a result, Queer IR assists in exposing and understanding what Thiel 
(2017) argues is “the fluid, performative and ambiguous aspects of world politics” (Thiel, 
2017: 99). Furthermore, Queer IR criticises International Relations approaches that assume 
“natural and moral hierarchies,” for example, troubling the “normalisation” of 
unconventional sexualities within hetero/homonormative parameters – a strategy that 
withdraws marginalised sexualities from radical modes of resistance (Thiel, 2017).  
With regard to more classical IR topics, it [Queer IR] critically assesses the assumption that 
all societies find themselves at different points along a linear path of political and economic 
development or adhere to a universal set of norms. Hence it embraces ambiguity, failure and 
conflict as a counterpoint to a dominant progressive thinking evident in many foreign or 
development policies. As a scholarly undertaking, queer theory research constitutes of ‘any 
form of research positioned within conceptual frameworks that highlight the instability of 
taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations’ (Nash and Browne 2012, 4) (Thiel, 
2017: 99) 
Thiel (2017) argues that Queer IR is also more “theoretically inclusive,” particularly in ways 
that LGBT and Feminist scholarship falls short.  Finally, he notes that there is a need for 
queer (IR) theorists to question their own racial, class and Western-centric orientations –
power relationships that can be exposed and disrupted through the deployment of queer itself. 
The next section will therefore explore the development of Queer IR as a theoretical lens 
before expanding on the recent work of one of the founders of Queer IR, Cynthia Weber. The 
deployment of Queer IR in this study is particularly important when noting Thiel’s (2017) 
assertion that  “In a time when IR is often accused of being parochial, queer theory is a 
necessary corrective to powerful myths and narratives of international orders” (Thiel, 2017: 
103). 
Developing Queer IR 
The founding work for Queer International Relations (IR), as Sjoberg (2016) argues, was a 
book published by critical IR theorist Cynthia Weber Faking it: US Hegemony in a Post-
Phallic Era (1999), in which she discusses gender and sexuality in global politics. She also 
discusses foreign policy and state identity, fundamentally arguing that these factors are 
inherently intertwined. By examining US-Caribbean relations through a queer lens, the author 
demonstrates how sovereign nation-states mobilise “queer performativities.” Weber (1999) 
agrees with mainstream IR theorists with regard to a post-Cuban Revolution US hegemony 
crisis. Through deploying mainstream, feminist and gendered lenses in themes associated 
with Queer IR, the author argues that a crisis of hegemony is related to two other/Other 
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factors, namely a masculinity crisis (feminist and gender IR) and a heterosexuality crisis 
(queer IR). Laura Sjoberg (2016) states in this regard: 
But Faking It is more than a story of the US and the Caribbean – it is a story of US state 
identity and its influence on US foreign policy that provides an analytical example of 
relationships between gender and sexuality signification, state identities, and strategic 
decisions in global politics. In 1999 when Faking It was published, no one had made an 
argument like this in IR. On the book’s back cover, Kathy Ferguson calls it ‘startlingly 
original’. In hindsight, both words were apt – Faking It was the original use of queer 
theorising in IR, and its original argument was emphatically that sexuality as much as gender 
shapes state identities and foreign policy (Sjoberg, 2016: 81).  
Over ten years later Cynthia Weber built upon her Queer IR theorising in Fake It by 
publishing three ground-breaking studies: “Queer International Relations: From Queer to 
Queer IR” (2014a), “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” (2014b) and Queer 
International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (2016a).  
In her article “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” Weber (2014b) claims that 
Queer Studies has indeed become “Global Queer Studies” (GQS) generating new and 
significant insights into fundamental global political processes. Weber (2014b) goes further 
to claim that the transformation from Queer to “Global Queer” has left the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) predominantly unaffected, highlighting that a noted resurgence of 
activity in and attention to Global Queer Studies (GQS) has bypassed IR. She demonstrates 
this by illustrating that “only six journal articles and no special issues on GQS themes have 
been published in the top 20 impact-rated IR journals” (Weber, 2014b:1). This led Weber 
(2014) to question why the discipline of IR has not gone “somewhat queer” (Weber, 2014b: 
1), referring to Martin Wright’s (1960) “provocative term” questioning why there is no 
“[Queer] International Theory?” (Weber, 2014b: 1). 
Weber (2014) challenges the notion that “All of the GQS-themed work produced by IR 
scholars is so interdisciplinary that it lacks a primary focus on core IR concerns, which is 
why IR scholars are not interested in it and why it is not published in IR outlets”. Weber 
(2014b) is quick to address this perception by highlighting that the primary focus of most 
queer-themed work published by IR scholars in fact entails classic IR concerns such as war, 
security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, colonialism and the 
general practice of foreign policy (Weber, 2014b).  
Cynthia Weber (2014b) demonstrates that many queer IR scholars are exploring how failing 
hegemonic states perform queerness through their conduct of intervention and wars to 
“solidify their hegemonic status” (Weber, 1999). She refers to Puar (2007b), who discusses 
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how states “produce themselves and their citizens” as pro-LGBT subjects in part to constitute 
other states, “civilisations” or peoples as national and global threats. She also cites 
Agathangelou (2013) and Scott (2013), who discuss how the “articulation and circulation” of 
global economic value through queer and racialised bodies supports “the practices of 
empires”. Weber (2014b) therefore addresses the question in one clear and coherent claim 
that multiple queer international theories in fact do exist, leading her to pose a different 
question in this regard: “Why does there appear to be no Queer International Theory?” 
(Weber, 2014b: 29).  
Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) latest publication Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, 
Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge is ground-breaking in that it actively seeks to challenge 
questions around the utility of Queer Studies in the discipline of International Relations. An 
extension of her 2014 articles, Weber (2016a) attempts to demonstrate that queer lenses in 
fact address problems that IR scholars believe are central to the discipline, namely political 
economies, the geopolitics of war and terror, manifestations of sexual, racial and gendered 
hierarchies, as well as the implications of this for globalisation, neoliberalism and sovereignty 
(Weber 2016a). The author attempts to explain some of the broader domestic and global 
sexualised logics that occur within the confines of state and nation formation, as well as in 
the organisation of global politics. Through applying a queer perspective to Richard Ashley’s 
(1989) work on “statecraft as mancraft”, Weber (2016a) explores her conceptualisation of 
“queer logics of statecraft” and how such logics operate within global politics to form 
“sexualised organisations of international relations” (Weber, 2016a). 
Furthermore, in “Introduction: Faking It in 21st Century IR/Global Politics” Laura Sjoberg 
(2016) also builds on Cynthia Weber’s (1999) founding piece by discussing Weber’s 
disciplinary contributions within the context of 2016. As such, Sjoberg (2016) argues that 
although queer theorising has not become a “disciplinary norm”, noting that Queer IR “never 
needed to be at the disciplinary centre of disciplinary IR” (Sjoberg, 2016: 82), Weber’s 
original Faking It (1999) is being read by a growing number of Queer IR scholars.  
In 1999, there was no such IR community to embrace Faking It. Today, in contrast, Faking It 
is read by an ever-growing critical mass of aspiring critical IR scholars who situate it within a 
Queer IR literature that argues that sex, gender, and sexuality are key to the constitution of the 
international arena. Considered in relation to this contemporary Queer IR literature, Faking 
It’s argument that sexual self-perception influences patterns of interstate interaction remains 
unique today. This suggests that Faking It can and should be read with IR current literatures – 
not only about feminist/queer IR questions but also about identity and foreign policy concerns 
more widely (Sjoberg, 2016: 82). 
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Queer IR Methodology & Theoretical Framework 
Who is the “Homosexual?” 
In her book Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge, 
Cynthia Weber (2016a) provides a theoretical and methodological framework within which 
to use Queer IR as an analytical tool. It is this theoretical and subsequent methodological 
framework, along with Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) concept of Homonationalism, that forms the 
core theoretical underpinning of this study. As such, it is imperative to understand the 
theoretical journey embarked upon by Weber (2016a) in order to utilise her (de)constructed 
lenses for the purpose of analysing global politics, and in this case, Western populism. 
Accordingly, the contents of Chapter 2 “Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International 
Relations Method: Developing Queer IR Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks” (and 
others) of Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality 
and the Will to Knowledge will be specifically utilised throughout this section.   
In introducing her theoretical and methodological approaches, Weber (2016a) asks the 
questions: “What is homosexuality?” and “Who is the homosexual?” She refers to a “queer 
intellectual curiosity” – a method drawn from Cynthia Enloe’s feminist curiosity (Enloe, 
2004) – in which there is a shared refusal to take for granted “the personal-to-international 
institutional arrangements, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that figure 
‘homosexuality’ and the ‘homosexual’” (Weber, 2016a: 19). Weber (2016a) thus argues that 
such a method investigates how “figurations” or “distillations of shared meaning in forms or 
images” powerfully associate with and disassociate from material bodies. Such “figurations” 
are explicitly mobilised in international politics, disrupting conventional assumptions that 
(homo)sexuality is irrelevant in global politics (Weber, 2016a).  
Weber (2016a) begins with a historical account, tracking a brief chronological ordering of the 
“homosexual” as a figuration of global society. She refers to the 19th -century Victorian 
account, which is addressed intricately by Michel Foucault (1980) in A History of Sexuality: 
Vol. I, where the “homosexual” is figured as an actor of sodomy (sexual practice between 
men). Weber (2016a) refers explicitly to Foucault’s (1980) argument that the Victorians not 
only viewed “homosexuality” as an abnormal sexual practice, they also went further to 
categorise the “homosexual” or “sodomite” as a new “alien strain” or species (Foucault, 
1980: 53-71). Weber (2016a) explains Foucault’s (1980) assertion that “perversion” was 
implanted into “homosexuality” as a pathologised embodiment of an “abomination” of 
“normal” sexuality. Thus the “perverse homosexual” was invented and subject to scientific 
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study, experimentation, and moral and psychological correction (Weber, 2016a).  Weber 
(2016a) seeks to demonstrate that the notion of the “perverse homosexual” still prevails 
today, even though such understandings are selectively accompanied by growing sentiments 
of “the normal homosexual” (Weber, 2016a).  
Here Weber (2016a) refers to Hillary Clinton’s 2011 Human Rights Day speech (Clinton, 
2011), when the then US Secretary of State articulated and legitimised (humanised) 
sentiments of abnormality often associated with the “homosexual.” The biopolitical term 
“homosexual” is thus discarded and replaced with LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender) in an attempt to encapsulate same-sex sexual activity as an act of love within a 
same-sex relationship rather than a biological aberration. Whilst asserting the Obama 
administration’s foreign policy objectives, Hillary Clinton in that very moment reformed the 
global figuration of homosexuality  and “refigured” the understandings of “homosexuality” 
as a naturalised desire that is subjected to domestication through (often state-sponsored)  
institutional modes such as marriage, gay consumerism and gay patriotism 
(homonormativity) (Duggan, 2003). In demonstrating this “transition”, as it were, Weber 
(2016a) seeks to expose a conventional binary that forms part of domestic and international 
debates around sexuality: the homosexual as either normal or perverse (Weber, 2016a). 
Weber’s (2016a) final chronological shift embodies her theoretical disruption of the either/or 
binary, that is, the case of Conchita Wurst or Neuwirth/Wurst, the Austrian Eurovision star 
who sparked global political debate around the representation of the European/non-European. 
Weber (2016a) argues that the case of Neuwirth/Wurst demonstrates the limitation of 
either/or modes of analysis, as their embodiment can be viewed as normal and perverse in a 
number of registers, specifically those that are imperative for international relations 
(nationality, civilisation, gender, sexuality). Weber states in this regard:  
These three very different figurations of ‘homosexuality’ and the ‘homosexual’ are important 
not only because they mark major historical shifts in dominant Western perspectives on the 
‘homosexual’ and ‘homosexuality’. They also illustrate how specific figurations of 
‘homosexuality’ and the ‘homosexual’ make it (im)possible for Western ‘experts’ to 
categorize people and geopolitical spaces as normal or pathological and to react to them 
accordingly. This matters for IR because specific figurations of ‘homosexuality’ and of the 
‘homosexual’ enable and contest specific modes of organization and regulation of national, 
regional, and international politics (Weber, 2016a: 21). 
In concluding her theoretical and methodological background account, Weber (2016a) 
demonstrates that her analysis of the three queer IR and sexualised figurations reveal 
different alignments of homosexuality with (ab)normality – the perverse Victorian 
“homosexual”, the “normal” Obama administration “homosexual”, and the normal and/or 
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perverse Eurovisioned “homosexual.” It is important to note that registering these shifting 
(homosexual) alignments is important for this study, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Weber (2016a) also argues that queer intellectual curiosity of such figurations further 
produces queer IR methodological lenses with which to investigate IR beyond 
(homo)sexuality as an exclusive unit, including but not limited to colonialism, human rights, 
state and nation formation, foreign policy and international communities.  
Discourse & Power (Foucault) 
In the process of developing her theoretical and methodological framework, Weber (2016a) 
draws from Michel Foucault’s (1979) The History of Sexuality: Vol. I. With a particular focus 
on developing a queer IR method, she applies Foucault’s four primary recommendations or 
instructions on how to analyse modern sexuality. In doing so, Weber (2016a) offers an 
interpretation of these instructions, particularly within the context of how they inform the 
theoretical underpinnings of queer IR. Weber (2016a) asserts that Foucault’s (1980) central 
claim in The History of Sexuality is that “the organizing principle of sexuality from 
nineteenth-century Europe to ‘the contemporary West’ is how sex is “put into discourse” 
(Foucault 1980, 11), for example, how specific meanings of sexualities and sexual 
subjectivities are produced through specific – even repressive – discursive formulations that 
bring sexualities like ‘homosexuality’ and sexual subjectivities like the ‘homosexual’ into 
being” (Weber, 2016a: 25). While various Victorian institutions repressed “abnormal” sexual 
practices, they also invented the discursive narratives associated with the sexual norm vs 
sexual deviant binary. Weber (2016a) argues that Foucault’s first instruction is to analyse 
how sex is put into discourse and to examine what emerges from this observation.  
Weber (2016a) draws attention to Foucault’s (1979) argument that the Victorians produced a 
scientific discourse on sexuality, referred to as “scientia sexualis”, which included biology 
and psychology, among other disciplines. This “productive power”, according to Foucault, 
invented the “homosexual”, leading him to offer his second instruction: analyse the functions 
and effects of productive power. Weber (2016a) interprets Foucault’s (1979) second 
instruction as finding the means to expose productive power, as Foucault (1979) seeks to 
demonstrate how Victorian productive power managed the “homosexual” through a 
biopolitical apparatus. This apparatus, Foucault (1980) argues, produced the “alien strain” of 
the homosexual as scientific fact, with the “homosexual” as an empirical reality rather than a 
discovery in 19th-century Europe. Weber (2016a) asserts that “it was through the scientific 
examination of his ‘sexual deviance’ and the therapeutic correction he was subjected to that 
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Victorian society brought the ‘homosexual’ into being” (Weber, 2016a: 25). This regime of 
normalisation, as argued by Foucault (1979), subjects the “homosexual” to constant 
surveillance, managements and correction, located within a system of power/ knowledge/ 
pleasure.  
This brings him to his third instruction: understand productive power as working through 
networks of power/knowledge/pleasure. Weber (2016a) asks why Victorian society invented 
the “homosexual”, diagnosed this figure and subject individuals to modes of correction and 
normalisation? She argues that Foucault (1979) asserts that the invention of the 
“homosexual” made it possible to categorise and identify “normal” sexual behaviour, impose 
this normality, and distribute socially acceptable understandings of the heterosexual, 
monogamous, married, Christian couple as the morally appropriately equipped Victorian unit. 
Thus the normal vs perverse dichotomy is born, one which was distorted (but not disrupted) 
when Hillary Clinton made her 2011 speech in which she “normalised” the (LGBT) 
“homosexual” couple as a productive figure of the nation-state. Neuwirth/Wurst, as Weber 
(2016a) argues, then disrupts the normal vs perverse homosexual dichotomy in that they are 
figured as a “perverse, underdeveloped homosexual” and  “normal, developed homosexual” 
at the same time. Conventional IR, as Weber (2016a) argues, offers a limited analytical scope 
with which to understand how such (queer) figures operate within global political registers 
(Weber, 2016).  
It is here that Weber (2016a) draws on Foucault’s (1979) fourth and final instruction: analyse 
how understandings of the “normal” and the “perverse” are frozen, without assuming they are 
either true or forever fixed. Weber (2016a) argues that this recommendation reveals that her 
three figurations: the “perverse homosexual”, the “normal” LGBT individual and the 
embodiment of both at the same time (Neuwirth/Wurst), are not true or false. Instead, they 
are “powerful apparent representations whose meanings and functions vary radically 
throughout history and across the globe” (Weber, 2016a: 27). Weber (2016a) concludes by 
arguing that Foucault’s (1980) method (instructions) exposes the fluidity of figurations of the 
“homosexual.” In doing so, the historical figurations employed by Weber (2016a) and 
analysed through Foucauldian thought thus highlights an imperative question about modern 
sexuality: “How did these different understandings of the homosexual (perverse-LGBT-both) 
come about?”  In claiming the importance of Foucault’s (1979) work for the understanding of 
power and discourse, Weber (2016a) also highlights its limitations. She argues that 
Foucault’s (1979) work can be sweeping and “problematically limited to a self-referential 
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‘Europe’ as his analytical terrain” (Weber, 2016a: 28). Weber (2016a) draws on the work of 
Donna Haraway’s Butlerian theorisation of figuration in order to further inform her own 
theoretical development.  
Figurations (Haraway) 
In developing her theoretical and methodological framework, Weber (2016a) draws 
extensively on the work of Donna Haraway (1997), more specifically her discussions on 
“techniques of figuration” (Weber, 2016a: 28). Cynthia Weber (2016a) argues that such 
techniques allow an individual to employ figuration as a critical conceptual device, going 
further to claim that Haraway’s conceptualisation is compatible with Foucault’s analysis. She 
specifically asserts that Haraway’s (1997) work builds on Butler’s (1999) notion of 
“performativity”, and that it can help scholars explore the “homosexual figure” in extensive 
detail (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) defines figurations as “distillations of shared meanings 
in forms or images. They do not (mis)represent the world, for to do so implies the world as a 
signified pre-exists them. Rather, figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic 
assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images 
that bring specific worlds into being” (Weber, 2016a: 28).  
In arguing that Haraway’s (1997) techniques are useful for analysing how figurations are 
crafted and employed, Weber (2016a) extracts four key elements from which figurations are 
formed: tropes, temporalities, performativities and worldlings (Weber, 2016: 28). According 
to Weber (2016a: 29) and Haraway (1997:11) “tropes are material and semiotic references to 
things that express how we understand them.” Weber (2016a) refers to tropes as non-literal or 
self-identical to what they describe. She goes further to demonstrate Haraway’s (1997) 
argument that language imposes the deployment of figuration, because it involves 
displacements that essentially disrupt “identification and certainties” (Haraway, 1997:11). In 
referring to Haraway’s (1997) second element, temporalities, Weber (2016a) asserts that this 
figurative element represents a relationship to time. She notes that developmental time may 
not necessarily be applied equally to every figuration. Haraway (1997: 9) argues that 
figurations are historically rooted in “the semiotics of Western Christian realism”, for 
example, the “perverse homosexual” figuration is built on scientific discourse and on the 
Europe vs colonies binary, whereas the Obama LGBT figure is figured within static and 
universal moral terms (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) goes further to argue that 
developmental temporality is inherent in the Obama LGBT discourse, particularly in that it is 
located in the relations between sovereign nation-states rather than in the figure itself. As 
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such, a state’s measure of development and modernity is based on its appreciation of “gay 
right as human rights” (see Puar, 2007b on Homonationalism).  
According to Weber (2016a), understanding the contrasts associated with figurations of “the 
homosexual” and their relationships with temporalities demonstrates the relevance of 
Haraway’s (1997) third element: performativities. The term was originally developed by 
Judith Butler (1999) in an attempt to explain gender and sexuality as performance through 
repeated acts that constitute subject “norms.” Weber (2016a) states in this regard:  
Applying Nietzsche’s idea that there is no doer behind the deed and that the deed is 
everything (1999, 33) to an analysis of sexes, genders, and sexualities, Butler argues that 
enactments of gender make it appear as if sex – which Butler understands as a social construct 
– is natural and normal, and as if particular sexed bodies map ‘naturally’ onto particular 
genders. It is through the everyday inhabiting of these various sexes, genders, and sexualities 
by everyday people who enact them that the subjectivities of these doers of sexes, genders, 
and sexualities appear to come into being. This does not mean that – once enacted – 
performativities freeze sexed, gendered, and sexualized subjectivities and the networks of 
power and pleasure that are productive of them. Rather, because each enactment is itself 
particular, it holds the possibility of reworking, rewiring, and resisting both ‘frozen’ notions 
of sexes, genders, and sexualities and their institutionalized organizations of power, including 
those that participate in ‘build[ing] the fantasy of state and nation’ (Butler 2004, 124; in IR, 
see Campbell 1992; Weber, 2016: 31).  
Weber (2016a) argues that Haraway (1997) employs Butler’s (1999) notion of performativity 
by claiming that “figurations are performative.” Weber’s (2016a) three figurations (and 
figures of speech) thus become subject to repetition and are understood to be images of 
oneself or of others (another state, community, regional body etc.). Hence, the “homosexual” 
may choose to perform as this figuration and/or it may be imposed (Weber, 2016a). For 
example, the LGBT figure is often embraced as a positive performance, whereas the 
“perverse homosexual” may not. Others may (and do) find the LGBT figure as constraining, 
homonormative/homonationalist (Duggan, 2003; Puar, 2007b) and normative.  
Their objections center on how the ‘LGBT’ is produced by and is productive of institutions, 
structures of understanding, and practical orientations that value only what they describe as 
hetero/homonormative ways of being ‘homosexual’ (in marriage, the military, and 
consumption) and devalue what they describe as queer ways of inhabiting one’s sexuality 
(Duggan 2003), illustrating a tension between IR conceptualizations of norms as uniformly 
beneficial (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and (antinormative) queer critiques of 
norms/normalization. As for Neuwirth/Wurst, by both embracing and exceeding 
hetero/homonormativities, his/her performative figuration complicates both the ‘LGBT and a 
‘hetero/homonormative versus (antinormative) queer’ dichotomy (Weber, 2016a: 32).  
Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate that figurations are never stable. She claims that every 
performance of a figuration depends on a number of factors, including history, geopolitics, 
performance readings and responses, inhabitation or resistance, among others. As a result, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 74 | P a g e  
 
every performance and its repetitions introduce a new element, thus reiterating that 
figurations of the “homosexual” are flexible, fluid and ever-changing. Weber (2016a) goes 
further to critique institutional arrangements of power/knowledge/pleasure, such as 
heteronormativities and/or homonormativities, stating that they are “likewise less stable than 
they appear to be” (Weber, 2016a: 33). Weber (2016a) concludes that performativity, in 
conjunction with the deployment of tropes and temporalities, produces the final element of 
Haraway’s (1997) figuration: worlding. Drawing on the work of Haraway (1997) and 
Agathangelou and Ling (2004), Weber (2016a) argues that worlding “map[s] universes of 
knowledge, practice, and power” (Haraway, 1997:11), adding that:  
In the cases of the Victorian ‘homosexual’, the Obama administration’s ‘LGBT rights holder’ 
and European debates over Neuwirth/Wurst, knowledge about these figurations, the way they 
are performatively put into practice, and the power relations running through them combine 
so differently in each case that it is sometimes difficult to remember that we are speaking 
about the same general figure – the ‘homosexual’ (Weber, 2016a: 33). 
From this point of departure, Weber (2016a) demonstrates that there are differences in how 
the “homosexual” is worlded, particularly in that “the maps produced by worlding practices 
are as contestable as the figurations to which they give specific form” (Haraway, 1997: 11). 
In once again referring to Foucault (1979), Weber (2016a) concludes that understandings of 
the “homosexual” and networks of power/knowledge/pleasure that produce this figure are 
never static. She argues that they are instead an imposition of power on bodies and their 
(sexual) activities, all of which produces new rules for “the game of powers and pleasures” 
(Foucault, 1980: 48). It is these games, Weber (2016a) argues, that are projected beyond the 
realm of private space and intimate relations, and into the realms of national, regional and 
international/global relations (Weber, 2016a). 
Statecraft as Mancraft (Derrida & Ashley) 
In tracking Weber’s (2016) theoretical journey, it is possible to identify the “layering” of 
various theoretical and methodological elements that are drawn from the authors discussed up 
to now. When discussing “statecraft as mancraft” Weber (2016a) goes further to incorporate 
Foucault’s (1980) exposure of discourse and productive power with Haraway’s (1997) 
“Butlerian” (1999) exploration of figuration. By layering these insights to provide multiple 
perspectives for analysis, an intricate account of the figuration of the “homosexual” is 
provided. Further incorporating these perspectives with Richard Ashley’s (1989) “statecraft 
as mancraft” reveals how states attempt to “freeze” or stabilise meanings of the 
“homosexual” in the global political realm (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) thus draws from 
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Ashley’s argument that “it is impossible to understand the formation of modern sovereign 
states and international orders without understanding how a particular version of ‘sovereign 
man’ is inscribed as the necessary foundation of a sovereign state and how this procedure of 
‘statecraft as mancraft’ produces a specific ordering of international relations” (Weber, 
2016a: 34) as a core underpinning of her queer IR theoretical framework.  
Weber (2016a) explores Ashley’s (1989) argument through two techniques: first she applies 
it to her first two “homosexual” figurations (Victorian perverse and Obama LGBT); second, 
she deploys the work of Foucault (1979: 1980), Haraway (1997) and Butler (1999) to argue 
that Ashley’s (1989) “statecraft as mancraft” simultaneously expands on the understanding of 
figurations of the “homosexual” and produces unique IR research questions for the purpose 
of analysing figurations of the “homosexual” in the “sexualized orders of international 
relations” (Weber, 2016a: 34). Weber (2016a) begins by providing an overview of Ashley’s 
(1989) poststructuralist perspective on international relations, arguing that whilst he built 
upon Foucault’s analysis of “the constitution and problematisation of subjectivities” (Weber, 
2016a: 34), he also includes Jacques Derrida’s (1977) “deconstructive critique of 
logocentrism” (Weber, 2016a: 34). She states: 
Logocentrism refers to how ‘the word’ – indeed, a singular, specific word signifying a 
specific presence – grounds all meaning in a linguistic system because of how it is positioned 
as a universal referent that is located outside of history. In the classical age, ‘God’ was the 
most common example of a ‘Logos’ in a logocentric system. In the modern age, as Nietzsche 
argued, ‘man’ displaced ‘God’ from this logocentric position. Understood as ‘a pure and 
originary presence – an unproblematic, extra-historical identity, in need of no critical 
accounting’ (Ashley 1989, 261), ‘modern man’ is now the figure who functions in modern 
discourse as ‘an origin, an identical voice that is regarded as the sovereign source of truth and 
meaning’ (Ashley 1989, 261; Weber, 2016a: 34). 
Weber (2016a) endorses Ashley’s (1989) argument that in international relations theory and 
practice, “modern man” as sovereign man functions as both “the Logos” of modernity and as 
the foundation for the sovereign nation-state. This is a result of the shift from monarchical to 
popular sovereignty, where “modern man” has now given the modern nation-state its 
sovereign authority (since authority is no longer passed down from “God” to a sovereign 
monarch). Weber (2016a) articulates Ashley’s (1989) argument as follows:  
The state’s sovereign authority that had previously been vested in the monarch – as 
transcendental, as reasonable, as the interpreter of meaning – is now vested instead in 
‘modern man’. To be sovereign, then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular 
sovereign man as an always already existing domestic presence, as the foundation of its 
authority domestically and internationally, which emerges from the complex interplay of 
domestic and international relations (Weber, 2016a: 35). 
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Weber (2016a) argues that three key points emerge from Ashely’s (1989) analysis in this 
regard, more specifically with reference to the Victorian “perverse homosexual” and 
Obama’s “LGBT rights-holding homosexual” figurations. First, Weber (2016a) asserts that 
the modern nation-state is inherently connected to “modern man” and that “the sovereign 
inscription of the modern state is intimately tied to the sovereign inscription of ‘modern 
man’” (Weber, 2016a: 35). She refers to Ashely’s (1989) statement that ‘Modern statecraft is 
modern mancraft. It is an art of domesticating the meaning of man by constructing his 
problems, his dangers, his fears” (Ashley, 1989: 303). Furthermore, Weber (2016a) argues 
that such sentiments are projected into the realm of international anarchy where “sovereign 
man” attempts to tame the arena with his foreign policies. Weber (2016a) refers explicitly to 
the work of Rao (2012), where it is argued that the Obama administration’s modern man is a 
“neo-imperial man” that insists on the post-colonial (perverse homosexual) state to assert the 
hierarchy of the enlightened US “sovereign man.” This (US) sovereign man thus narrates gay 
rights as human rights in the global arena in order to justify “neoimperial rule” (Richter-
Montpetit 2014b; 2014c), an argument that is also put forward by Jasbir Puar (2007b) within 
the context of post-9/11 nationalism, which will be discussed further in this chapter and 
critiqued throughout this study.   
By providing such examples, Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate Ashley’s (1989) argument 
that “paradigms of man are themselves tools of power” (Ashley 1989, 300). In doing so 
Weber (2016a) moves to her second point, where she argues that such paradigms have 
implications for understanding the orders of international relations. She refers to Ashley’s 
(1989) notion that “modern mancraft” gives rise to modern understandings of the 
international order as well as of the modern sovereign state.  
For just as the ‘logos’ in Derrida’s logocentric system makes it possible to establish 
hierarchies, the ‘logos’ of ‘modern man’ as the ‘logos’ of the modern state organizes 
international relations according to hierarchies as well. These include reasonable man/pure 
danger, civilized/barbaric, security/danger, peace/war, domestic/international, and 
order/anarchy. In this logocentric system, whatever can be narrated from the point of view of 
‘the logos’ and made to ‘speak from a sovereign voice’ is what is valued and  protected;  what  
cannot  be  made  to  speak  from  a  sovereign  voice (e.g., anarchy and terror) must be 
violently opposed (Ashley 1989, 284; Weber, 2016a: 36). 
Thus Weber (2016a) argues that through expanding figurations of the “normal couple” 
(heterosexual, white, Christian, patriotic) to include the LGB (not always including the T, as 
the T is often still considered perverse), the Obama administration “narrated those 
unreasonable states that do not recognise the gay rights of the ‘LGBT’ as sources of 
barbarism, instability, and danger to ‘modern man’, established neocolonial education 
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policies to enlighten unreasonable states’ leaders (e.g., by distributing ‘LGBT’ human rights 
tool kits to foreign embassies), and imposed sanctions on some states that failed to embrace 
gay rights as human rights” [queer logics] (Weber, 2016a: 36). In providing this case, Weber 
(2016a) seeks to demonstrate how “modern man” as sovereign man, authorises and 
legitimises the possible use of violence (by the sovereign state) on behalf of his “presumed 
transcendental reason” (Ashley 1989, 268; Weber, 2016a: 36). 
Weber’s (2016a) third and final point that she draws from Ashley’s (1989) analysis is that 
none of the figurations discussed throughout (modern man, modern state, international 
orders) that are understood in IR as “variations of order versus anarchy” are stable or 
ahistorical (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) argues that 
…the reasonableness of ‘modern man’ can always be shown to be unreasonable, just as the 
order of domestic politics can always be shown to contain aspects of anarchy. To put it in 
Derrida’s terms, the binaries that order domestic and international relations constantly 
deconstruct themselves, making them both unstable and (because unstable) unreliable. What 
this means is that various invested actors – from citizens to states to formal international 
institutions – constantly attempt to stabilize these unreliable hierarchies and the figurations 
that authorize them so they appear to be ahistorical, given, and true, so that they might more 
reliably function in domestic and international politics (Weber, 2016a: 37). 
In applying such an argument to her Victorian (perverse) and Obama’s (LGBT) 
“homosexual” figurations, Weber (2016a) asserts that the immense effort to construct such 
rigid figurations (often in the face of global resistance) demonstrates a case point in itself. 
She argues that this explains why international/global politics is assumed to be dangerous by 
sovereign nation-states, because refusing to bend to the will of a national sovereign, man will 
expose sovereign man and his sovereign order that he protects as ahistorical and non-
contingent as being historical and contingent, particularly in the (anarchical) international 
realm. According to Weber (2016a), this is why “the order/anarchy boundary is so highly 
policed, both in international practice and in international theory” (Weber, 2016a: 37). In 
concluding her theoretical derivation from Ashley’s (1989) Derridian analysis, Weber 
(2016a) argues that, much like Foucault’s and Haraway’s analyses, Ashley suggests 
“contemplating how figurations and the orders (and anarchies) they produce and that are 
produced by them are fixed and frozen as well as unfixed and unfrozen” (Weber, 2016a: 37). 
She further argues that because Ashley’s (1989) analysis is embedded in IR thinking, it 
further generates particular IR research questions that contribute to development of the 
methodological foundations of her own analysis, specifically in that it provides techniques 
with which to analyse “how ‘modern man’ is figured as sovereign man on behalf of sovereign 
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nation-states and how specific figurations of ‘modern man’ as sovereign man participate in 
the production of domestic and international orders” (Weber, 2016a: 38).  
Weber (2016a) therefore raises the following questions, which are inherently embedded in 
her Queer IR theoretical and methodological exploration. Weber (2016a) goes further to 
utilise and critique these queer IR research programmes and layered inputs discussed 
throughout, inevitably producing her own theoretical lens which forms the theoretical 
backbone of this study: the “queer logics of statecraft” (Weber, 2016a) 
• How does speaking ‘the truth’ about ‘homosexuality’ and the ‘homosexual’ participate in the 
organization and regulation of international relations? (Weber, 2016a: 38) 
• What ordering principles of sexuality generate and sustain – and are generated and sustained by 
– figurations of the ‘homosexual’, and how do they function in international relations? (Weber, 
2016a: 38) 
• How do figurations of the ‘homosexual’ function as instances of ‘statecraft as mancraft’, and 
how specifically is this normality or perversion figured as ‘the logos’ of or against ‘sovereign 
man’? (Weber, 2016a: 38) 
• How do these ordering principles of sexuality and figurations of the ‘homosexual’ as or against 
‘sovereign man’ work together to order international relations? (Weber, 2016a: 38) 
• What do various practices of statecraft as mancraft make possible in world politics, and what 
contingencies are rendered necessary by and through these practices? (see Ashley,1989; Hopf, 
2010) (Weber, 2016a: 38) 
Queer Logics of Statecraft (Weber) 
In this section Weber (2016a) provides a critique of her theoretical exploration in relation to 
the authors she has drawn from up to this point (Foucault, Haraway, Butler, Ashly, Derrida). 
She then seeks to provide theory with which to analyse and understand international 
relations/global politics in the form of the “queer logics of statecraft” by further theorising 
Queer IR. Weber (2016a) begins by arguing that while her developed research questions 
contribute significantly to queer IR research programmes, they are limited in that they 
encompass Derrida’s perspectives on deconstruction and its connection to the “logos” and the 
“plural” (Weber, 2016a). She elaborates that Ashley’s Derridian analysis draws on the claims 
that “deconstruction is not something we bring to a text; rather, it is something that is 
inherent in a text” (Weber, 2016a: 38), going further to state:  
The logocentric procedure that tries to impose a singular meaning upon a text or a discourse, 
then, is always as political as it is impossible. This explains why politics – like the politics of 
statecraft as mancraft – endlessly loops through circuits in which states (or other political 
communities) attempt to impose order on anarchy. By critiquing the logocentric procedure as 
it functions in domestic and especially international politics, Ashley’s analysis takes us some 
way toward understanding how ‘paradigms of man are them- selves tools of power’ (Ashley 
1989, 300), not just in specific times and places (as in, e.g., Kuntsman 2009; Puar and Rai 
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2002; Puar 2007), but more generally. For Ashley explains how these impossibly singular 
normal or perverse paradigms of sovereign man attempt to figure impossibly singular normal 
or perverse international orders in their own image. This is how actors attempt to impose 
order onto anarchy (Weber, 2016a:39).  
In establishing this argument as a relevant account within her broader theoretical exploration 
(and that of Queer IR), Weber (2016a) argues that Ashley’s (1989) Derridian analysis falls 
short of recognising how figurations of sovereign man are utilised to establish domestic and 
international orders. She asserts that there is a missing account of what she calls the “plural 
logoi”: 
What is missing is an account of how not just a singular logos but a plural logoi potentially 
figures sovereign man and orders international politics in ways that construct and deconstruct 
these figures and orders (Weber, 2016a: 39).  
Weber (2016a) goes further to argue that this is particularly relevant for Queer IR because 
this “plural logoi” can be read as simultaneously normal and/or perverse as it is understood 
through enactments of sexes, genders and sexualities, as well as numerous registers of 
authority. She notes that plural logoi, particularly normal and/or perverse logoi, can be 
perceived as counterintuitive, stating the following with reference to Ashley’s (1989) 
Derridian argument:  
This is especially the case because of how Derrida initially sets up the ‘logos’ as the 
necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) ‘word’ that he opposes to the necessarily 
plural (and possibly perverse) ‘text’. Following Derrida, Ashley analyzes accounts of 
sovereign man as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) ‘sovereign orderer’ 
who is opposed to the necessarily plural (and presumptively perverse) ‘anarchy’. While 
Ashley insists on the plurality of man, he does not consider how this plural man might 
function as a sovereign man who might be necessarily plural (Weber, 2016a: 39).  
Weber (2016a) argues that Ashley’s (1989) Derridian analysis does not seek to explore how 
“the plural” may be empowered as (simultaneously) foundationally normalised and 
foundationally perverted. She goes further to claim that Ashley (1989) neglects to seize a 
vital opportunity, particularly in exploring how the normal and/or perverse plural “might 
function as a possible or even necessary foundation of meaning in a logocentric system, 
rather than always in opposition to the singular (presumptively normal) logo” (Weber, 2016a: 
39). Weber (2016a) then draws on the work of Roland Barthes (1976) and his articulation of 
the rule of and/or in order to demonstrate the plural logoi and expose its implications for 
understanding statecraft as mancraft (Weber, 2016a).  
Weber (2016a) applies both and/or and either/or logics to notions of sex, gender and 
sexuality in order to further demonstrate its utility. She notes that either/or operates within 
conventional and binary logics, imposing a choice to encompass either one term or the other 
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(not both) in order to justify the “true meaning” of a text, discipline, person or act. Weber 
(2016a) thus seeks to demonstrate contrasting understandings by disrupting these binary 
logics with and/or (Queer) logics. She argues that and/or acknowledges how the meaning of 
something or someone can be located beyond the either/or binary, particularly in 
understanding that someone or something is not simply fixed by singular meanings. Rather, 
true understanding insists on acknowledging that a person or a thing can be constituted 
through simultaneous (sometimes even “contradictory”) and multiple meanings that do not 
conform to the boundaries of the either/or dichotomy. In asserting the plurality of the and/or, 
Weber (2016a) states:  
According to the logic of the and/or, a subject is both one thing and another (plural, perverse) 
while simultaneously one thing or another (singular, normal). For example, a person might be 
both a boy and a girl while simultaneously being either a boy or a girl. This might be because 
a person is read as either a boy or a girl while also being read as in between sexes 
(intersexed), in between sexes and genders (a castrato), or combining sexes, genders, and 
sexualities in ways that do not correspond to one side of the boy/girl dichotomy or the other (a 
person who identifies as a ‘girl’ in terms of sex, as a ‘boy’ in terms of gender, and as a 
‘girlboy’ or ‘boygirl’ in terms of sexuality). In these examples, a person can be seen as and 
while simultaneously being or because the terms ‘boy’ and ‘girl’ are not reducible to 
traditional dichotomous codes of sex, gender, or sexuality either individually or in 
combination, even though traditional either/or readings attempt to make them so (Weber, 
2016a: 40). 
In applying Barthes’s (1974) and/or rule, Weber (2016a) notes that the plural that 
“constitutes a subjectivity” can also be more than one thing and/or another: “For a 
subjectivity can be one thing and another and another, and so on, as well as one thing or 
another or another, in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities, as there are multiple sexes, 
genders, and sexualities individually and in combination” (Fausto-Sterling 1993; Weber, 
2016a: 41).  Weber (2016a) argues that there are indeed limitations to Barthes’s (1974) 
and/or rule as an expression of singular notion. This further reveals a number of possibilities 
in relation to plural logics, particularly in Weber’s (2016a) pluralisation of the plural (and/or) 
rule itself. The author thus argues that two important elements are highlighted throughout this 
discussion. First, the binary either/or logic that imposes choice automatically excludes the 
plural logics of and/or.  
Plural logics of the and/or contest binary logics, understanding the presumed singularity and 
coherence of their available choices (either ‘boys’ or ‘girls’, either normal or perverse), their 
resulting subjectivities (only ‘boys’ and ‘girls’), and their presumed ordering principles 
(either hetero/homonormative or antinormatively disruptively/disorderingly queer) as the 
social, cultural, and political effects of attempts to constitute them as if they were singular, 
coherent, and whole. Therefore, it is only by appreciating how the (pluralized) and/or 
constitutes dichotomy-defying subjectivities and (anti) normativities that we can grasp their 
meanings (Weber, 2016a: 41). 
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Second, according to Weber (2016a), when the now pluralised and/or complements the 
either/or, meanings are articulated differently. This is because in the pluralised and/or 
meanings are not structurally regulated by the slash that governs or divides either/or. Rather, 
meanings are “irregulated” by the slash (and additional slashes) that connect terms in a 
number of ways that overtly disrupt the either/or binary and rule. As Weber (2016a) puts it: 
“The (pluralized) and/or, then, is a plural logic that the either/or can neither comprehend nor 
contain” (Weber, 2016a: 42). 
Weber (2016a) thus argues that the pluralised and/or is a ‘Queer Logic’ (Weber, 1999: xiii), 
because it inserts a systematic, non-decidable plurality into discourse that effectively disrupts 
the understandings of normativity and antinormativity, particularly with regard to the 
normality and/or perverse constructions of sexuality and gender. In essence, this disruption 
acts as a method for resisting binaries that accumulate differences (Crewshaw 1991; Weber, 
2016a). Weber (2016a) justifies her deployment of queer logic by drawing on Sedgwick’s 
definition of queer, whilst simultaneously queering the Barthesian and/or: 
[Queer is] the … excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of 
anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically’ … as exclusively 
‘and’ or as exclusively ‘or’. Identifying these often illusive figurations, the now queer 
Barthesian and/or suggests how we should investigate queer figures. Barthes’s instruction is 
this: read (queer) figures not only through the either/or but also through the (pluralized) 
and/or (Weber, 2016a: 42, citing Sedgewick, 1993: 8). 
Weber (2016a) notes that while Barthes’s (1974) recommendation applies to the reading of 
literature, his queering of and/or (pluralised) can also be applied to the works and contexts of 
foreign policy. She argues that sovereign man (as a plural logoi in a logocentric procedure) 
can figure foreign policy and participate in ordering and disordering international/global 
politics. Weber (2016a) refers specifically to the case of the 2014 Eurovision winner Tom 
Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst as an example of “how the ‘normal and/or perverse 
homosexual’ can function in logics of statecraft as mancraft as both a singular ‘sovereign 
man’ and a plural ‘sovereign man’” (Weber, 2016a: 42). By dedicating a chapter to this 
debate, Weber (2016a) seeks to demonstrate that Ashley’s (1989) statecraft as mancraft is 
more complicated than originally asserted. According to Weber (2016a), this is because the 
logos/logoi of the “logocentric procedure” can be singular and plural by being normal and/or 
perverse with regard to gender and sexuality as well as manifestations of international/global 
politics, such as nationality, civilisation, religious and secular authority. The author goes 
further to argue that statecraft as mancraft can be a queer activity (as well), often resulting in 
an alternative sexualised order of international/global politics (Weber, 2016a: 43).  
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Weber (2016a) seeks to establish the validity of her theoretical guiding principle/tool: queer 
logics of statecraft. She argues that it is not as simple as adding the singular “homosexual” 
(as either sovereign man or his foil) to account for queer instances of statecraft. Instead, 
observing how plural logics (and/or) function in global politics (queer logics of statecraft) can 
assist in understanding how the normal and/or perverse plural influences sovereign figures, 
their adversaries (and fears), and the queer orders that these figures simultaneously produce 
and are products of (Weber, 2016a). The author goes further to argue that: 
Queer logics of statecraft are evident in those moments in domestic and international relations 
when actors or orders rely upon a queerly conceptualized Barthesian and/or – an and that is at 
the same time an or in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities – to performatively figure 
sovereign man, the sovereign state, or some combined version of the order/anarchy and 
normal/perverse binaries as normal and/or perverse (Weber, 2016a: 43). 
Cynthia Weber (2016a) therefore asserts that utilising the lenses of “queer logics of 
statecraft” to analyse international relations/global politics reveals (by following and 
extending Ashley’s (1989) arguments) the categories that connect and break apart 
foundational binaries, such as order/anarchy and normal/perverse. This exposure entails an 
understanding of the “stabilising slash” in these binaries as multiplying, disrupting and 
complicating structures, figures and orders, rather than categorising, stratifying and 
simplifying (Weber, 2016a). Weber (2016a) argues that this disruption encourages the 
questioning of how the plural and/or  “is introduced into these binaries to both establish and 
confound their meanings and the meanings of ‘men’, ‘states’, and ‘orders’ as well as the 
meanings of ‘sexes’, ‘genders’, and ‘sexualities’ which are foundational to them” (Weber, 
2016a: 43). In drawing from Butler (1999), Weber (2016a) argues that queer logics of 
statecraft insist on an imperative understanding of how the plural is “performatively enacted”, 
thus exposing numerous national and international/global figurations and logics that can be 
queerly enacted. In drawing further from Sedgewick (1993), Weber (2016a) goes on to assert 
that queer logics of statecraft inherently expose how sexes, genders and sexualities that resist 
monolithical understandings (queer) are (unexpectedly) produced by and products of (normal 
and/or perverse) sovereign men, sovereign states and sovereignly ordained (authorised by the 
sovereign man) orders and anarchies (Weber, 2016a).  
Queer logics of statecraft, then, do not just describe those moments when the performatively 
perverse creates the appearance of the performatively normal. Nor do they describe only the 
opposite, when the performatively normal creates the appearance of the performatively 
perverse, although those can be among their effects. Rather, queer logics of statecraft describe 
those moments in domestic and international politics when the logos/logoi as a subjectivity or 
the logos/logoi as a logic is plurally normal and/or perverse in ways that ‘confound the norm, 
normativity [antinormativity]’ (Barthes 1976, 109; Wiegman and Wilson 2015) of 
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individually or collectively singularly inscribed notions of sovereign man, sovereign states, or 
sexualized orders of international relations (Weber, 2016a: 44). 
Weber (2016a) notes that queer logics of statecraft may still give rise to “institutions, 
structures of understanding, and practical orientations” (Berlant and Warner 1995, 548: 2), 
particularly those that make sovereign men, sovereign states and international/global orders 
static and hierarchical. The author refers to conceptualisations of homonormativity (and 
homonationalism) and heteronormativity which refer to notions of sexual organising 
(Duggan, 2003; Puar, 2006; Puar 2007). This means that disruptions of norms, binaries and, 
as Weber (2016a) argues, anti-norms, queer logics of statecraft can also construct novel 
institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that are built upon a 
disorientating and/or reorientating plurals. It is in this light that queer logics of statecraft are 
used as the theoretical lens of this study in order to build upon Puar’s (2007b) 
Homonationalism, and conceptualise Homopopulism. This is particularly relevant with regard 
to Weber’s (2016a) claim that such deployments can make (un)conventional understandings  
“more alluring, more powerful, and more easily mobilised both by those who, for example, 
wish to resist hegemonic relations of power and by those who wish to sustain them” (Weber, 
2016a: 44; see also Weber 1999 2002; Puar and Ra, 2002; Puar 2007). As such, Weber 
(2016a) states with regard to the deployment of the queer logics of statecraft and their 
specific pluralistic (and/or) dynamic: 
Unlike heteronormativities and homonormativities, though, we cannot name in advance what 
these institutions, structures of understanding, and practical (dis)/(re)orientations will be. We 
cannot know if they will be politicizing or depoliticizing. To determine this, it is necessary to 
both identify the precise plural each particular queer logic of statecraft employs to figure 
some particular ‘sovereign man’, ‘sovereign state’, and international order, always asking, 
‘For what constituency or constituencies does this plural operate?’ (Weber, 2016a: 44). 
In her book, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to 
Knowledge, Cynthia Weber (2016a) argues that European leaders sought to mobilise 
Neuwirth/Wurst as either normal or perverse within the realm of international 
relations/global politics, going further to claim that these traditional logics of statecraft failed 
to understand the gendered, sexualised, national, powered, ordered and global political 
dynamics associated with the plurals registered in this figure. The author states the following 
in this regard, and concludes with an additional set of research questions for both 
international theory and practice. It is these questions, along with the various contributions 
and explorations evinces throughout this section, that contribute significantly to the 
theoretical foundations of Queer IR, queer logics of statecraft, Homonationalism, and the 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this study:  
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European leaders failed to consider Neuwirth/Wurst through the lens of queer logics of statecraft, 
they generally failed to appreciate what plural(s) constituted him/her/them and how the plural 
and/or logic he/she/they embodies is what made their attempts to claim or disown – to normalize 
or to pervert – this normal and/or perverse figure both possible and impossible. Yet it is this very 
failure on the part of European leaders to read Neuwirth/Wurst through the plural(s) that 
constitute(s) him/her/them that suggests an additional set of research questions for international 
theory and practice, including the following (Weber, 2016a: 45): 
• Can a paradigm of sovereign man be effective without being – as Ashley claims the ideal type 
of ‘sovereign man’ must be – ‘regarded as originary, unproblematic, given for all time, and, 
hence, beyond criticism and independent of politics’ (Ashley, 1989: 271)? 
• What happens when a political community like a state or the EU considers grounding itself 
upon a pluralized and/or logoi? (Weber, 2016a: 45) 
• Under what conditions might this be desirable or even necessary, and what might it make 
possible or preclude? (Weber, 2016a: 45) 
• How might queer logics of statecraft affect the organization, regulation, and conduct of 
international politics? (Weber, 2016a: 45) 
 
 
In developing these theoretical and methodological frameworks of Queer IR, Weber (2016a) 
seeks to demonstrate how the queer logics of statecraft contribute significantly to the field of 
International Relations and to understandings of international relations/global politics. Weber 
is particularly interested in the case of 2014 Eurovision winner Conchita/Wurst as well as 
other figurations, more specifically the ‘unwanted im/migrant’, the ‘terrorist’, the ‘gay rights 
holder’, the ‘gay patriot’, and how they function in national, regional, and international 
games of power associated with sovereignty, all of which encapsulate the key themes of this 
study. While the Conchita/Wurst case will not be discussed any further in this specific study, 
it acts as significant marker and contribution to the development and understanding of (Queer 
IR) theory (Weber, 2016a).  
The diagram below (Figure 4.1) provides a summary of the abovementioned theoretical 
development of Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft.” This tool of Queer IR is 
informed by various scholars and texts; their contributions are outlined below as initiated by 
Weber’s (2015) initial conversation (Queer Intellectual Curiosity) on some of the theoretical 
and methodological tenants of Queer IR.  
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(The Author) 
The next section will explore Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism as theorised in her 
ground-breaking book Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. The 
purpose of including Homonationalism in this chapter is to situate Puar’s (2007b) work as 
both a product of and contribution to Queer IR. Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism further 
informs a key theoretical contribution to this study, providing one of the lenses with which to 
examine the problem and answer the research questions.  
Understanding Homonationalism  
Developing Homonationalism 
This section provides a brief illustration of the development of Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) concept 
of Homonationalism within the broader context of Queer and Queer IR scholarship. This next 
section will briefly explore the theoretical contributions that make up the conceptual 
underpinnings of Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism. The purpose of exploring the 
development of Homonationalism, as well as its theoretical contributions and conceptual 
underpinnings, is in order to fully understand its initial foundation. This is so as to effectively 
deploy and critique Puar’s (2007b) arguments within the geopolitical contexts of 2018, whilst 
Queer Intellectual Curiosity (Queer IR) 
(Weber, 2015) 
The Homosexual 
(Weber, 2016a) 
Queer Logics of Statecraft (Weber, 2016a) 
(Queer IR) 
Discourse & 
Power (Foucault, 
1979, 1980) 
 
Figurations 
(Haraway, 1997; 
Butler, 1999) 
Statecraft as 
Mancraft (Ashley, 
1989; Derrida, 1977) 
Figure 4.1: Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) Theoretical and Methodology Framework in Queer International 
Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 86 | P a g e  
 
simultaneously drawing Weber’s (2016a) theorisation of the queer logics of statecraft, all of 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In her ground-breaking book Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times Jasbir 
Puar (2007b) introduces her conceptualisation of “Homonationalism”, which was informed 
by her work on “Homonormativity” specifically her article “Mapping US 
Homonormativities” (Puar, 2006). The book has two primary purposes, namely to explore the 
emergence and dynamics of Homonationalism, and to rethink intersectionality and identity by 
employing assemblage theory. Puar (2007b) analyses sexuality as an “assemblage” of bodies, 
movements and representations.  The ultimate aim of Terrorist Assemblages is therefore to 
expose complicities and collusions among LGBTQ and feminist approaches to war, terrorism 
and immigration, going further to (queer) critique hegemonic notions of “foreign” (Muslim) 
sexual orders (Martin, 2010).  
Puar (2007b) is thus the coiner of the widely deployed term “Homonationalism” and its 
associated theoretical underpinnings in Terrorist Assemblages. Whilst noting Schotten’s 
(2014) claim that queer theory is useful for political theory, particularly in thinking about 
hegemony and empire, as well as theorising modes of resistance to it, Puar (2007b) employs 
Queer Theory and, as Weber (2014) argues, Queer IR lenses for analysis in this regard. Puar 
(2007b), like many queer theorists, is interested in mobilising queer as a verb and political 
formation, particularly to disrupt the interaction between queer (homonormative) politics and 
(post-911) nationalistic ideology that she calls “homonationalism” and queer as regulatory. 
This normative “historical shift” and “facet of modernity” (Puar, 2013b) that embodies the 
politics of sexualised nation, emerges from an inherently complex and theoretically dense 
postructuralist critique:  
Simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer and 
representative recognition of LGBTQ subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, 
immigrant rights and the expansion of state power to engage in surveillance, detention and 
deportation. The narrative of progress for gay rights is thus built on the backs of racialised 
and sexualised others, for whom such progress was either once achieved but is now 
backsliding or has yet to arrive. This process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of 
homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologised perverse 
(homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, specifically Muslim others, upon whom 
Orientalist and neoOrientalist projections are cast. Homonationalism is thus not simply a 
synonym for gay racism or another way to critique the ‘conservatisation’ of gay and lesbian 
identities, but instead an analytic for apprehending the consequences of the successes of 
LGBT liberal rights movements (Puar, 2013a: 25). 
Since the publication of Terrorist Assemblages , Jasbir Puar has published a number of texts 
discussing the developing nature and deployment of Homonationalism. She criticises what 
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she calls the “reductive applications” of Homonationalism, particularly in activist circles. In 
2013 Puar published an article titled “Rethinking Homonationalism”, where she claims to 
clarify her original conceptualisation.  
Instead of thinking of homonationalism as an accusation, an identity, a bad politics, I have 
been thinking about it as an analytic to apprehend state formation and a structure of 
modernity: as an assemblage of geopolitical and historical forces, neoliberal interests in 
capitalist accumulation both cultural and material, biopolitical state practices of population 
control, and affective investments in discourses of freedom, liberation, and rights (Puar, 
2013b: 337). 
The author then followed up with a more intricate and detailed article titled: 
“Homonationalism As Assemblage: Viral Travels, Affective Sexualities” (Puar, 2013a). Puar 
(2013a) highlights the notion that her intention for Homonationalism is fundamentally to 
build upon the work of Lisa Duggan (2002), her exploration of “Homonormativity” and her 
theorisation of neoliberalism and the domestication of queer communities. The author points 
to Homonationalism as a critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses’ production of 
(equality) narratives, particularly their association with progress and modernity, and their 
establishment of hierarchies of (neo-liberal) citizenship at the expense of other/Other 
populations. This is further exemplified by Puar’s endorsement of Mikdashi’s (2011) work on 
homonationalism in Gay Rights as Human Rights: Pinkwashing Homonationalism, where the 
author attempts to define the concept (queer as regulatory) as a type of “neoliberal identity 
politics” (Mikdashi, 2011). 
Many scholars have criticised what they call “inconsistencies” within Puar’s (2013b) 
explanations. In her article “Homonationalism: From Critique to Diagnosis, Or, We Are All 
Homonational Now” Heike Schotten (2016) tracks the development of Puar’s (2007b) 
original conceptualisation by differentiating homonationalisms 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0. The author 
argues that Homonationalism has evolved from a critique of politics into a diagnostic of 
international political relations. Schotten (2016) further argues that while these transitions 
offer insights into global politics, in the process Homonationalism loses its critical capacity as 
well as its distinctiveness as a political formation, becoming incapable of critically analysing 
strategies of resistance, activism and political discourse.  
I examine this transformation neither to proscribe nor condemn terminological innovation, but 
rather to address questions about activism and solidarity raised by it. Tracing what I call 
homonationalism1 through the development in Mikdashi’s work into homonationalism1.5 and 
up to the present moment of a new, updated homonationalism2, I argue that homonationalism 
has broadened significantly beyond the theoretical frame and US political context in which it 
was originally articulated in Terrorist Assemblages, a transformation that attenuates the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 88 | P a g e  
 
distinctive character of homonationalism as a political formation in its own right and 
diminishes its critical force (Schotten, 2016: 352). 
More recently Puar (2017) released an updated edition of Terrorist Assemblages in which she 
includes an additional postscript titled “Homonationalism in Trump Times”. This postscript 
contextualises Homonationalism within the context of the Donald Trump presidency and the 
rise of populist-nationalism in North America and Europe, highlighting the notion that 
discussions around homonationalism are more important now than ever. This will be 
discussed further in the next chapter. While there are various contestations around the 
meanings, deployments and transformations of Homonationalism, there is little doubt that 
Puar’s (2007b) theoretical and conceptual framework in Terrorist Assemblages provides a 
powerful tool for analysis, particularly with regards to queer themes associated with war, 
terrorism, immigration, hegemony, empire, security, global politics, discipline and regulation, 
among other factors. Cynthia Weber comments as follows on the themes covered by Jasbir 
Puar within the broader context of Queer IR:  
Queer IR scholarship has demonstrated the role of non-normative understandings of gender 
and sexuality in representations of the figure of the Muslim terrorist and/or insurgent and the 
ways in which these knowledges have shaped security practices in the War on Terror. Queer 
IR draws our attention to how the will to knowledge about sexuality and gender in this 
context is deeply shaped by cultural ideas about racial difference and colonial forms of power 
to construct internationally dangerous figures – like “the terrorist” and/or “the insurgent” – 
and those who need to be secured from them like “the docile patriot” (Richter-Montpetit & 
Weber, 2017). 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the theoretical development of Homonationalism as outlined in Puar’s 
Terrorist Assemblages (2007b). It demonstrates how Homonationalism has contributed to and 
is informed by Queer IR thinking and theorisation. It further illustrates the two major pillars 
of Homonationalism as discussed above, namely “Homonormativity” and “post-9/11 
Nationalism.”  
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(The Author) 
Theorising Homonationalism: Queer as Exceptional & Disciplinary 
In order to understand and deploy and/or resist homonationalism, it is important to explore its 
foundational theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. In doing so, this section will refer to 
Jasbir K. Puar’s introductory chapter “Homonationalism & Biopolitics” in the original 
Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007b) . It will also draw 
extensively from Heike Schotten’s (2016) article “Homonationalism: From Critique to 
Diagnosis, or, we are all Homonational now”. This is because of the coherent, detailed and 
contemporary analysis of the theoretical contributions of what the author terms 
“homonationalism 1,” the Homonationalism that she argues appears in Puar’s original 
Terrorist Assemblages (2007b), the text and framework that is utilised throughout this study. 
It is noted that the content throughout Schotten’s (2016) article presents varying (developing) 
forms of Homonationalism ( 1.5, 2.0 etc.) as discussed in the previous section. However, for 
the purpose of this study, Schotten’s (2016) “Homonationalism 1” will be the only stage 
explored in this regard. This strategy is deployed specifically in line with Schotten’s (2016) 
argument that “homonationalism has broadened significantly beyond the theoretical frame 
and US political context in which it was originally articulated in Terrorist Assemblages 
[2007]” and in the light of the analysis that will be conducted in the next chapter.  
Figure 4.2: Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism in Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times 
Homonormativity 
(Duggan, 2002, 
2003; Puar, 2006) 
Post-9/11 US 
Nationalism 
(Puar, 2007b) 
Homonationalism 
(Puar, 2007b) 
Queer IR 
(Weber, 1999; 
2014;2015;2016a) 
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“Homonationalism” is a term formed of a combination of the words “homonormative” and 
(post 9/11) “nationalism.” In developing this term, Puar (2007b) draws on the work of Lisa 
Duggan (2002, 2003) as well as her own work on “homonormativity” (Puar, 2006). It is 
important to note that the term “homonormativity” appeared prior to Duggan’s (2002) work, 
more specifically in Berlant and Warner’s (1998) Sex in Public. Schotten (2016) notes that 
Puar’s (2007b) work draws specifically from Duggan’s (2002) conceptualisation of 
“homonormativity” and not on Berlant & Warner (1998). The authors argue that 
“homonormativity” cannot be equally compared to “heteronormativity” because of the 
specific power and hierarchical relations associated with societal (subtle and compulsory) 
heterosexuality (Berlant & Warner, 1998). Duggan’s (2002, 2003) “homonormativity” differs 
significantly from that of Berlant & Warner (1998), particularly in that she exposes an 
intersection of neoliberal and sexual politics. She further argues that such intersections 
demonstrate a marked shift from the original “liberal/left”-leaning progressive politics of the 
“gay movement” to one that embraces the free market and associated neoliberal cultural, 
economic and political practices (homonormativity). Schotten (2016) notes that 
“homonormativity” is often solely associated with gay assimilation, while in Duggan’s (2002, 
2003) original conceptualisations, it refers very specifically to neoliberal sexual politics as 
well (upward distribution of wealth, privatisation, market sovereignty) (Schotten, 2016). 
It is Duggan’s (2002, 2003) original version of “homonormativity” that informs Puar’s 
(2007b) Homonationalism. This is further articulated in Terrorist Assemblages, where Puar 
(2007b) discusses “exceptionalism” in relation to queerness. Schotten (2016) states:  
For Puar, queer’s exceptionalism functions as both an immunization from critique and a 
regulatory mechanism, disciplining queers into proper modes of transgression or deviance 
(and labeling them “assimilationist” if they fail). Rather than make an ideal out of 
transgression, which becomes its own regime of proper queerness (“a regulatory queer ideal 
that demarcates the ideal queer” 2007, 22), Puar instead encourages political analysis and 
self-reflection that can account for various types of complicity (2013) (Schotten, 2016: 354). 
Puar (2007b, 2012) specifically notes that queerness does not necessarily occupy a space of 
confounded radicalness. This is based on her argument that queer can participate in hierarchy 
and violence. As such, Puar’s (2007b) initial conversation with “homonormativity” (and its 
relation to Homonationalism) is very much within the context of Duggan’s (2002, 2003) 
“sexual politics of neoliberalism” its collusion with [and/or] (as argued in the next chapter) 
resistance from, LGBTQ subjects. In her interview, Judge (2018) states: 
Neoliberalism is interested in conflict and war, and it sows the divisions that prop up 
nationalisms. We are seeing an antidemocratic politics emerging in all of that, and your 
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question is an essential one; where are the queers in this? Of course the queers are on both 
sides of the line; the queers are central to some of the forms of resistance that we are seeing in 
the Middle East, we are seeing in Africa, some of the most exciting political resistance 
movements are coming from the gender and sexual margin, on the one hand, and then you are 
seeing the “co-opted queer” in the ruling establishments that are basically taking on their 
resistant counterparts – we are not outside these systems of domination (Interview, Melanie 
Judge, 02/07/2018). 
Puar’s (2007b) employment of “nationalism” in her terminology is not explicitly defined in 
Terrorist Assemblages . She does, however, consistently refer to “nationalism” as an 
ideological dispensation associated with the US nation-state, and more specifically post-9/11 
(“melting pot”; see next chapter) registers of patriotism and citizenship. In doing so, Puar 
(2007b) locates Homonationalism as a collusion between (homonormative) homosexuality 
and US nationalism that is simultaneously produced by patriotic, inclusive narratives [and/or] 
gay and queer (patriotic) subjects of the sovereign state (Puar, 2007b; Weber, 2016). Puar 
(2007b) thus seeks to demonstrate that the nation-state is not solely heteronormative and 
patriarchal, as many feminist and queer scholars have sought to establish(Weber, 1999, 
2016). Instead , the nation-state is also homonational, simultaneously sanctioning and 
producing homosexuality through “normalised” modes of institutionalism (patriotism, 
marriage, consumption) [and/or] “queering” racial others as threats to the nation, its national 
security and its values. In summary, Puar (2007b) seeks to expose how (a certain kind of) 
homosexuality colludes with the nation, rather than remaining beyond the periphery (Puar, 
2007b). Schotten (2016) therefore argues that Puar’s aim in Terrorist Assemblages is 
“theorizing US national homosexuality, or homonationalism” (Puar, 2007b: 49). 
Throughout Puar’s (2007b) theoretical journey a number of major innovations emerge, 
forming the theoretical spine of Homonationalism. The first of these manifestations is US 
sexual exceptionalism. Puar (2007b) positions US exceptionalism as a key IR deployment for 
understanding hegemony and imperialism. She includes the word “sexual” and forms the 
term “US sexual exceptionalism” as a mode for understanding how global narratives and 
behaviours are shaped around the perception that the United States (and the West more 
broadly: see next chapter) is morally superior (and successful) in its tolerance of gender and 
sexual diversity, and progress in advancing gay and women’s rights. 
Unravelling discourses of U.S. sexual exceptionalism is vital to critiques of U.S. practices of 
empire (most of which only intermittently take up questions of gender and rarely sexuality) 
and to the expansion of queerness beyond narrowly conceptualized frames that foreground 
sexual identity and sexual acts (Puar, 2007b: 10). 
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The second manifestation that makes a significant theoretical contribution to 
Homonationalism is what Puar (2007b) terms “Queer as regulatory.” This core element of 
Puar’s (2007b) work refers to a relationship between queerness and biopolitics, that is, in this 
context, queer life is regulated at the expense (death) of the sexual and racial Other.  
While we can point to the obvious problems with the emancipatory, missionary pulses of 
certain (U.S., Western) feminisms and of gay and lesbian liberation, queerness has its own 
exceptionalist desires: exceptionalism is a founding impulse, indeed the very core of a 
queerness that claims itself as an anti-, trans-, or unidentity. The paradigm of gay liberation 
and emancipation has produced all sorts of troubling narratives: about the greater homophobia 
of immigrant communities and communities of colour, about the stricter family values and 
mores in these communities, about a certain prerequisite migration from home, about coming 
out teleologies. We have less understanding of queerness as a biopolitical project, one that 
both parallels and intersects with that of multiculturalism, the ascendancy of whiteness, and 
may collude with or collapse into liberationist paradigms. While liberal underpinnings serve 
to constantly recenter the normative gay or lesbian subject as exclusively liberatory, these 
same tendencies labor to insistently recenter the normative queer subject as an exclusively 
transgressive one (Puar, 2007b: 22). 
 
Puar (2007b) further analyses a photograph by Poulomi Desai, published in 2003, that depicts 
what Puar (2007b) claims is “a Muslim cleric staging terrorist drag” (Puar, 2007b: 11). In 
doing so, the author seeks to expose a queer disciplinary (regulatory) subject, namely the 
queer secular liberal. Operating within the apparatus of queer liberalism and queer secularity, 
Puar (2007b) argues that queer liberal secularity insists on a specific transgression of 
(religious) norms, particularly those that bind the subject to religious parameters. Thus the 
“queer agential subject” can only be located beyond the periphery of religious norms which, 
as Puar (2007b) argues, conflate agency and resistance. In arguing that religion, particularly 
Islam, has “supplanted race as one of the irreconcilable binaries between queer and 
something else” (Puar, 2007b: 13), Puar states the following whilst locating queer liberal 
secularity within the discourse of binary and queer as regulatory:  
For queer Arabs and Muslims the either/or plight thickens: queer secularity understands 
observance of religious creed, participation in religious public spaces and rituals, devotion to 
faith-based or spiritual practices, and simply residence within an Islamic nation-state (floating 
upon the supposition of the separation of church and state in non-Islamic nation-states; for 
example, the denial of Christian fundamentalism as a state practice in the United States) as 
marks of subjugated and repressed sexuality void of agency. But regardless of complex 
affinities with Islam, Arab nation-states, and Muslim identity, the agency of all queer 
Muslims is invariably evaluated through the regulatory apparatus of queer liberal secularity. 
This further contributes to apolitical readings typically ascribed to the refusals of western 
modernity that may be enacted by Islamic followers (Puar, 2007a: 13). 
 
Puar (2007b) argues that queer liberal secularity emerges most prominently in relation to 
Islam. This is because Islam, deployed universally, is perceived as inherently less tolerant of 
and yielding to homosexuality than Christianity and Judaism. Even with the deployment of 
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“secularism” as a supposedly tolerant and all-encompassing religious world view, Puar 
(2007b) seeks to expose the hierarchies associated with queer liberal secular orders and their 
affinity to Western (religious/non-religious) discourse and hierarchy. In doing so, Puar 
(2007b) insists (as she does with most of her critiques in Terrorist Assemblages) that she 
seeks to explore the “resilience and stranglehold of this discourse, its operating logic, the 
myths and realities it manufactures” rather than establishing associated truths and falsehoods 
(Puar, 2007a: 14). This study seeks to follow the same methodology in this regard.  
 
Puar’s (2007b) third and final “imbricated manifestation” of Homonationalism is the 
ascendancy of whiteness. Intricately linked to Queer as regulatory, Puar (2007b) draws from 
the work of Rey Chow (2006), who argues that “homonormativity” reproduces racial, class 
and national norms, as well as those of sexuality and gender. These norms are specifically 
constructed around modes of consumption, materialism and neoliberalism. Puar (2007b) 
argues that it is the ascendancy of whiteness that locates Muslims on the periphery of 
“appropriate” multiculturalism. In speaking to the poststructuralist influence on the text, Puar 
(2007b) draws on the work of Michel Foucault (1989) in her discussions on Queer as 
regulatory and the ascendancy of whiteness. Schotten (2016) argues that Puar’s (2007b) 
approach to racism is similar to Foucault’s (1989), particularly her assertion of “queerness as 
a process of racialisation” (Puar, 2007a: xi). Puar (2007b) thus argues that the intersection of 
queerness and biopolitics divides (constructs a binary of) sovereign subjects into those who 
must live (be protected and nurtured) – the (white) gay patriot – and those who must die (be 
eradicated, removed) – the queer/perverse/racial non-national, non-citizen “terrorist” (Puar, 
2007b). Puar (2007b) thus positions queerness as demarcating nationhood, national 
belonging, and “racialised patriotism,” through narratives of proper multiculturalism. Hence, 
binaries are constructed on the basis of racial/national disloyalty, and proper 
secularity/irrational religiosity (specifically “anti-modern” fundamentalist Islam). Thus the 
“terrorist” figuration is born of the racial, national, religious and sexualised parameters of 
(post-9/11) Homonationalism:  
September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together 
persons who appear ‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.’ This consolidation reflects a 
racialization wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are dis-identified 
as citizens.This disidentification is a process of sexualization as well as of a racialization of 
religion. But the terrorist figure is not merely racialized and sexualized; the body must appear 
improperly racialized (outside the norms of multiculturalism) and perversely sexualized in 
order to materialize as the terrorist in the first place. Thus the terrorist and the person to be 
domesticated – the patriot – are not distant, oppositional entities, but ‘close cousins.’ Through 
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this binary-reinforcing ‘you’re either with us or against us’ normativizing apparatus, the war 
on terror has rehabilitated some – clearly not all or most – lesbians, gays, and queers to U.S. 
national citizenship within a spatial-temporal domain I am invoking as ‘homonationalism,’ 
short for ‘homonormative nationalism.’ (Puar, 2007b: 38).  
Schotten (2016) in her critique of Puar’s (2007b) concept of Homonationalism argues that US 
sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory and the ascendency of whiteness (the three 
manifestations of Homonationalism) form vital theoretical contributions in this regard. She 
goes further to assert that these contributions concurrently locate Homonationalism within a 
unique political register, for without US sexual exceptionalism, there would be no connection 
to the US imperial agenda. Furthermore, without Queer as regulatory and the ascendancy of 
whiteness, there would be no exploration of racial power dynamics. As Schotten says:  
Crucial in their interconnectedness to describe the post-9/11 domestic scene in the United 
States, these three phenomena are concomitant but distinct and do not necessarily entail one 
another, either logically or historically. Taken together, however, they constitute a distinctive 
theoretical contribution of this text and make clear that the homonationalism of Terrorist 
Assemblages requires both US sexual exceptionalism and queer as regulatory for its complete 
conceptualization as a racialized project of US empire (Schotten, 2016: 356). 
In the context of this study and the analysis in the next chapter, Schotten (2016) offers three 
contemporary observations of the original Terrorist Assemblages text. These observations, 
which will be briefly discussed, offer important insights into the benefits and limits of Jasbir 
Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism, some of which will be addressed through the 
conceptualisation of Homopopulism in Chapter 5. 
Schotten’s (2016) first observation is with regard to the scope of Homonationalism. The 
author argues that Puar’s (2007b) text is written primarily within an American context. She 
notes Puar’s (2007b) brief references to the Netherlands and United Kingdom (UK), but 
asserts that Homonationalism is conceptualised on the analytical basis of (post-9/11) US 
policies and discourses. She argues that this is further substantiated through the manifestation 
of US sexual exceptionalism as a key theoretical component, going further to claim that 
understanding globalising Homonationalism (though relevant) “is neither a task of this text 
nor a guiding theme of the term’s original formulation” (Schotten, 2016: 356). This study, 
through the conceptualisation of Homopopulism, will seek to globalise Homonationalism (see 
Chapter 5). Schotten’s (2016) second observation is that Homonationalism is presented not 
only as form of state behaviour or policy, but also as a phenomenon that is manifested among 
various subjects and non-state actors, including (global) organisations, groups and 
individuals. Schotten (2016) states in this regard:  
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Homonationalism moves in more than one direction: not simply from the state to subjects, but 
also from subjects toward the state. Homonationalism thus cannot be understood as solely a 
state practice or as requiring a unified notion of the state or state power, as some have 
suggested (Currah 2013; Ritchie 2015). Puar not only emphasizes the partial and fragmentary 
nature of homonationalism’s movement (2007: 10), but also clearly states that it does not 
operate along a simple, top–down model of power. Homonationalism is also a practice of 
queer subjects, who align and identify themselves with the nation and nationalist projects 
(Schotten, 2016: 357).  
Schotten’s (2016) third observation is that Homonationalism is not necessarily confined to 
right-wing political dispensations. In fact, she argues that Puar’s (2007b) interests are in the 
manifestations of Homonationalism in liberal/progressive/left-wing political dispensations, 
which are often subtle and masked. This particularly relevant for this study, since 
Homopopulism, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is interested exclusively in right-
wing political behaviour and dispensation (particularly concerning its rising global 
hegemony). Much like her criticism of queer exceptionalism, Schotten (2016) notes that Puar 
(2007b) seeks to expose violence against the Other along the whole spectrum of society, and 
in Terrorist Assemblages she is particularly invested in demonstrating that homonationalisms 
infiltrate sectors where such phenomena are least expected, such as in feminist, gay, queer 
and progressive circles. Puar (2007b) provides the following account of a mode for tracking 
and resisting such collusions:  
It is precisely by denying culpability or assuming that one is not implicated in violent 
relations toward others, that one is outside of them, that violence can be perpetuated. 
Violence, especially of the liberal varieties, is often most easily perpetrated in the spaces and 
places where its possibility is unequivocally denounced. What is at stake in defusing queer 
liberal binaries of assimilation and transgression, secularity and religiosity? If we are to resist 
resistance, reading against these binaries to foreground a broader array of power aliations and 
disaliations that are often rife with contradiction should not provide ammunition to chastise, 
but rather generate greater room for self-reflection, autocritique, and making mistakes. It is 
easy, albeit painful, to point to the conservative elements of any political formation; it is less 
easy, and perhaps much more painful, to point to ourselves as accomplices of certain 
normativizing violences (Puar, 2007a: 24). 
 
Schotten (2016) concludes by providing the following conceptualisation of Jasbir. K Puar’s 
(2007b) Homonationalism as articulated in Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times. Whilst noting that the scope of this study cannot fully comprehend the intricate 
foundations of this theoretically dense text, this conceptualisation and its theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings discussed above will guide the broad understanding of 
Homonationalism going forward.  
As explicated in Terrorist Assemblages, homonationalism consists of, on the one hand, the 
marshaling, inclusion and solicitation of gay and queer people by the US nation-state to serve 
its domestic and foreign imperial interests (e.g. through marriage, military service, the use of 
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“gay rights” as a legitimating discourse for military aggression and war); and, on the other 
hand, gay and queer complicity with the US state, whether individual or organizational. I refer 
to this two-part definition as homonationalism1. US sexual exceptionalism and queer as 
regulatory are integral to it (Schotten, 2016: 357). 
 
Conclusion  
When applying a set of theoretical lenses to assist in solving a problem and answering 
research questions, it is imperative to understand the theory and its methods of application. 
This chapter sought to outline and unpack the necessary theoretical, methodological and 
conceptual approaches that make up the foundational theoretical lenses of this study. Two 
prominent texts were explored, both of which inform Queer IR as scholarship and its 
theoretical development within Queer and IR more broadly. The work of Cynthia Weber 
(2016a) and Jasbir K. Puar (2007b) make up the majority of the literature presented above; 
however, the work of various scholars inform their theoretical explorations, many of which 
are highlighted throughout. As a result, the “queer logics of statecraft” (Weber, 2016a) and 
Homonationalism (Puar, 2007b) are investigated and deployed as the theoretical lenses to 
inform the analysis of the themes, questions and case studies presented in this study. In doing 
so, this chapter proceeded with a historical review of Queer IR as scholarship, going further 
to unpack the theoretical and methodological underpinnings that inform the “queer logics of 
statecraft” as presented in Weber’s Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and 
the Will to Knowledge (2016a).  It then explores both the historical background and 
theoretical contributions that inform Puar’s (2007b) conceptualisation of Homonationalism, 
drawing from the original edition of Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer 
Times and the recent work of Heike Schotten (2016) in Homonationalism: From Critique to 
Diagnosis, or, we are all Homonational now. 
In providing a historical, theoretical, methodological and conceptual overview in this chapter, 
and previous chapters more broadly, this study utilised the literature explored up to now in 
order to guide the analysis and inform the conclusion in the final two chapters. Moving from 
a densely historical and theoretical exploration in this chapter, the next chapter will apply the 
scholarship and produce a brief analysis of the themes discussed throughout, including but 
not limited to LGBTQ politics, populism (as the politics of fear), nationalism, patriotism and 
sovereignty. In doing so, it will explore, extract, critique and deploy the work of Weber 
(2016a) and Puar (2017) where they apply their own theoretical frameworks (discussed 
above) in an attempt to understand the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North 
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America and its collusion with queer politics. The next chapter will then theorise and 
conceptualise new understandings of Homonationalism through deploying the theoretical and 
methodological recommendations and applications of Weber (2016a, 2016b) and Puar 
(2007b, 2017). It will conceptualise a new political phenomenon that has occurred 
concurrently with the rise of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America: 
Homopopulism – the (queer) logic of the politics of fear and/or the politics of queer.  
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CHAPTER 5 
From Homonationalism to Homopopulism  
Introduction 
The application chapter of a qualitative study is where theory is applied and “brought to life”, 
as it were. This is in order to solve the problem and answer the research questions posed in 
the research proposal (see Chapter 1). This analysis chapter does just that, contributing to the 
overall findings of this study. Through deploying Queer IR and Homonationalism (see 
Chapter 4) in order to understand a LGBTQ political shift in line with a populist-nationalist 
resurgence in Europe and North America, this chapter tests the utility of these theoretical 
lenses. In doing so, it provides new theoretical insights through the conceptualisation of 
Homopopulism, thus solving the problem and addressing the research questions that inform 
the overall study. 
The re-emergence of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America has, in many ways, 
disrupted the hegemonic (neo)liberal status quo. As a result, various global actors and 
subjects, including queer subjects, have sought to co-opt (or be co-opted) and appropriate 
queer discourses and subjectivities for the purposes of figuring sovereign subjects and 
asserting Othering agendas. This has been witnessed across the globe, from the United States, 
to France, the Netherlands and Germany, where recent (2016/2017) elections revealed a 
geopolitical shift in the global political scene. Donald Trump holding an LGBT flag at a 
campaign event in Colorado, and Geert Wilders publicly supporting the Dutch LGBT 
community against the “onslaught of Islam” are but some of the more overt indicators of how 
right-wing politics is using queerness. In his interview Fransch (2018) states that “Populist-
nationalism and queer politics work well together where people are very attached to their 
national identity – where Othering is possible and where specific groups are framed as 
responsible for the problems in a society” (Interview, Chet Fransch, 24/07/2018).  
Queer IR, and more specifically Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft,” assist 
in exposing the way that hegemonic actors employ queer logics in order to receive and/or 
assert sovereign authorisation (domestically and globally). Jasbir K. Puar’s (2007b) concept 
of Homonationalism provides the analytics with which to understand how queer can be 
implicated as a regulatory discourse, particularly through registers of sex, gender, sexuality, 
race, class and nationality. In order to provide the scope within which to answer the research 
questions and address the problem statement of this study, this chapter demonstrates how 
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theory can be applied in order to understand the current global political scene, as well as the 
locations of queer within it. It explores two texts by queer theorists Cynthia Weber (2016b) 
and Jasbir K. Puar (2017) in which the authors seek to apply their theoretical undertakings, 
explored in Chapter 4, to the rise of populist-nationalism, and in their specific case, the 
election of Donald Trump as the president of the world’s hegemonic powerhouse, the United 
States.  
This chapter begins with Weber’s Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Trump (2016b), 
where she applies her Queer IR theoretical and methodological approach to the 2016 election 
of Donald Trump as US president. It argues that the Trump campaign employed queer and/or 
logics in figuring authorising (fearful) sovereign subjects. It then explores Jasbir Puar’s 
(2017) postscript that appears in the later expanded edition of her study, where she seeks to 
contextualise Homonationalism within the current political scene. This study argues against 
Puar’s (2017) assertion that these times are not exceptional, whilst going further to claim that 
Homonationalism requires an expansion of its theoretical scope. Finally, through bringing 
Puar’s (2007b, 2017) and Weber’s (2016a, 2016b) theoretical and conceptual outcomes into 
conversation, this chapter takes on the task of expanding Homonationalisms theoretical 
scope. It does so by conceptualising Homopopulism as an analytic of the politics of queer 
and/or the politics of fear. 
The purpose of exploring these applications is to demonstrate both the valuable contributions 
and the shortcomings of Weber’s (2016a, 2016b) and Puar’s (2007b, 2017) theories and 
methods, which is an important objective in line with this study’s research questions and 
problem statement. Furthermore, through drawing on both Puar’s (2007b, 2017) and Weber’s 
(2016a, 2016b) theories and their applications, this chapter seeks to bring these Queer IR 
explorations into conversation with each other. This is in order to conceptualise a new 
“historical phenomenon” within the “facets of modernity”– Homopopulism. It is this (queer) 
political shift (from Homonationalism to Homopopulism) and/or analytical tool (through the 
convergence of Weber’s and Puar’s work) that will assist in understanding a queer (LGBTQ) 
political shift in Europe and North America. In using Puar’s (2007b, 2017) own terminology, 
times are indeed queer, perhaps queerer than ever before.  
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Sovereignty, Sexuality & the Will to Trump 
Applying Queer (IR) Logics: Fearful Sovereignty & Patriotism 
After publishing her book Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will 
to Knowledge (2016a), Cynthia Weber participated in a symposium to which she invited 
various critiques and supplementary contributions to her ground-breaking (Queer IR) 
theoretical and methodological work. Weber (2016b) wrote her concluding response to the 
symposium by putting her Queer IR analysis to work and making her theoretical stance 
“come alive” as it were. As such, she produced yet another significant text by applying her 
theories and methods in order to simultaneously understand and resist the 2016 election of 
Donald Trump as the president of the United States. This piece titled Sovereignty, Sexuality 
And The Will To Trump: A Queer IR Analysis And Response is particularly relevant to this 
chapter and the overall study in two ways: first, it demonstrates how the “queer logics of 
statecraft”, and Queer IR more broadly (see Chapter 4), can be used as a lens for 
understanding global political phenomena; second, the case to which Weber (2016b) chooses 
to apply her analysis covers a theme that is integral to this study and the associated research 
questions, specifically the rise of populist-nationalism and the resistance from and/or 
collusion by queer subjects. 
Cynthia Weber (2016b) thus reiterates her argument in Queer IR that:  
[S]overeignty, sexuality and all political scales from the intimate to the international are 
inseparable. So, too, are the intersectional ways sex, gender and sexuality function in relation 
to and through, for example, race, class, ability, religion, ‘civilization’ and colonialities. One 
cannot understand sovereignty without understanding how sexuality functions intersectionally 
at every scale, and one cannot understand sexuality without understanding how sovereignty 
functions intersectionally at every scale (Weber, 2016b). 
Weber (2016b) seeks to demonstrate this argument in practical terms, noting that while 
similar critiques are found in various critical fields – such as critical race, postcolonial and 
decolonial studies – none of them insists (as Queer IR does) on focusing on the functions of 
sex, gender and sexuality. In asserting her understanding of “sovereignty” (a key concept in 
her analysis) as a “political delusion”, Weber (2016b) argues that political delusions about 
sex, gender and sexuality are inherently connected to delusions about race, ability, religion 
and nationality, particularly with regard to her discussion of “sovereign subjectivities” (see 
Chapter 4). Weber’s (2016a) theorisation of the “queer logics of statecraft” helps scholars 
understand how “sexed, gendered and sexualised ‘sovereign subjects’ and ‘sovereign 
nations’” are constructed with the purpose of ordering the world in specific ways (Weber, 
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2016b).  It is through these lenses that Weber (2016b) seeks to understand and resist Trump’s 
presidency.  
Weber (2016b) focuses specifically on the strategies of the Trump campaign building up to 
the November 2016 election. She argues that it used “three interrelated ideas at the heart of a 
US conception of sovereignty to figure a particular ‘US sovereign subject’ who could 
authorise a Trump presidency” (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; see Chapter 4). Weber (2016b) goes 
further to argue that these three ideas are patriotism, the “melting pot” myth, and the 
American Dream, all of which simultaneously figure a “US sovereign subject” through sexed, 
gendered and sexualised, as well as racial, religious, classist and ableist registers and orders. 
At the heart of this formulation is what Weber (2011, 2016) terms “fear-based patriotism,” a 
tradition that she explores in detail in her 2011 book I am an America (Weber, 2011). 
Through the deployment of this conceptualisation in her analysis, Weber (2016b) seeks to 
demonstrate a resurgence of political Othering, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks (Puar, 2007b; see Chapter 4). In constructing “foreigners” (outside the state) and 
“illegals” (inside the state) as a threat, Weber (2016b) argues that fear-based patriotism’s 
modes of Othering groups “US Americans into trustworthy, loyal citizens vs. risky, 
(potentially) disloyal citizens”.  The deployment of “fear-based patriotism” forms an integral 
contribution to the conceptualisation of Homopopulism, which is discussed in final section of 
this chapter.  
Weber (2016b) thus argues that the Trump campaign ignited an anti-Muslim, post-9/11 fear-
based patriotism, whilst simultaneously expanding the scope of US fears (by also capitalising 
on other catastrophic world events) (see Chapter 3). Weber (2016b) notes that the Trump 
campaign presented the “radical Islamic terrorist” as a universal threat to US citizens whilst 
also building upon traditional constructions of racial, sexual and gendered biases in order to 
figure “‘the underdeveloped’, ‘the un-developable’, ‘the unwanted im/migrant’, ‘the 
terrorist’, and some ‘LGBTQs’ as dangerous perversions of and threats to ‘the real America’” 
(Weber, 2016a, 2016b; Puar, 2007b; see Chapter 4).  
Weber (2016b) argues that the Trump campaign simultaneously instilled the notions of whom 
US Americans must fear and distrust, whilst crafting a specific figuration of “the fearful US 
citizen” that could authorise a Trump presidency (Weber, 2016a; 2016b; see Chapter 4). 
Weber (2016b) calls this authorising figure the “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject”, going 
further to argue that:  
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[The subject is] generally a white, US-born, Anglo, Christian, heteronormative, able-bodied 
man or woman, who was groomed to respect striding masculine forms of white authoritarian 
leadership (like those of Trump and Russia’s Vladimir Putin) more than the ‘rigged’ 
democratic process. The campaign figured the most trustworthy patriots of them all as white 
working-class men who had been sold out by the Clintons and by President Obama (Weber, 
2016b). 
Whilst the “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” forms an integral part of Weber’s (2016b) 
analysis, this study will argue in the final section of this chapter (through the deployment of 
homonationalism) that this authorising subject is also queer and homonormative (Puar, 
2007a; see Chapter 4).  
Weber (2016b) argues that this specific (Trumpian) fear-based patriotism is formed out of the 
reform of traditional post-9/11 patriotism, particularly that which values “American 
diversity.” In other words, the Trump campaign’s methods of Othering was not compatible 
with the former narrative of the “melting pot” (US citizens “melt together” in a diverse, 
harmonious and homogenous nation) that informed conventional post-9/11 patriotism and the 
subsequent Bush and Obama campaigns/administrations. It is on this basis that the next 
section will critique Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism and its contextual utility, particularly 
in that it is conceptualised through the registers of post-9/11, liberal and “melting pot” 
nationalism.  
In this regard, Weber (2016b), much like Puar (2007b), notes that  
…the liberal tolerance ideology that informs the melting pot myth always allows for some US 
Americans not to be tolerated, because they are unmeltable or improperly melted US 
Americans. And it allows US leaders and ordinary citizens to change their minds about who is 
meltable and who is unmeltable at any time. 
 Weber (2016b) exposes how the Trump campaign utilised the “melting pot” myth in a new 
way, particularly by locating those Americans who are and those who are not “meltable” or 
“tolerable” (Weber, 2016b).  Whilst this is a relevant observation under conventional liberal 
hegemonic dispensations, this study further argues that the liberal tolerance ideology is 
succumbing to the rise of a more explicitly exclusive political intolerance, the same 
ideological dispensation that notably informs the Trump campaign and Homopopulism (see 
the following two sections of this chapter).  
Weber (2016b) goes further to note a number of contradictions associated with Trump’s 
stance on the “homosexual” particularly with regards to the subject location within the 
tolerable, meltable/intolerable, unmeltable dichotomy (through the deployment of “queer 
logics” (and/or) this study will, in the final section, argue that the homosexual subject is 
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implicated in both). Weber (2016b) argues that Trump is “consistently inconsistent on this 
front” (queer logics), noting that he has simultaneously supported and rejected LGBTQ 
interests in various theatres. Whilst noting that this article was written in 2016, Trump’s 
actions and reactions remain in line with Weber’s (2016b) observation to this day, appointing 
an openly gay US ambassador and at the same time signing “religious freedom”  (right to 
discriminate) executive orders.  
Weber (2016b) thus suggests that this “rewriting” of the “melting pot” myth, manifested 
through fear-based patriotism, is further accompanied by Trump’s portrayal as the 
embodiment of the “American Dream.” That is, as Weber (2016b) argues, a “sovereign 
dream”, where US citizens can become sovereign over their own lives by generating their 
own wealth that is collectively beneficial to the broader US sovereign-state capitalistic 
project. 
Trump appealed to white, Christian, male, working-class voters in particular by 
acknowledging their failure to achieve or to retain their American Dreams and by reassuring 
them that their failures were the fault of domestic and foreign enemies who had stolen this 
Dream out from under them. Domestically, these enemies were immigrants, Muslims, 
Mexican Americans, African Americans, and anyone else who was getting an unfair 
advantage in the politically-correct, rigged system or anyone who was channeling those unfair 
advantages to undeserving groups. Internationally, it was countries like China who were 
‘raping’ the US through its trade practices, with the help of career politicians like the 
Clintons, who Trump blamed for the neoliberal free trade agreement NAFTA (which, when it 
passed the Senate in 1993, had more support from Republicans than Democrats) (Weber, 
2016b). 
Weber (2016b) argues that Trump’s portrayal of himself “as politically incorrect, self-made, 
ruthless, ‘art of the deal’ bullying businessman who – like them – knew who America’s real 
enemies were” (Weber, 2016b) convinced many (mainly white) voters that he understood 
them and that he was the only one who could address their issues (e.g. implementing 
protectionist economic policies, particularly in the context of the global financial crisis – see 
Chapter 3). He simultaneously convinced the middle- to upper-class white voters that his 
unconventional economic policies would benefit them through the implementation of tax 
cuts. Through noting the logics that inform the Trump campaign’s exclusive populist-
nationalist rhetoric (see Chapter 3), Weber (2016b), deploying her own lenses of queer 
(and/or) logics, states:  
This means that Trump did not win the presidency in spite of his vile comments about and 
vile behavior toward women, ‘the gays’, ‘the blacks’, ‘the Mexican rapists’ and ‘the radical 
Islamic terrorists’. He won the presidency because of and/or in spite of these comments and 
actions and because of how his campaign mobilized them to create a coalition of fear-based, 
misogynistic, Christian, patriotic whiteness (Weber, 2016b). 
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Weber (2016b) asserts that sex, sexuality and gender played an integral role in the 
construction of Trump’s “US sovereign subject”- a figure that was particularly appealing to 
(and embodied by) predominantly white US Americans (and as this study argues, many queer 
subjects too).  
Furthermore, a crucial aspect of Weber’s (2016b) analysis is her assertion that the Trump 
campaign did not solely figure the “US sovereign subject” through either/or logics, but it 
used queer (and/or) logics as well. While Trump pitted a number of binaries 
(meltable/unmeltable; trustworthy/untrustworthy; good citizen vs. bad citizen), he was 
“consistently inconsistent” on which subject was located where. Statements such as “There 
can be no discrimination against gays. I’m against gay marriage” (Weber, 2016b) embody the 
appropriation of queer logics.  
Comments like these were implicitly and explicitly made in the register of sex, gender and 
sexuality throughout the campaign, and they were more consistent with and/or logics and 
neither/nor logics than they were with either/or logics. These statements demonstrate how 
some of the paradoxical figures and logics found in queer discourses were co-opted by the 
Trump campaign for its own purposes (Weber, 2016b). 
Queer IR and Queer lenses more broadly can assist in understanding how queer discourses 
are appropriated by hegemonic actors, including sovereign subjects, sovereign leaders and 
sovereign states. Such notions present an integral theme presented consistently throughout 
this study. Queer IR scholarship has been particularly critical about the ways in which 
queerness, sexuality and gender have been weaponised and utilised as tools of 
chauvinist/imperial statecraft and empire. Terms such as “Homonationalism” and 
“homocolonialism” are often deployed through attempts by Queer IR scholars to 
problematise associated practices of, for example, diplomacy and foreign policy (Richter-
Montpetit & Weber, 2017). These questions have informed much of Cynthia Weber’s work, 
as demonstrated in her 2014 article “Why is there no queer international theory?”:  
It is, therefore, vital to pose a second set of Queer IR research themes and questions that take 
account of how “queer” is sometimes claimed in the name of normalizing and depoliticizing 
understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality rather than contesting them. Research questions 
that explore these dimensions of queer often investigate how the nonmonolithic character of 
queer signification – a queer logic of “and/or” – is appropriated by hegemonic actors, 
alliances, and orders as a national and international strategy of governance through 
securitization and marketization (Weber, 2014: 599). 
In her 2016 Queer IR analysis, Weber (2016b) thus exposes two notable elements in the 
strategies of the Trump campaign. First, through asserting fearful patriotism, the Trump 
campaign figured the “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” (through registers of sex, 
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sexuality, gender, race and class) to authorise Trump as the sovereign leader of the sovereign 
state. Second, the Trump campaign appropriated queer logics as a method for doing so. As a 
result, his win came as a surprise, as conventional modes of analysis were incapable of 
understanding how and why this could/did occur. Queer (IR) lenses thus assist in 
understanding the deployment of queer logics and figurations of sovereignty, all of which 
featured prominently in the Trump campaign.  Perhaps it would bode well for those who have 
continuously discarded queer theoretical and methodological frameworks to introspect on 
their own theoretical scope in this regard.  
Weber (2016b) further notes with regard to the appropriation of queer discourse, cautioning 
against an “antinormative” blindness that can dilute or obstruct queer deployment:  
…exclusively anti-normative, always contrarian, somehow liberating understandings of 
‘queer’, ‘queers’, and ‘queer logics’ can obscure the fact that ‘queer’ – just like any 
(dis)position, strategy, or tool – can be captured, mimicked, and mobilised to map the world 
in despicable ways. Alt-Right offers one important example of a white supremacist 
organization adopting techniques of the left for such purposes. How the Trump campaign 
mobilized what (otherwise) might appear to be queer logics of statecraft to de-normalize 
Clinton’s ‘neoliberal US sovereign subject’ on behalf of Trump’s (re)normalized ‘repressed, 
entitled, white US sovereign subject’ is another. There is no reason to believe that, as 
President, Trump will abandon the very logics and tactics that helped win him the Presidency 
(Weber, 2016b). 
For the purpose of this study, it is also important to note that while queer logics were applied 
to the case of Trump’s election in a US context, Weber’s (2016b) analysis can be deployed in 
various contexts, particularly in understanding the queer logics and sovereign figurations that 
often underpin the rise of populist-nationalism across Europe and North America. This is 
discussed throughout this chapter.  
The next section will present a brief discussion of Jasbir Puar’s (2017) Homonationalism 
within the context of this rise in populist-nationalism. It will look at the recently published 
postscript to Terrorist Assemblages, whilst critiquing the theoretical scope of 
Homonationalism outside the realms of (neo) liberal hegemony. It also positions 
Homonationalism as a major theoretical contribution, along with Weber’s (2016a; 2016b) 
“queer logics of statecraft” and “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject”, to the conceptualisation 
of Homopopulism in the final section. 
Figure 5.1 summarises the theoretical contributions to and development of Queer IR and 
Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft.” It further demonstrates how these theoretical 
lenses are applied, resulting in new theoretical developments that also inform this study. 
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Through applying Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft” (see Chapter 4), the queer 
logics, resistance and/or collusions associated with the election of Donald Trump are 
exposed. Furthermore, it is through a Queer IR analysis that Weber (2016b) exposes the 
“fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” as an authorising subject of the fear-based sovereign 
leader. 
 
 
(The Author) 
 
 
Queer Intellectual Curiosity (Weber, 2015) 
(Queer IR) 
The Homosexual 
(Weber, 2016a) 
Queer Logics of Statecraft (Weber, 2016a) 
(Queer IR) 
Discourse & 
Power (Foucault, 
1980) 
 
Figurations 
(Haraway, 1997 & 
Butler, 1999) 
Statecraft as 
Mancraft (Ashley, 
1989; Derrida, 1977) 
Figure 5.1: Cynthia Weber’s (2016b) Sovereignty, Sexuality & The Will to Trump 
Sovereignty, Sexuality & 
The Will to Trump 
(Weber, 2016b) 
 
Fearful Sovereignty & 
Patriotism (Weber, 2011; 
2016b) 
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Homonationalism in Trump Times 
Contextualising Homonationalism: Ten Years Later 
In 2017 Jasbir K. Puar collaborated with Tavia Nyong’o and produced a Tenth Anniversary 
Edition of Puar’s (2007b) ground-breaking book Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times. Tavia Nyong’o (2017) wrote a new foreword to the text, while Puar (2017) 
added a 15 page postscript titled: “Homonationalism in Trump Times”. Collectively, both 
academics sought, in some respect, to contextualise Puar’s (2007b) widely deployed term 
Homonationalism, 10 years after it’s unveiling in Terrorist Assemblages. Nyong’o’s (2017) 
brief yet insightful foreword tracks the various manifestations of Homonationalism, whilst 
exploring the political dynamics of the Orlando massacre and, as she argues, the relevance of 
queer and assemblage theory in understanding war and hegemony (Puar, 2017).  
Puar’s (2017) own postscript is as dense and theoretically complex as the text itself, offering 
both a challenging and insightful look at Homonationalism in Obama’s and Trump’s America 
(noting that the original Terrorist Assemblages  was written and published in 2007 during the 
Bush administration). In summary, the Tenth Anniversary Edition of Terrorist Assemblages  
seeks to justify the notion that understanding (and resisting) Homonationalism is as important 
now as ever before, particularly in light of the election of Donald Trump as president of the 
United States and the subsequent (as Weber, 2016a, 2016b would argue) sovereign figures 
that were formed as a result (Puar, 2017). “Homonationalism in Trump Times” (Puar, 2017) 
is important for this study, firstly because it explores one of its integral themes (the rise of 
populist-nationalism), although this is not stated explicitly. Secondly, it exposes how 
Homonationalism, as originally conceptualised in Terrorist Assemblages  in 2007, cannot be 
contextualised without acknowledging a need to expand its theoretical scope. This section 
therefore critiques Homonationalism in its current form, whilst acknowledging its continued 
relevance in political, activist and academic circles. It exposes its theoretical shortcomings 10 
years later, particularly within the context of the fall of the (neo) liberal hegemony. As a 
result, whilst drawing significantly from Homonationalism and from Weber’s (2016a, 2016b) 
theoretical contributions, this section goes further to conceptualise Homopopulism in the next 
(final) section of this chapter. 
As is the case with the original Terrorist Assemblages, “Homonationalism in Trump Times” 
with its associated critique confined itself to an exclusively American context, written within 
the context of the War on Terror, and the subsequent global (neo) liberal hegemony. In 
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discussing the terrorist script (or figure, as Weber (2016a, 2016b) argues) and the relevance 
of Homonationalism in 2017, Puar states:   
On this day, the terrorist script feels largely unchanged from the post–9/11 moment. There’s 
no need to exceptionalize the trauma of the current political scene, of which Trump is a 
symptom, not the cause. Debates about rupture and continuity forego more incisive analyses 
about scale, intensification, affect, speed, contractions, expansions, and tactics. The jolt of 
Trump is not that he revealed something heretofore unknown, but that he has accelerated and 
vastly expanded the scale of disregard, extending precarity to, yes, your back yard: it’s in 
your backyard. Amidst constant refrains about the horror of our contemporary political 
scenario, I am continually struck by the discursive and material resonances with the war on 
terror (Puar, 2017: 224). 
A lot has happened in the 10 years since Terrorist Assemblages was published in 2007. 
Whilst the “terrorist script”, as Puar (2017) rightfully notes, is still deeply embedded in 
American (and more broadly Western) society, the dynamics of the War on Terror have 
shifted and expanded significantly. Two significant events have occurred that Puar did not 
acknowledge in her 2017 postscript but are inherently influential of how Homonationalism 
has manifested (and developed) in a contemporary context. The first is the 2011 Arab Spring 
which, with a contribution of a number of factors, ultimately gave birth to ISIS (see Chapter 
3). The second is the 2016 Orlando massacre (Tavia Nyong’o did discuss it in her foreword, 
though she explored only her perception of the causes and not the effects), which saw the 
most deadly attack on American soil since 9/11 (see Chapter 3). What is more relevant about 
these two events within the context of Homonationalism is how queer discourses and 
subjectivities are intertwined with the subsequent politics that followed. ISIS used its various 
social media platforms to present videos of alleged homosexuals being thrown off rooftops, 
an act that was, for a number of reasons including those embedded in homonationalisms, 
condemned by the UN Security Council. The Pulse night club where the Orlando massacre 
took place was a gay club, and this was the first direct attack on the queer community by a 
global terrorist network (ISIS claimed responsibility). Following these events 
Homonationalism was expanded by both queer subjects and hegemonic actors (such as the 
US nation state) that sought to appropriate LGBT and Queer discourses (see previous 
section). In her interview, Judge (2018) states that: 
The [post-Orlando] politics of fear has been effective. There has been an effective use of a 
“populist-thuggery” on one level. There is a certain thuggery in the Trump regime in its post-
truth rhetoric. Bullying meets this post-truth narrative and it is desperately trying to show a 
veneer of respectability and civility in amongst that thuggery. And the homosexual is the 
perfect subject to help with that “veneer building,” that “respectable politics.” As in Africa 
where homophobia is used to prop up autocratic regimes, in the global north you have 
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homonationalisms being mobilised to prop up equally autocratic, regressive and patriarchal 
leaders (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). 
Furthermore, in her postscript Puar (2017) does not acknowledge the global geopolitical 
trends occurring electorally, and the subsequent rhetoric and policy assertions/outcomes 
forming as a result (as well as the queer and fearful logics that often inform such trends and 
outcomes). Whilst this study agrees that “[the election of] Trump is a symptom, not the 
cause” of the current political scene, Puar (2017) does not acknowledge what that political 
scene is and where it is heading. It is thus useful to further acknowledge what Judge (2018) 
states with regard to the historical nature of theory:  
I don’t think there is ever one theory. There is never one lens through which one can 
understand social and political phenomena – they appear as if they are now, but they are also 
historical. They have deep historical roots and we see them in the realm of whatever dominant 
discourses, including theoretical discourses, are in play (Interview, Melanie Judge, 
02/07/2018). 
In this regard, it is important to note that (as discussed in Chapter 4) Homonationalism is 
formed out of a critique of a hegemonic (neo)liberal order and the queer complicity and 
collusion within it, as well as rooted in post-9/11 patriotism. As noted throughout this study, 
that hegemonic (neo)liberal order is declining (see Chapter 3). Even in her foreword to 
Terrorist Assemblages Tavia Nyong’o (2017) notes that a political shift has occurred, and 
that there are implications for Homonationalism: “But even if homonationalism was never 
intended to explain everything about the ways neoliberal (and now neofascist) political 
formations seek to engage the question of sexual diversity and gender nonconformity, it 
remains an indispensable tool for grappling with the ambiguous present” (in Puar, 2017: xiv). 
Weber (2016b) further adds to this critique when she notes (see previous section) that the 
(liberal) melting pot of post-9/11 patriotism (the same one that informs Puar’s (2007b) 
concept of Homonationalism) has been stripped of the valuation of “American diversity” 
demonstrated specifically through the rhetoric of the Trump campaign and subsequent 
presidency (Weber, 2016b).  
Whilst this study agrees that Puar’s (2017) analysis remains a valuable tool for understanding 
political formations (both past and present) it takes the position that Homonationalism 
requires further theoretical development. This is in order to expand its scope (contextualise), 
address its “global blindness,” speak to the geopolitical shifts occurring globally (the rise of 
populist-nationalism), acknowledge the queer logics that often inform and/or manifest from 
these shifts, and factor in the deeply embedded notions of the politics of fear (populism), 
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patriotism and sovereign figurations that embody, collude with and/or resist registers of sex, 
sexuality and gender, among others. Judge (2018) states in this regard: “Homonationalism 
does have currency now. Is it sufficient on its own or as a singular lens? Of course not, as 
with any other idea, concept, notion. Should it be spoken, theorised with and against? Yes” 
(Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). 
This is where the valuable Queer IR contributions of Cynthia Weber (2016a, 2016b) can 
supplement Puar’s (2007b, 2017) analysis. Equally, Puar’s (2007b, 2017) work on 
Homonationalism can contribute significantly towards complementing Weber’s (2016a, 
2016b) theoretical applications, particularly in understanding the “fearful, patriotic sovereign 
(Queer) subject.” This will be discussed in the next (final) section of this chapter. Through 
deploying Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft,” her subsequent exposure of the 
“fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” (Weber, 2016b), Puar’s (2007b, 2017) Homonationalism 
(see Chapter 4) and Wodak’s (2015) “populism as fear” (see Chapter 3), the next section will 
lay the groundwork for conceptualising Homopopulism – an ‘expansion pack’ of 
Homonationalism that seeks to contextualise queer politics and its collusions in the current 
(populist-nationalist) political scene.  
Conceptualising Homopopulism  
The Politics of Queer and/or the Politics of Fear 
In their recent publications both Weber (2016b) and Puar (2017) acknowledge the current 
political scene, that is, the growing support for and election of right-wing political entities 
(the rise of populist-nationalism) in Europe and North America authorised by (certain) 
sovereign subjects/bodies. Whilst Puar (2017) argues that there is nothing exceptional about 
these times, which makes Homonationalism more relevant today than ever before, the 
previous section sought to argue that the theoretical scope of Homonationalism requires 
expansion. Weber (2016b), like Puar (2017), does not necessarily discuss the exceptional 
state of the current political scene, she does, however, offer a number of theoretical 
contributions that, in conversation with Homonationalism, can assist in understanding the 
location of queer discourses and subjects within the broader global political realm. Therefore, 
this section will draw from the various contemporary, historical and theoretical explorations 
discussed throughout this study in order to conceptualise a new political phenomena and/or 
analytical tool – Homopopulism. 
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Before moving forward, it is important to note two important factors raised by Puar (2017) in 
her postscript to Terrorist Assemblages. The first is that Homonationalism is “a structuring 
facet of modernity” and a “historical shift” or “historical moment” rather than a parameter of 
identity or an accusation (Puar, 2017: 230). The second is that  Puar (2017) “intended 
Terrorist Assemblages more as an incitement to debate than as a corrective” (Puar, 2017: 
227). These two statements matter significantly in a discussion of Homopopulism and to the 
broader intentions of this study.  
First, in acknowledging how Homonationalism has been deployed globally (see Chapter 4), 
and that Homopopulism is built on many of the theoretical foundations of Homonationalism, 
the concept remains an analytic rather than a prescription. This is particularly in line with 
how queer (which informs its theoretical core) is deployed in this regard (see Chapters 2 and 
4). However, if Homopopulism, like Homonationalism, is appropriated in different forms, it 
only adds positively to on-going debates around queer discourse and subjectivity. Second, 
like Puar’s (2017) purpose in Terrorist Assemblages, the conceptualisation of Homopopulism 
is intended to incite debate and lay the groundwork for further investigation rather than to 
cast any aspersions. Judge (2018) states the following about Homonationalism in this regard: 
“The question is, what value does it [Homonationalism] bring? Where are its limits? Rather 
than does it work or no?. Should we chuck it out? – we cannot do that” (Interview, Melanie 
Judge, 02/07/2018). It is thus important to note that Homopopulism cannot exist without 
Homonationalism, and while the scope of this study does not necessarily allow a full critique 
of Puar’s (2017) complex yet insightful work, nor does it claim to offer all the solutions in 
this regard, it does seek to start a conversation about extending Homonationalism’s 
theoretical scope.  
With that said, and acknowledging Puar’s (2017) call to explore the histories of 
Homonationalism, this study seeks instead to explore the futures of Homonationalism. In 
doing so, it argues that, in line with the changes in the global political scene (from liberal 
order to populist-nationalist order – see Chapter 3), a new “historical moment” within the 
facets of modernity has occurred, that is a shift from Homonationalism to Homopopulism.  
In her interview Judge (2018) states that “It is interesting to read homonationalism within the 
changing concept of the state since 2007. It is less the “homo” and more the “nationalism” – 
how are we rethinking “nationalism?” (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). The concept 
of Homopopulism is situated in a post-Orlando/ISIS nationalist context (rather than post-
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9/11) and in a political order that is no longer rooted in a (neo)liberal hegemony and melting-
pot patriotism (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, Homopopulism is informed by queer politics 
(see Chapter 2) and/or a fearful sovereignty that is embedded in the appropriation of “queer 
logics” (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; see Chapter 4).  
As a result of the rise of Homopopulism, a new queer disciplinary/regulatory subject is 
emerging known as the “fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject” that is also playing an 
integral role in authorising fear-based sovereign leaders who are increasingly employing 
“queer (and/or) logics” (Weber, 2016a, 2016b; Puar, 2017).  It is this fearful, patriotic queer 
sovereign subject that is no longer favouring liberal rights-advancement discourses and 
subsequently authorising fear-based sovereign leaders. As such, it is these (populist) leaders 
who (queerly) promote “security” agendas (in order to relieve the fear) at the expense of 
racial (black, brown), gendered (women, non-binary), sexual (homosexual, queers), classist 
(poor), national (immigrants, rapists), and Other figurations (terrorist, unmeltable, disloyal 
citizens). Judge (2018) states: 
None of us are outside of power – we are all implicated, it operates through us, we all wield it 
and deploy it. It is obvious that queers on the top of the social and economic hierarchy will be 
implicated in the power arrangements that keep those hierarchies intact because they are 
products of those hierarchies. So of course you get fascist queers, so of course LGBT people 
would be implicated in those forms of power, including ones that deny homosexuality itself. 
Internalised homophobia is also a dimension of why they would be absorbed into a system of 
power that ultimately works against you as a sexual subject (Interview, Melanie Judge, 
02/07/2018). 
In her interview Bouchard (2018) further states that “We have to assume that that is the case 
[more LGBTQ people voting right-wing]. Some LGBTQ people cannot be let off the hook 
for being implicated in fascist politics. However, there are many people who are critical of 
this [shift]” (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 29/06/2018). 
In exploring Homopopulism, it is important to note that there are four major theoretical 
contributions that inform its conceptualisation. Bringing Weber’s (2011, 2016b) Queer IR 
analysis of the “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” into conversation with Puar’s (2007b, 
2017) Homonationalism informs the exposure of the “fearful, patriotic queer sovereign 
subject”, as it draws from both Weber’s (2011, 2016b) notions of fearful sovereignty and 
Puar’s (2007b, 2017) notions of homonormativity and queer as regulatory.  Weber’s (2016a) 
“queer logics of statecraft” further assists in understanding how fearful, patriotic sovereign 
subjects, and in this case fearful patriotic queer sovereign subjects, are counter-intuitively 
complicit in authorising fear-based sovereign leaders that do not necessarily serve queer 
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interests. Weber’s (2016a) theory further exposes how fear-based sovereign leaders employ 
queer and/or logics in order to figure sovereign subjects to authorise their sovereign 
leadership.  
For example, after the Orlando massacre, Trump asserted that he would “protect the LGBTQ 
community from hateful foreign ideologies,” but a year later he banned transgender soldiers 
from serving in the military. Furthermore, in their interview Coleman Chavez (2018) noted 
(in dismay because of Dr Coleman Chavez’s views on the global violence perpetrated by the 
US military) that “There has been a resurgence of Trans* folks, especially Transmasculine 
folks, in the [US] military” (Interview, Daniel Coleman Chavez, 19/07/2018), in spite of this 
blatant affront by the US state.  
Moreover, bringing Weber’s (2016a, 2016b) understandings of sovereignty into conversation 
with Homonationalism assists in exporting the concept of Homopopulism globally, that is, 
beyond the confines of American sexual exceptionalism to Western sexual exceptionalism. 
This is particularly relevant in the light of Weber’s (2016a) argument that 
To be sovereign, then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular sovereign [subject] 
as an always already existing domestic presence, as the foundation of its authority 
domestically and internationally, which emerges from the complex interplay of domestic and 
international relations (Weber, 2016a: 35). 
Finally, the work of Ruth Wodak (2015; see Chapter 3) and her analysis of “the politics of 
fear” within the rhetorical context of right-wing political strategies, highlights the explicit 
presence of populist-nationalism politics embedded in Weber’s (2016b) concept of “fearful 
sovereignty and patriotism.” Thus Wodak’s (2015) work in conversation with Weber’s 
(2016a, 2016b) and Puar’s (2007, 2017) reveals two conceptual underpinnings of 
Homopopulism. First, Homopopulism is informed by interactions among the politics of queer 
and/or the politics of fear. In their interview, Coleman Chavez (2018) stated the following in 
this regard: 
[Fear politics] has been very successfully mobilised. Political rhetoric has become more 
important than critical engagement – there is a conservative rage. Fear is working too well 
and is deeply connected to the economy. Fear is thus operating in multiple ways – 
compromises are happening on all sides [of the political spectrum] (Interview, Daniel 
Coleman Chavez, 19/07/2018).  
Second, queer lenses assist in understanding populism and its fear-based, popular strategies, 
specifically because queer logics are exemplified, asserted and/or appropriated by both 
populist strategies (fear-based sovereign leader touting fear-based politics) and the recipients 
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of those strategies (fearful, patriotic sovereign queer subjects). Judge (2018) states the 
following in this regard: 
The fear factor cuts across the mobilisation of populism, populism needs that, it needs people 
to congeal around particular signifiers of sameness in relation to that which is excluded, or 
resisted, or denounced.  Of course gay people are lured into that…it would be done so 
through the fear of a loss of power, probably mostly racial and gendered power, and also the 
power of nation e.g. “Make America Great Again.” For gay white men, economic interests 
are really at the centre of this (Interview, Melanie Judge, 02/07/2018). 
Homopopulism is therefore the result of the incorporation of fearful (populist) sovereignty 
and patriotism with Homonationalism, simultaneously exposing the queer logics associated 
with the interactions among the politics of queer and/or the politics of fear. It is product of 
queer collusions (voluntarily and involuntarily) with the rise of populist-nationalism, its 
associated authorising sovereign subjects and sovereign leaders, and its inherently regressive 
and violent Othering strategies. It is a historical and political phenomenon that, if not resisted 
through effective solidarity and coalition building, could result in unprecedented queer-on-
queer violence. As stated by Bouchard (2018) in her interview: “Populism is being used to 
target marginalised communities. It is about refining queer politics, a method for separating 
and [LGBTQ] demobilisation” (Interview, Danielle Bouchard, 29/06/2018). 
Thus the conceptualisation of Homopopulism by way of various theoretical contributions 
assists in answering the research questions posed in this study, particularly as to whether 
there is a queer political shift. In her foreword to Terrorist Assemblages Tavia Nyong’o 
(2017) states, in discussing the election of Donald Trump, that “white women voters were 
among the demographics who opted for security theater over feminist solidarity” (in Puar, 
2017: xii). In appropriating this statement, this study argues that through the phenomena of 
Homopopulism, LGBTQ (Queer) politics is ‘opt[ing] for security theatre over [Queer] 
solidarity’ (The Author).  
This chapter thus assists in addressing the research problem and answering the research 
questions through the conceptualisation of Homopopulism. The existence of Homopopulism 
is indicative of itself in that there is indeed an LGBTQ political shift occurring in Europe and 
North America in line with the resurgence of populist-nationalism. The fear-mongering 
security discourses employed by populist-nationalist leaders (fear-based sovereign leader), 
and endorsed (authorised) by many LGBTQ individuals (fearful, patriotic queer sovereign 
subjects), is indicative of a shift towards security politics and away from rights-based politics. 
The backlash against the (neo)liberal order perpetuated in/from the rise in populist-
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nationalism is not accounted for in Puar’s (2007b) concept of Homonationalism, nor is the 
associated politics of fear and contemporary historical influences. As such, Homonationalism 
requires an expansion of its original theoretical scope – Homopopulism begins that process. 
Furthermore, the contributions of Weber’s (2016a; 2016b) theory and its application form an 
integral part of this study, particularly in exposing the “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” 
figuration and the queer and/or logics of “fear-based sovereign leaders.” It does not, 
however, expose the role of the “fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject” in authorising 
“fear-based sovereign leaders” – bringing Weber’s (2016a; 2016b) theory and its applications 
into conversation with Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism through the conceptualisation of 
Homopopulism, assists in exposing this queer political collusion.  
The three figures below compiled for this study assist in demonstrating how Homopopulism 
is conceptualised. Figure 5.2 illustrates its theoretical journey through identifying the various 
theoretical contributions discussed in each chapter of this study. Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
historical journey of Homopopulism within the broader context of LGBTQ political history, 
as well as the impact of influential geopolitical developments throughout the 20th and 21st 
centuries. Figure 5.4 is a comparative table that illustrates the similarities and differences 
between the epistemological characteristics of Homonationalism and Homopopulism, 
particularly in terms of historical context, discourse, logic, subjectivity and theory. 
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Figure 5.2: Illustrating the theoretical contributions to Homopopulism 
(The Author) 
 
Figure 5.3: Graphic charting the historical shift from Homonationalism to 
Homopopulism 
Queer Logics of 
Statecraft  
(Weber, 2016a) 
Chapter 4 
Homopopulism 
Homonationalism  
(Puar, 2007b; 
2017) 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Populism as Fear 
(Wodak, 2015) 
 
Chapter 3 
Fearful 
Sovereignty & 
Patriotism (Weber, 
2011; 2016b) 
Chapter 5 
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Conclusion 
This chapter sought to demonstrate the utility of Weber’s (2016a, 2016b) and Puar’s (2007b, 
2017) theoretical and methodological frameworks through exploring their applications within 
the context of a shift in the global political scene, more specifically the rise of populist-
nationalism in Europe and North America. The chapter began with Weber’s (2016b) Queer 
IR analysis of the election of Donald Trump in 2016, noting the queer logics (through 
applying the lenses of the “queer logics of statecraft”)  appropriated by the election campaign 
as well as the sovereign (authorising) figurations that emerged as a result. Her exposure of the 
“fearful, sovereign patriotic subject” which, brought into conversation with Puar’s (2017) 
Homonationalism, informed a key theoretical contribution to this chapter as well as the 
overall study.  
Puar’s (2017) postscript to Terrorist Assemblages, which sought to contextualise 
Homonationalism within the current political scene, was also explored and critiqued. As a 
result, this chapter argued that under the current shifting political order (liberal to populist-
nationalism), Homonationalism requires an extension of scope and further theoretical 
development. The chapter sought to demonstrate that Homonationalism has shifted to 
Homopopulism through interactions among the politics of queer and/or the politics of fear. 
Furthermore, through mobilising various theoretical contributions, specifically Weber’s 
(2011, 2016a, 2016b) “queer logics of statecraft” and “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” as 
Queer IR 
Homonationalism Homopopulism 
 Post-9/11 nationalistic citizen 
 (Neo)Liberal order 
 Rights-advancement discourse 
 Nationalism  
 Melting-pot patriotism 
 Inclusionary 
 Liberal-saviour 
 US sexual exceptionalism 
 Homonormativity 
 9/11, GFC 
 Progressive 
 Assemblage 
 Fearful queer sovereign subject 
 Populist-nationalist order 
 Security discourse 
 Populism 
 Othering patriotism  
 Exclusionary 
 Nationalist-rejecter 
 Western sexual exceptionalism 
 Homonormativity 
 Orlando, ISIS, Trump 
 Regressive 
 Queer (and/or) logics 
Figure 5.4: Comparative table presenting key epistemological features of 
Homonationalism & Homopopulism  
 
(The Author) 
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well as Puar’s (2007b; 2017) Homonationalism and Wodak’s (2015) “politics as fear”, this 
chapter conceptualised Homopopulism, but goes further to argue that it is informed by a new 
queer disciplinary/regulatory (authorising) sovereign subject: the “fearful, patriotic queer 
sovereign subject.”  
The next chapter is concludes this study. It will seek to utilise the various historical, 
theoretical and conceptual explorations throughout this study in order to reaffirm the solving 
of the research problem and the answering of the research questions. More specifically, as 
demonstrate in this chapter, it will take Homopopulism to task, attributing this (queer) 
political phenomenon to the shift in LGBTQ politics in Europe and North America (from 
liberal rights-advancement discourses to populist-nationalist security discourses). It will also 
provide a brief synopsis of this study as well as highlighting its limitations and suggesting 
areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion  
Synopsis of the Study 
In order to understand the 21st century LGBTQ populist-nationalist political shift in Europe 
and North America, Chapter 2 of this study presents a modern history of LGBT and Queer 
within the context of various socio-political and academic developments. Whilst the 
Stonewall riots are considered a significant catalyst for radical LGBTQ politics in the so-
called Western world, the politics of “the homosexual” have featured significantly throughout 
modern history. This study considers a number of cases where 20th-century queer activism 
existed prior to Stonewall, more specifically during the Nazi persecutions and the homophile 
movement’s drive for decriminalisation that followed. While Chapter 2 provided the 
necessary terminological explanations, noting the complexities associated with the LGBTQ 
acronym and Queer as a deployment, it also revealed the evolving nature of LGBTQ politics 
as well as the subsequent formation of social movements and strategic modes of resistance. 
This is particularly interesting when considering how historically sensitive LGBTQ 
politicising is to the shifting dynamics of global and domestic geopolitical trends. A review 
of the development of heteronormativity and homonormativity was especially important in 
this regard, particularly in demonstrating how these concepts inform both Homonationalism 
and as a result Homopopulism. 
In acknowledging the histories of LGBTQ politics, this study seeks to review the intellectual 
development of Queer. It establishes the founding philosophy of queer as a scholarship in 
poststructuralism, particularly in the work of Michel Foucault. In order to contextualise the 
foundations that inform the theoretical deployments of this study (Queer IR and 
Homonationalism), Chapter 2 thus provided a necessary overview of Queer Theory, its 
origins and its founders, more specifically the work of Eve Sedgewick and Judith Butler in 
the early 1990s. Whilst this chapter does not specifically explore the theoretical 
underpinnings of Queer IR and Homonationalism (as is done in Chapter 4), it does contend 
that these two lenses/analytics are inherently informed by Queer Theory. 
Chapter 3 seeks to provide an overview of populism in practice and in rhetoric (as politics), 
as well as in scholarship (epistemologically). This is in order to elucidate the necessary 
historical and theoretical foundations that inform Homopopulism – the analytic with which to 
solve the research problem and answer the research questions. Defining populism has proven 
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to be difficult, as this study seeks to demonstrate the different waves, strands and 
deployments of the term over the past 60 years. In doing so, Chapter 3 establishes the 
necessary terminology that is deployed throughout this study, more specifically a comparison 
between right-wing and left-wing populism, and the acknowledgement of right-wing 
populism (populist-nationalism) as the focus point in this regard. The historical review of 21st 
century geopolitics provides the necessary contextualisation with which to understand the rise 
of populist-nationalism in this era, specifically the global events that often formed the basis 
of right-wing populist rhetoric and the subsequent politics of fear and “Othering” that 
manifested as a result.  
The development of the scholarship on populism is particularly relevant as it provides an 
opportunity to review the associated literature. This assists in understanding populism, what 
forms it can take, how it is deployed and how it has changed so dramatically in the 21st 
century. The role of the media and technology has had a significant effect in this regard, and 
so scholars have sought to expand the literature on populism in more recent years, compared 
to its original conceptualisation in the 1960s. The “fear factor” that informs much of the 
populist-nationalist rhetoric that is witnessed today is specifically explored by the work of 
Ruth Wodak. This is an important exploration, particularly in conceptualising Homopopulism 
(Chapter 5) and in understanding how queer subjects are often enticed into supporting 
populist entities – a useful contribution that assists in solving the research problem and 
answering the research questions.   
Chapter 4 establishes the theoretical and methodological core of this study. More specifically, 
the theoretical and methodological frameworks that inform Queer IR and Homonationalism 
are explored. In following on from the literature review of Queer Theory (Chapter 2), this 
study tracks the recent academic journey from Queer to Queer IR, firmly establishing Queer 
as a useful and critical lens of International Relations. In doing so, the study explores the 
work of Cynthia Weber as one of the founders of Queer IR, going further to examine her 
recent contributions to Queer IR scholarship, that is, the “queer logics of statecraft.” Through 
drawing on the work of various scholars, Weber (2016a) provides a useful theoretical lens 
through which to understand sovereignty and sexuality as well as the queer logics that inform 
many of the associated figurations. Through the “queer logics of statecraft”, the domestic and 
the international are mutually informative of each other, once again propelling queer into the 
international realm. Such lenses assist in answering the research questions, and in the solving 
of the problem statement of this study.  
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The theoretical component of this study is further informed by the work of Jasbir Puar 
(2007b) and her theorisation of Homonationalism (homonormativity and nationalism). 
Chapter 4 seeks to understand Homonationalism through exploring both its theoretical 
journey and its theoretical underpinnings with the purpose of examining notions of 
exceptionalism and queer as regulatory within the (neo)liberal post-9/11 order. When brought 
into conversation with one another, Homonationalism and the “queer logics of statecraft” 
assist in understanding 21st century LGBTQ political shifts in Europe and North America. 
It is in Chapter 5, the application chapter of this study, where the theory discussed in Chapter 
4 is applied in order to answer the research questions and address the problem statement. 
Here Cynthia Weber’s “queer logics of statecraft” is applied to the election of Donald Trump 
as US president in 2016. Through exploring the rhetoric of the Trump campaign the queer 
logics of his presidency are exposed. Furthermore, Weber (2016b) explains the process of 
how sovereign subjects authorise sovereign leaders, going further to argue that “fearful 
patriotic sovereign subjects” authorise “fear-based sovereign leaders” (such as Trump) who 
employ queer logics of statecraft.  
Jasbir Puar’s (2017) postscript, in which she seeks to contextualise Homonationalism in 
2017, is also examined. This study contends that Homonationalism cannot be contextualised 
in the present day without an expansion of its theoretical scope. This is because it was 
initially theorised against the backdrop of an established (neo)liberal order and, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, this (neo)liberal order is being disrupted by the rise of populist-
nationalism. Chapter 5 introduces a new analytic with which to understand queer as 
regulatory and what Judge (2018) calls the “co-opted queer” (Interview, Melanie Judge, 
02/07/2018). This new concept is called Homopopulism, and it emerges from bringing 
Homonationalism and “queer logics of statecraft” into conversation. As a result, the “fearful 
patriotic sovereign subject” becomes the “fearful patriotic queer sovereign subject” with the 
concept of Homopopulism assisting an understanding of the queer logics of populism, the 
fearful queer sovereign subjects that authorise it, and the fear-based sovereign leaders that 
deploy it. The existence of Homopopulism is thus indicative that there is indeed a LGBTQ 
political shift occurring in Europe and North America. 
Solving the Research Problem 
This study has sought to understand a visible LGBTQ political shift in Europe and North 
America in line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in these historically liberal democratic 
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regions. It notes that populist-nationalism represents a significant threat to LGBTQ rights 
advancement, particularly in that rights advancements remains low on the domestic and 
foreign agendas of many right-wing political ideological dispensations. This study 
accordingly notes with interest the growing support for populist-nationalist sentiments (both 
in rhetoric and electorally) from segments of the LGBTQ community. In the light of the 
recent wave of 2016 and 2017 national elections in Europe and North America, more 
LGBTQ-identifying individuals are visibly aligning themselves politically with, and 
participating (as candidates and activists) in the campaigns of, populist-nationalist entities. 
Furthermore, many populist-nationalist entities are becoming equally receptive to LGBTQ 
support, demonstrating an unconventional association with LGBTQ “interests”, particularly 
through a (populist) security rhetoric. This is evident when examining the campaigns of 
populist-nationalist entities in the USA, France, Holland and Germany, where issues around 
immigration, security and surveillance have been fused with the protection of marginalised 
groups, and in this case, the LGBTQ community.  
As such, through employing the lenses of Queer IR, Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of 
statecraft” and Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism, this study has sought to solve the research 
problem and answer the research questions by understanding what seems to be an 
unconventional and counter-intuitive political phenomenon. Through bringing the above 
theories and concepts into conversation, this study has conceptualised what it calls a political 
and historical shift in European and North American LGBTQ politics, that is, from 
Homonationalism (post-9/11) to Homopopulism (post-Orlando/ISIS). The theorisation of 
Homopopulism thus assists in understanding the dynamics associated with this shift, 
particularly the inclusion of the politics of fear against the backdrop of a declining post-
WWII liberal democratic internationalist global order. Why is this happening? Through 
Homopopulism populist-nationalist leaders are employing queer logics in order to gain a 
broad range of electoral support, including that of the LGBTQ community. Furthermore, 
members of the LGBTQ community are being bullied/enticed through fear-based politics to 
support populist-nationalist political entities. Thus the “fearful, patriotic queer sovereign 
subject” is successfully authorising the “fear-sovereign leader”, who is employing queer 
logics in line with their populist strategies.  
These collusions predominantly serve the interests of the populist-nationalist entities as their 
unconventional “interests” in the LGBTQ community are quickly disbanded once they 
achieve electoral success. The emergence of Homopopulism thus represents a disruption of 
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historically conventional (rights-advancement) LGBTQ politics in the 21st century. To what 
extent is this happening? As demonstrated throughout this study, its prominence is inherently 
global, as are the consequences of its inception. 
Answering the Research Questions 
The study’s primary research question is: Is there an LGBTQ political shift taking place in 
line with a populist-nationalist resurgence in Europe and North America? 
There is a geopolitical shift occurring in Europe and North America that is marked by a 
resurgence in populist-nationalist politics. This is particularly evident when examining the 
recent wave of national elections that took place across these historically mature liberal 
democratic regions over the past three years – populist-nationalist entities have made 
significant electoral inroads and their anti-(neo)liberal, anti-establishment rhetoric is being 
increasingly accepted and endorsed by a diverse range of people, marginalised communities 
included.  
Whilst the implications for the LGBTQ community are evident, particularly in the 
traditionally anti-LGBTQ sentiment of these exclusive right-wing political entities, many 
LGBTQ individuals are complicit in this populist-nationalist resurgence. This has been 
exposed through selective election polling, but more importantly it is visible through the 
active participation of openly LGBTQ individuals in the campaigns (as candidates, activists 
and voters) of populist-nationalist political entities (fearful, patriotic queer sovereign subject). 
Furthermore, many populist-nationalist entities are increasingly (unconventionally) receptive 
to LGBTQ political support and, as witnessed in the 2016 and 2017 elections in the US, 
France, Holland and Germany, many populist political leaders are claiming (queer logics) to 
protect LGBTQ “interests” in the name of security (fear-based sovereign leader). 
As such, a LGBTQ political shift is indeed occurring in line with the populist-nationalist 
resurgence in Europe and North America. The conceptualisation of Homopopulism assists in 
understanding this political phenomenon, and while it is assumed that many LGBTQ 
individuals historically do not endorse populist-nationalist sentiments (which can often be the 
case), the past three years have demonstrated that there are in fact many who do. While there 
are noted complexities associated with universalising an entire LGBTQ political formation, 
traditional LGBTQ political alignments are being disrupted by Homopopulism.  For the 
benefit of successful LGBTQ resistance, coalition-building and solidarity, these collusive 
disruptions are exposed through conducting this study and answering this research question.  
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The secondary research questions are addressed below. 
1. Does this potential shift entail a move towards a (populist) fear-based prioritisation of 
security interests over (liberal) LGBTQ rights advancement?  
This study has established that a LGBTQ political shift has taken place in Europe and North 
America. It has further established that this political shift is in line with a populist-nationalist 
resurgence as a backlash to the post-WWII (neo)liberal order. Moreover, it has noted the 
ways in which the politics of fear has influenced this shift, specifically the ways in which a 
security-based rhetoric has been deployed in order to entice/bully LGBTQ individuals. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, this is conceptualised as Homopopulism and it entails a prioritisation 
of security over LGBTQ rights advancement. This is exposed in how anti-immigration and 
securitisation rhetoric is deployed, and subsequently endorsed, in favour of protecting 
LGBTQ subjects and the so-called “Western values” that reject the anti-LGBTQ, immigrant, 
non-secular, Other.  
This study contends that an LGBTQ political shift in Europe and North America does entail a 
move towards a (populist) fear-based prioritisation of security interests over (liberal) LGBTQ 
rights advancement.  
2. Does Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism have the theoretical scope to identify, 
describe and explain queer politics in the context of this potential shift?   
This study has established that Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) concept of Homonationalism does have 
the theoretical scope to identify, describe and explain a historical and political shift in queer 
politics in a post-9/11 US context. Importantly, Homonationalism introduces the idea of 
queer collusions with systems of hierarchy and power. This is particularly in line with the 
melting-pot patriotism and the (neo)liberal hegemony that existed in 2007 when her ground-
breaking book Terrorist Assemblages was written and published.  
This study does, however, contend that Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism requires an 
expansion of its theoretical scope within the context of new historical developments (GFC, 
Orlando/ISIS) and a subsequent backlash against the (neo)liberal hegemony that has resulted 
in/from the resurgence of populist-nationalism in Europe and North America. As such, this 
study finds that Jasbir Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism does not have the full theoretical 
scope to identify, describe and explain queer politics in the context of the political shift 
outlined in the primary research question.  As a result, it conceptualises Homopopulism in 
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order to understand queer collusions within the context of a rising populist-nationalist 
hegemony and associated Othering patriotism.  
3. Does Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft” assist in identifying, 
describing and explaining the collusions and/or resistances that may form from this 
potential shift?   
This study has established that Cynthia Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft” assists in 
identifying, describing and explaining how populist-nationalist leaders employ queer logics, 
as a populist strategy in order to entice/bully support. Weber’s (2016a; 2016b) “queer logics 
of statecraft” does expose how, in the case of Donald Trump’s election, the (white, Christian, 
American) “fearful, patriotic sovereign subject” is implicated in authorising the “fear-based 
sovereign leader.”  Whilst this study resolves that this is an important revelation in the 
context of a populist-nationalist resurgence, it finds that Weber’s (2016a; 2016b) theory and 
its application fall short in explaining how the queer subject is figured as an authorising 
sovereign subject. This study therefore brings Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism and Weber’s 
(2016a; 2016b) “queer logics of statecraft” into conversation in order to expose the “fearful, 
patriotic queer sovereign subject” through the conceptualisation of Homopopulism. This 
study consequently affirms that Weber’s (2016a) “queer logics of statecraft” does assist in 
identifying, describing and explaining collusions and/or resistances within the context of a 
populist-nationalist resurgence, but not queer collusions and/or resistances without the 
contributions of Puar’s (2007b) Homonationalism. 
Areas for Future Research 
It is clear that Queer International Relations (IR) has developed significantly as a theoretical 
force in International Relations. Throughout this study, its utility has been demonstrated, 
particularly in the way it has so successfully assisted in the understanding of various themes, 
including state and nation formation, global political economy, war and security, power and 
hierarchy, and LGBTQ politics, among others. The same can be said about Homonationalism. 
However, the idea of Queer lenses in International Relations is relatively new and there is 
ample room for further theoretical and methodological development. The conceptualisation 
of Homopopulism was indeed the result of bringing Queer IR theories into conversation in 
order supplement and complement one another, so as to contribute to its theoretical journey. 
That journey is, however, far from complete, and in considering Queer resistance to 
boundary, binary, stability and conformity, it is possible that that theoretical journey may 
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never be complete. And Queer would certainly want it that way.  This implies that the field of 
Queer IR is boundless and in constant need of disruption in order to keep the Queer alive.  
In many ways Homopopulism shares the journey of its theoretical progenitor. Its novelty is 
unquestionable; however, its utility has yet to be critiqued. It is the result of the start of a new 
conversation, and it is deployed with purpose of encouraging further discussion. This study 
invites further contributions to and disruptions of Homopopulism in subsequent research. It 
further invites the application of the concept to various case studies, histories, contexts, 
futures and geographic locations. It is worth noting that this study did not explore cases in 
Africa, Asia, South America and the Middle East, hence there is an essential need to bring 
Queer IR lenses, and Queer lenses more broadly, to the subaltern world. Furthermore, the 
global implications of Homopopulism in Europe and North America, specifically for queer 
subjects around the world, require further exploration, as do new modes of resistance. 
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